Operation Market Garden

Logistics

In August 1944, following the successful Allied breakout from Normandy and the encirclement of German forces in the Falaise Pocket, the Allied armies aggressively pursue the retreating German forces, driving them out of most of France and Belgium.

Unknown to the Germans, by late August, the Allied advance is hampered by a severe shortage of gasoline, forcing several divisions to pause and resupply. Eisenhower faces the daunting task of managing the logistical demands of the various Allied armies. While fuel supplies are available in the improvised ports of Normandy, the challenge lies in transporting them across the long distances to the front lines in Belgium and northern France. This fuel is transported in five-gallon jerry cans, hauled by trucks from Normandy in an operation known as the Red Ball Express. The solution to these logistical difficulties appears to be the capture of a major port closer to the advancing armies.

On September 4^th, 1944, Field Marshal Montgomery’s forces successfully capture the port of Antwerp in Belgium almost intact, but the Scheldt Estuary, leading to the port, remains under German control. Despite the strategic importance of Antwerp, neither Eisenhower nor Montgomery initially prioritises opening the port, delaying its use by Allied supply ships until November 28^th, 1944, after the Battle of the Scheldt.

Strategies

General Eisenhower advocates for a “broad front strategy,” wherein Montgomery’s forces in Belgium and general Bradley’s forces in France advance simultaneously along a wide front into Germany. Montgomery and General George S. Patton, Bradley’s aggressive subordinate, both favor a concentrated “single thrust” into Germany, but each wants to lead it. Montgomery argues that a focused and powerful drive across the Rhine into Germany’s heart, supported by all available Allied resources, is the best strategy. This would, however, reduce Bradley’s American forces to a more static role. Patton, on the other hand, asserts that with enough gasoline, he could be in Germany within days. However, war planners find both proposals tactically and logistically unrealistic.

Although Eisenhower agrees that Montgomery’s advance towards the Ruhr should take precedence, he insists that it is also important to keep Patton advancing. Montgomery counters that with the deteriorating supply situation, he cannot reach the Ruhr unless all resources are concentrated on one thrust, preferably towards Berlin. Initially, Montgomery proposes Operation Comet, a limited airborne operation aimed at capturing bridges on the way to the Rhine, but poor weather and increased German resistance force him to cancel the plan by September 10^th, 1944. Operation Comet is in the line of many planned airborne operations before. Between June 1944 and Market Garden at least 15 airborne operations were planned.

1. Operation Comet
2. Operation Tuxedo
3. Operation Wastage
4. Reinforcement of the U.S. 82^nd Airborne Division June 7^th, 1944 to June 10^th, 1944
5. Operation Wild Oats
6. Operation Beneficiary
7. Operation Swordhilt
8. Operation Hands-Up
9. Operation Transfigure
10. Operation Boxer
11. Operation Axehead
12. Operation Linnet
13. Operation Linnet II
14. Operation Infatuate
15. Operation Comet

Most of them became unnecessary simply because the fast Allied advance had already passed the traget area for the planned airborne operation.

Dolle Dinsdag

In the days before Dolle Dinsdag (Mad Tuesday), the Allied advance towards the Netherlands looks unstoppable. The German front seems to collapse. Brussels is liberated on September 3^rd, 1944. A day later, Antwerp is recaptured from the Germans. Optimists project the momentum forward. At this pace, they reckon, Rotterdam could fall on September 5^th, and Amsterdam and Utrecht on September 6^th. The rest of the country would surely follow within days. In the south, people can already hear the guns.

Rumour feeds on rumour. Soon many insist that several southern towns are already free. In Rotterdam, word has it the Allies stand at Moerdijk. In Amsterdam, they are said to have reached Rotterdam and Den Haag. A British radio bulletin hardens the belief, reporting that Breda has been liberated.

On September 4^th, 1944, Radio Oranje carries a speech by minister-presidentPieter Sjoerds Gerbrandy. He tells listeners that Allied forces have crossed the Dutch frontier and are pressing north. Tellingly, he had altered the draft himself. Where it first said the armies were approaching, he changed the words to say they had already crossed.

