Operation Market Garden, XXX Corps

Operation Garden

During the meeting between Montgomery and Browning in the former’s caravan at 21^st Army Group headquarters on September 9^th, 1944, Montgomery is said to have declared the operation achievable in two days, and Browning to have suggested that the airborne force could hold for four.

In a pre-operation discussion, General Dempsey said he expected to reach Arnhem by D+2. No latest date was set for a junction between XXX Corps and the 1^st Airborne Division, and it is possible that dates were never discussed with Horrocks.

After receiving his orders, Horrocks waits four days to reveal Garden officially to his subordinate commanders, though the details may have gone out a day earlier through 30 Corps’ Operation Instructions Number 24, issued on September 15^th, 1944. Perhaps he is waiting on Montgomery’s formal authorisation, which does not come until September 14^th, 1944, as part of a wide-ranging directive.

On September 15^th, 1944 its commanding officer personally signs a statement of future operations. The intention, it reads, is to reach the area north of Eindhoven before dark on September 17^th, in readiness to advance at first light the next day, September 18^th. He signs the same intention again the day after. So while the forty-eight-hour relief deadline is indeed never issued outright, it plainly comes from the top, and, more tellingly, reaches and is accepted by nearly every party and level of command in Market Garden.

On Saturday, September 16^th, 1944, the senior commanders of the Guards Armoured, 43^rd and 50^th Infantry Divisions, along with their attached units and formations, are introduced to their parts in Operation Garden. The start is a large-scale briefing at 11:00 in the cinema at Bourg Leopold. The briefing is given in person by the commander of XXX Corps, Lieutenant-General Brian Horrocks. Horrocks looks unwell. Being wounded in a Luftwaffe strafing attack near Bizerte on June 24^th, 1943, he needed several operations and over a year to recover. During convalescence he asked Chief of the Imperial General Staff Sir Alan Brooke for another corps command, helped by his standing as a Montgomery protégé from the 1940 Dunkirk retreat. He got XXX Corps in early August 1944, but by month’s end was still suffering incapacitating bouts of fever, which may explain the casualness of his Garden preparations. Despite his health issues, Horrocks strides theatrically down the aisle, climbs onto the stage, and opens with his much-quoted remark that this is a tale the men will tell their grandchildren, who will be mightily bored by it.

Horrocks then lays out the concept of Market Garden with a large map board. The airborne objectives at Eindhoven, Nijmegen and Arnhem are marked in violet tape, and 30 Corps’ own role in black arrows running between them. The Guards Armoured Division, with the Irish Guards Group at its head, is to spearhead the breakout from the Neerpelt bridgehead and lead the advance north. The 43rd Division is to follow, bringing the equipment needed to span the wide Dutch rivers and canals, and the 9,000 engineers to erect it. This draws not only on 30 Corps and its three divisions but also on 21^st Army Group’s Bridge Column, with a further 2,000 truckloads of equipment gathered from across the theatre. Together this is enough to bridge the Wilhelmina Canal, the Maas-Waal Canal, and the Rivers Waal and Lower Rhine. The additional truckloads suffice to resupply the formation- and division-level bridging units completely, and to throw pontoon bridges over every major water obstacle besides. Should any of the great bridges be destroyed before the airborne troops can seize them, the Guards Armoured Division is to peel off to the flanks. The 43rd Division would then move up and cover the engineers at their work. Once the Lower Rhine is crossed, the 43rd Division is to take the point, pressing on from Arnhem across the River Ijssel to Deventer and Zutphen, with the 50th Division following as the Corps’ reserve. Horrocks stresses that speed is vital. He repeats the priority Montgomery had set at their meeting on September 12th, 1944, and states that Arnhem must be reached within forty-eight hours if at all possible. By any measure the schedule is tight. To meet it, the ground advance must reach Eindhoven by about 17:00 on Sunday, September 17^th, 1944, Veghel by midnight, Grave by midday on Monday, September 18^th, 1944, Nijmegen by 18:00, and finally Arnhem by 15:00 on Tuesday, September 19^th, 1944.

Horrocks spoke for an hour. Details may also have gone out to subordinate formations beforehand, since Lieutenant Wilson and the 3^rd Irish Guards appear to be briefed on their part in Operation Garden while the Bourg Leopold gathering is still in progress. The briefing sets the Irish Guards Group at the very forefront of the attack.