In the broadcast, Gerbrandy urges his countrymen to give the liberators the warm and dignified welcome they deserve. The hour of liberation has struck, he declares. Soon the beloved Queen will return. He gives heartfelt thanks to God for deliverance from great and bitter hardship. There will be joy, he says, yet grief too for the fallen. He remembers the compatriots still suffering under the enemy in the Dutch East Indies. Much sorrow remains; many have died and many more will. A final effort is needed, above all from public officials, to forestall the crimes the Germans may commit in their last moments. All resistance groups now form a single organisation under international law. These are historic days, he tells them, and posterity will judge every man and woman by their conduct. He calls for order, discipline, and obedience to the appointed leaders. The Netherlands is rising again, he ends, and may it rise in full greatness.

The following day, Tuesday, September 5^th, 1944, the underground paper Het dagelijks nieuws draws on the broadcast and puts out a liberation edition.

Many Dutch people greet the news with celebration. Out come the flags and the orange banners of the House of Orange. Workplaces empty as staff pour into the streets to await the liberators. The mood terrifies the occupier. German soldiers and members of the Nationaal-Socialistische Beweging (National Socialist Movement) panic. Fearing reprisal, they burn their records, gather their belongings, and set out for the supposed safety of Germany. Around forty trains are pressed into service to move the movement’s families eastward. Most of its members make first for the Lüneburger Heide (Lüneburg Heath).

Many Amsterdam members travel by night train to Lemmer. From there they are sent on to Kamp Westerbork (Camp Westerbork). Only two days earlier, the camp’s final transport to Auschwitz had left. The plan is a short stay before onward transfer to Germany by rail.

The movement’s leader, Anton Mussert, chooses the Bellinckhof, a country house near Almelo. From there he too can slip quickly across the German border if he must.

For some, the flight ends in tragedy. On September 6^th, a train of women and children of party members leaves Amsterdam for Germany. They are running from the news of the Allied advance. Near Diemen, Allied fighter aircraft strafe the carriages. Around thirty people are killed and many gravely hurt.

What the Dutch cannot know is how thin the Allied spearhead really is. The force at the front is far too small to free the whole country. The main body still lies in France. The troops who reached Antwerp have cleared only a narrow corridor through Belgium. Supply is the deeper trouble. The lines have stretched too far, and they hang on a single artificial harbour, because the Germans hold the fortified French ports. In truth, the Allies have not even reached the Dutch border. Occupied ground lies on either flank, and the leading units risk being cut off. There are signs that the Germans are regrouping. So the Allied command will not gamble on a further thrust north. Its main prize, Antwerp, is already in hand. The false report from Breda reflects a deeper confusion. The advance has been so swift that headquarters barely knows where its own men are. Only some days later do Allied reconnaissance patrols cross the frontier. Maastricht falls on September 14th, 1944, the first major Dutch city to be freed.

Germans Back in Control

On September 4^th, 1944, Hitler relieves Field Marshal Walter Model of his temporary command in the west, replacing him with Gerd von Rundstedt. However, Model remains the commander of Army Group B. Despite his experience, Model is dissatisfied with his dual role, preferring to be at the front with his troops rather than dealing with the administrative burdens of overall command.

Model faces a dire strategic situation, as his forces have been split in two by the advancing Allies. The 15. Armee, under General Gustav-Adolf von Zangen, is trapped south of the Westerschelde after retreating from the coast and is attempting to escape to North Brabant via Walcheren and Zuid-Beveland. Meanwhile, the 7. Armee has been pushed back by American forces to Aachen and Maastricht. A 120-kilometres gap now exists between these two armies, with no functioning combat units remaining, only scattered groups of German soldiers fleeing north and east. Model fears that the British 2^nd Army, positioned at the Dutch border, will exploit this gap. On September 4^th, 1944, nothing could have prevented the British from occupying the entire area up to the Maas. Known for his ability to improvise defences on the Eastern Front, Model now faces the daunting task of halting this chaotic retreat. He issues an order to stop the withdrawal, but it reaches only a few.

Lieutenant General Kurt Chill receives Model’s order. Having lost almost the entire 85. Infantrie Division in the fighting, Chill is ordered to regroup the remnants and retreat to Germany. However, upon witnessing the chaotic retreat and reading Model’s directive, Chill decides to ignore his original orders. After gathering his troops, he orders them to dig in along the Albert Canal and places officers at the bridges to stop the fleeing soldiers. Troops ranging from artillerymen to cooks are now repurposed to defend the Albert Canal. Chill’s actions help stabilize the situation in this area, and similar measures are taken across the entire western front. By the second and third weeks of September, over 150,000 German soldiers who had fled are recaptured and reintegrated into the military structure.

Also on September 4^th, 1944, Hitler orders General Kurt Student to form the 1. Fallschirm-Armee to close the gap between Antwerp and Maastricht. Student is given 4,000 trained Fallschirmjäger but must also rely on older, inexperienced men, unemployed Luftwaffe personnel, sailors, and anti-aircraft gunners. He also receives twenty-five pieces of mechanised artillery. Student immediately sends his paratroopers ahead, and within twenty-four hours, they reach the Albert Canal. Upon surveying the area, Student realises that Chill has performed a near-miracle in stabilising the front. Student establishes his headquarters in Vught, Noord Brabant, commanding not only the 85. Infantrie Division but also the 7. Fallschirmjäger Division, the 719. Infantrie Division, and the 176. Infantrie Division.

Student’s army receives unexpected reinforcement when Von Zangen successfully leads the 15. Armee across the Westerschelde using various vessels, advancing through Zuid-Beveland into North Brabant. The gap between Model’s two armies begins to close, resolving one of his most pressing problems. Despite these efforts, the defence of the Albert Canal remains weak.

Lining up for Operation Garden.

Responsible for capturing the Albert Canal bridges is the Guards Armoured Division who keeps up its drive north. Its tanks are over the Albert Canal at Beeringen by September 7^th, 1944. The three villages beyond, Bourg Leopold, Heppen and Hechtel, take five more days to clear. They lie roughly 11 kilometres short of the Meuse-Escaut Canal, the next water barrier. Hechtel is still contested when the Grenadier Guards Group pushes on northward on Saturday, September 9^th, 1944. Stubborn German defence exacts a price. One who falls is Lieutenant Sir Howard Frederick Frank, Second Baronet of Withyham, aged twenty-one, struck down when a hit knocks out his tank.

The Irish Guards Group is drawn in too. The 3^rd Irish Guards pass the Beeringen bridgehead to the 11^th Armoured Division at 17:30 on Friday, September 8^th, 1944. They then shift at dusk to Helchteren. The night is spent short of the town, beside tanks of the Regiment’s 2^nd Battalion. That pause lays bare a lesson. Pairing a tank unit and an infantry one by cap badge does not make them fight as one. The Division, for all its Normandy record, has not mastered the difference. A 3^rd Irish Guards company lies out ahead of the 2^nd Irish Guards tanks. The crews keep to habit regardless, hosing .30 machine-gun fire into every noise or stir in the black ahead. One company headquarters ends up trapped in its farmhouse. To bring tank support against a German probe, one of its platoon commanders must sprint through his own side’s fire. The two days, September 8^th and 9^th, 1944, cost the 3rd Irish Guards nine dead and eighteen wounded. The three officers among the dead fall that morning at Beeringen. Whether the tanks account for any of the others cannot be said.

The training gap shows itself once more the day after. Orders at 14:00 send the 3^rd Irish Guards to Exel, three to five kilometres north-east of Hechtel. This time the men perch on the 2nd Battalion’s tanks rather than their own troop-carriers. Lieutenant Brian Wilson, who leads a platoon in the 3^rd Battalion’s 2^nd Company, sets down the scene afterwards. Most of the men have never stood beside a tank before. It strikes him as odd that home training never once paired infantry of an armoured division with armour. Someone has to explain, there and then, how to reach a crew. A man wanting a word must use the telephone on the tank’s rear, the engine being too loud for speech. As Wilson notes, the din defeats the telephone as well.