As stated earlier, the opening attack alone means gathering and marshalling something like 20,000 assorted vehicles. What suggests that XXX Corps is not fully ready to launch Garden on September 17^th, 1944. Much of that seems to stem from the fighting across the Albert and Meuse-Escaut Canals, yet Horrocks’s tardiness may have squandered valuable preparation time as well. The root of the trouble is probably his physical state.

Operation Garden

The ground operation for XXX Corps begins at a key strategic point: the bridge over the Scheldt-Meuse Canal at Lommel, known as Joe’s Bridge. This bridge was captured on September 10^th, 1944, by No. 1 Squadron of the 3^rd Battalion, Irish Guards, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel John Ormsby Evelyn Vandeleur. XXX Corps, is to advance through the designated Corridor created by the 101^st Airborne Division, the 82^nd Airborne Division, the 1^st Airborne Division and the 1^st Polish Independent Parachute Brigade, passing through Eindhoven, Son, Sint-Oedenrode, Veghel, Uden, Grave, Nijmegen, Elst, Arnhem, and ultimately reaching Apeldoorn. According to the marching orders, this route will allow XXX Corps to secure key areas held by the enemy, ensuring contact with the three airborne divisions positioned at critical points along the way. These divisions are tasked with holding strategic locations, facilitating the Corps’ progression and the success of the operation.

The operation requires XXX Corps to break out from their bridgehead over the Maas-Scheldt Canal, starting at Joe’s Bridge near Lommel. Their advance follows a carefully planned route cleared by airborne forces, passing through key towns such as Eindhoven, Sint-Oedenrode, Veghel, Uden, Grave, Nijmegen, and ultimately Arnhem. The timeline for the advance is tightly coordinated. By 17:00 hours on the first day, XXX Corps is expected to reach Eindhoven, with the goal of arriving in Veghel by midnight. On the second day, they aim to reach Grave by 12:00 hours and Nijmegen by 18:00 hours. The final objective is to arrive in Arnhem by 15:00 hours on the third day.

According to the plan, XXX Corps should make contact with the 101^st Airborne Division by the end of the first day, link up with the 82^nd Airborne Division on the second day, and reach the 1^st Airborne Division and the 1^st Polish Independent Parachyte Brigade in Arnhem by the fourth day at the latest. Once this link-up is achieved, the airborne divisions will support XXX Corps in breaking out from the Arnhem area, driving the operation forward. This carefully coordinated effort is vital for the overall success of the mission, with each milestone crucial to ensuring the rapid progression through enemy territory.

XXX Corps is to advance along a narrow two-lane road known as Highway 69. The Corps consists of several key units: the 2^nd Household Cavalry Regiment, led by Lieutenant Colonel Henry Abel Smith; the Guards Armoured Division, commanded by Brigadier Allan Henry Shafto Adair; the 43^rd (Wessex) Infantry Division, under Lieutenant General Gwilym Ivor Thomas; the 8^th Independent Armoured Brigade, headed by Brigadier George Erroll Prior-Palmer; the 50^th (Northumbrian) Infantry Division, led by Major General Douglas Alexander Henry Graham; and the Royal Netherlands Motorised Brigade “Prinses Irene”, commanded by Colonel Albert Cornelis de Ruyter van Steveninck.

German Forces

The German units defending the Neerpelt bridgehead are have big problems to get organised. Kampfgruppe Walther suffered considerable loss in the failed counterattack of September 14^th, 1944, and stays fairly passive thereafter. On the evening of September 16^th the headquarters of the 1. Fallschirmjäger-Armee orders Oberst Walther to resume attacking the bridgehead. Unwilling to spend his strength with an assault clearly imminent, Walther compromises and authorises a few local probes.

The sector west of the Hasselt–Eindhoven road falls to Fallschirmjäger-Regiment 6 under Oberstleutnant Friedrich von der Heydte. East of the road, two battalions drawn from SS-Panzergrenadier-Regiment 19 and SS-Panzergrenadier-Regiment 21 hold the line under Hauptsturmführer Doctor Karl Segler and Hauptsturmführer Friedrich Richter. These SS units belong to Kampfgruppe Heinke, sent south by the II. SS-Panzerkorps (Second SS Armoured Corps) on September 10^th. The central sector straddles the Eindhoven road and thus the boundary between the Fallschirmjäger and the SS. It goes to Fallschirmjäger-Ausbildungs-Regiment Hoffmann, a replacement training unit under Oberstleutnant Helmuth von Hoffmann, and to Luftwaffe-Strafbataillon 6, a penal unit brought in from Italy.

Their titles flatter them. Both Fallschirmjäger-Ausbildungs-Regiment Hoffmann and Luftwaffe-Strafbataillon 6 contain a high proportion of partly trained Luftwaffe ground personnel. The force blocking the road therefore has to be stiffened with up to a company of combat engineers from SS-Panzer-Pionier-Abteilung 10. The precaution proves wise. On September 16^th British artillery kills the commander of Luftwaffe-Strafbataillon 6, a Major Veith, along with his adjutant. At about the same time the I. Bataillon of Fallschirmjäger-Ausbildungs-Regiment Hoffmann, under Major Helmut Kerutt, moves back into a reserve position behind the main line.

Kerutt’s battalion is joined there by the regimental anti-tank company under a Hauptmann Brockes, with eight or possibly nine towed guns. These may be 75-millimetre PaK 40 pieces, though some sources describe them instead as captured Soviet guns refurbished for German service as the 7.62 PaK 36(r). Whatever their origin, Brockes has no all-terrain prime movers able to shift them across the boggy ground flanking the road. His crews must therefore site them wherever wheeled vehicles and muscle power can reach, which confines them to positions a few metres off the main road at best.

Kerutt also prepares a tank ambush as a backstop, 2,500 metres behind the front line, manned by thirty men of his headquarters defence platoon. It consists of slit trenches with overhead cover, spaced along both sides of the road, for men carrying disposable Panzerfaust rocket launchers. Machine-gun positions further out support them. Their task is to shield the Panzerfaust teams from Allied infantry and to deal with any tank crews trying to bail out.

All in all, the Germans can muster about ten understrength infantry battalions against any advance out of the bridgehead. Supporting them are a handful of towed anti-tank guns and roughly a dozen Jagdpanzer IV tank destroyers of SS-Panzerjäger-Abteilung 10, under Hauptsturmführer Franz Roestel. These are billeted at Borkel-en-Schaft, a village in wooded country about halfway between the front line and Eindhoven, just east of the Hasselt–Eindhoven road.

Final Preperations

On September 13^th, 1944, the Guards Armoured Division’s tanks have been withdrawn south of the Meuse-Escaut Canal. The division’s infantry has defended the Neerpelt bridgehead against the counterattack of Kampfgruppe Walther on September 14^th, and the 50^th Infantry Division relieves them the next day. The 5^th Guards Armoured Brigade then spends two days on routine maintenance before turning to Garden on September 16^th. Unit briefings for Garden are complete by September 16^th, yet some Guardsmen are still making final preparations as the first lift flies over southern and eastern England. The 3^rd Irish Guards spend the morning of September 17^th checking weapons and loading vehicles. Lieutenant Brian Wilson’s platoon truck is so crammed, with everything from spare ammunition to blankets lashed to the roof, that he reckons it cannot take another toothpick. His platoon boards its troop-carrying vehicles with the rest of No. 2 Company at midday and moves off towards the Meuse-Escaut Canal and the start line.

This unhurried start follows from XXX Corps setting H-Hour for Garden at 14:30. The ground advance will therefore not begin until the entire first lift is down. That sacrifices surprise and, more seriously, several hours of daylight. At Arnhem that day the sun rises at 06:13 and sets at 18:47. A mid-afternoon start also strains an already tight timetable, which calls for Eindhoven by about 17:00 the same day. The leading elements must cover some twenty-seven kilometres in roughly two and a half hours. For tracked vehicles making thirty-two kilometres per hour on an unopposed road march, that is feasible. Against opposition, in enemy country, it is optimistic. The Germans masking the bridgehead know something is coming. The 719. Infanterie-Division reports continuous vehicle movement behind the Albert Canal through the night of September 15^th and 16^th. Kampfgruppen Richter and Walther report lights and heavy vehicles on the Hechtel–Valkenswaard road. Generalleutnant Kurt Chill predicts a major attack once the British have finished concentrating armour in the bridgehead.

The Irish Guards Group is formed up and ready by 13:15, having had confirmation at 12:00. Any friction lies further back. Operation Garden means marshalling 20,000 assorted vehicles on a restricted road network, on a narrow frontage, with all the traffic control that implies. The Guards Armoured Division alone deploys 3,124 vehicles for the initial attack. Every constituent and attached unit except the 5^th Guards Armoured Brigade is forbidden to leave its pre-battle harbour without explicit authority from Division Headquarters.

The 9,000-strong bridging train may pose the hardest problem, drawn as it is from across the North-West European theatre. Besides the organic and divisional engineer assets of XXX Corps, it includes four Army-level formations, two of them Canadian, two General Headquarters formations and two Mechanical Equipment Platoons. Some are still arriving around Bourg Leopold as Garden begins. The 23^rd Field Company, Royal Canadian Engineers, reaches the area only at 03:00 on September 17^th, after a two-day drive of some 400 kilometres from Saint-Omer in the Pas de Calais. It does not join the other Canadian units until 10:40, near Hechtel. Even so, the engineers assemble enough material to bridge every water obstacle on the route twice over, with a further 2,000 truckloads cached at Bourg Leopold, where they first concentrate. The train is divided into twenty columns, each organised for particular contingencies and given a codename and convoy serial, so that it can be called north through the traffic control system as required.

Whatever its timings, the concept behind the XXX Corps plan is simple enough. The Guards Armoured Division will lead the advance north, carrying six days’ rations, each vehicle holding enough extra fuel for a further 400 kilometres once its tanks run dry. The 43^rd Division will follow with the bridging train. Should any major bridge be destroyed before the airborne troops can seize it, the Guards are to move out and hold the flanks of the corridor while the 43rd covers the bridging operation, after which the Guards will press on. Once the Guards reach Arnhem, the 43^rd Infantry Division is to take over, cross the River Ijssel and drive on to Deventer and Zutphen, with the 50^th Infantry Division following as corps reserve.

The break-out from Neerpelt is to run along the Hasselt–Eindhoven highway, preceeds by a preparatory barrage. Ten field and three medium regiments of the Royal Artillery fire it, supported by a heavy battery and a heavy anti-aircraft regiment in the ground role, some 350 guns in all. It opens at 13:55 with counter-battery fire from every gun until 14:15. The ten field regiments then concentrate on the approaches to Valkenswaard. At 14:25 the heavy mortars of the 50th Infantry Division thicken the fire with a ten-minute concentration on known enemy positions. Two minutes later the field regiments shift again, to a line 900 metres ahead of the start line and extending 900 metres either side of the axis of advance. The barrage stands there for two minutes until 14:30, then creeps forward at 180 metres a minute until 14:50. Fire support then passes to eleven squadrons of Hawker Typhoon fighter-bombers of the Royal Air Force’s Second Tactical Air Force. Specialist Royal Air Force forward air control teams, codenamed Tentacles, direct them. These link the ground units to the aircraft through radio-equipped control cars travelling with the advance, co-ordinated by Royal Air Force Forward Control Posts attached to corps headquarters. For the opening phase the Guards Armoured Division appears to have three Tentacles, one with the 5^th Guards Armoured Brigade, one with 32^nd Guards Brigade and one with Division Headquarters, while XXX Corps headquarters keeps a single co-ordinating Forward Control Post.

The break-out itself falls to the 5^th Guards Armoured Brigade. Gwatkin passes the initial assault to the tanks and infantry of the Irish Guards Group, made up of the 2nd and 3rd Irish Guards. Their first objective is Valkenswaard, about eleven kilometres from the start line. Reaching it means crossing the River Dommel, which cuts the highway roughly 1.6 kilometres short of the town. Lieutenant A. R. J. Buchanan-Jardine of the 2^nd Household Cavalry has confirmed by reconnaissance on September 11^th that the bridge stands. The Shermans of No. 3 Squadron, 2^nd Irish Guards, are therefore to seize it, with two troops of the 2nd Household Cavalry and a reconnaissance party of 14 Field Squadron, Royal Engineers, bringing a heavy bulldozer against contingencies. Nos. 1 and 2 Squadrons are to follow in that order, carrying Nos. 1 and 3 Companies of the 3rd Irish Guards on their decks, with No. 2 Company in the rear in its own troop-carrying vehicles.

Once No. 3 Squadron has the Dommel bridge, the rest of the group is to pass through, clear Valkenswaard and hand it to the 1st Dorsets and the 2nd Devonshires, detached from 231^st Infantry Brigade of the 50^th Infantry Division for the opening phase. The Irish Guards Group will then push on to Eindhoven and meet the 101^st Airborne Division at the Wilhelmina Canal crossings north of the city. Beyond Valkenswaard the advance is to split. The 5^th Guards Armoured Brigade will continue north along the main highway through Aalst and enter Eindhoven from the south, while 32^nd Guards Brigade loops right along minor roads to come in from the east. Both are to meet the American airborne troops by nightfall, at about 19:30.

September 17th, 1944

September 18th, 1944

September 19th, 1944

September 20th, 1944

September 21st, 1944

September 22nd, 1944

September 23rd, 1944

September 24th, 1944

September 25th, 1944

September 26th, 1944

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