Nothing disturbs the ride, and the column is in Exel by about 18:00. The enemy’s recent presence is written across the place: wrecked vehicles, prisoners in the charge of Grenadier Guardsmen, German road signs, and broad pits scooped out to hide tanks and other heavy machines. Barely have the infantry begun digging in for the night when new orders arrive. Lieutenant J. N. Creswell, leading a 2^nd Household Cavalry patrol, has come upon an undamaged bridge over the Meuse-Escaut Canal some 11 kilometres north. The Irish Guards Group must take it without delay. Their route runs along a trail of Household Cavalry vehicles posted on the side roads.

The hour at which the Group comes up to the de Groot Bridge, immediately west of Neerpelt, is not recorded. Captain J. A. H. Hendry’s Number 2 Company carries it in a snatched assault, with a Sherman troop under Lieutenant D. Lampard in support. So swift is the British approach that the garrison is caught flat-footed. They had taken the Irish Guards’ tanks, they say, for their own side’s. With the crossing in hand, Captain Hutton of the Royal Engineers sets about lifting and disarming its demolition charges. Wilson, meeting him close by, notes four Irish Guardsmen at his side, pressed into service by their Regimental Sergeant Major. True or not, Hutton earns the Military Cross for the work. The bridge costs the Irish Guards one man dead and five hurt, though that death and two of the wounded may belong to an earlier moment.

At first the Germans stay quiet. Their real answer comes near 09:00 the next morning. An infantry thrust comes in, stiffened by a lone armoured vehicle, a self-propelled gun by some accounts, a Tiger by others. The attackers are turned back. The vehicle first grinds to within 100 metres of the 3^rd Irish Guards’ headquarters. No one is sure it is ever knocked out. Captain Edward Rawlence, the Battalion’s Motor Transport officer, dies hunting it with a PIAT. The Regimental Sergeant Major, caught in the same event, appears to take blast and burn wounds to the face and eyes. Three more men are killed and ten wounded before the day is out. German mortars and guns account for some of them, and smash a number of vehicles besides. Among them is the staff car of the Battalion commander, Lieutenant-Colonel John O. E. Vandeleur. Next day the prize is named Joe’s Bridge, a small consolation.

Behind the lines the Germans are assembling a fresh formation to wall off the British lodgement beyond the Meuse-Escaut Canal and throw it back. The order creating Kampfgruppe (battlegroup) Walther, named for the Fallschirmjäger (parachute) Oberst at its head, is given on September 12^th, 1944. Its first components are a scattering of Luftwaffe (air force) units. There is Oberstleutnant Friedrich von der Heydte’s Fallschirmjäger Regiment 6, the replacement-training Fallschirmjäger Ausbildungs Regiment Hoffmann under Oberstleutnant Helmuth von Hoffmann, and Luftwaffe Strafbataillon 6, a penal battalion lately up from Italy and still dressed for the tropics. The parachute titles flatter the first two, which are thick with Luftwaffe ground crew of little or no training, nine in ten of them, it is said, in von Hoffmann’s regiment. The penal battalion is barely of use. Reinforcement duly comes from Sturmbannführer (Major) Heinke’s Kampfgruppe of 10 SS Panzer Division, in from Arnhem on September 12^th or 13^th, 1944. Walther reaches Valkenswaard, 11 kilometres north of Neerpelt, in the small hours of Wednesday, September 13^th, 1944. Taking the reins from Oberstleutnant von Hoffmann, he wastes no time in ordering a concerted assault on the Neerpelt bridgehead for the next day.

The overcast keeps German preparations hidden from the air, but not from British gunner-observers, who rain fire on whatever movement they spot. The headquarters of von Hoffmann’s I Bataillon, at Luyksgestel five kilometres north-west of the bridge, comes in for this treatment repeatedly. Leutnant Heinz Volz, the Bataillon adjutant, leaves a picture of it. On September 13^th, 1944, a shell lands squarely in Leutnant Hansbach’s trench and kills him. A splinter touches off the grenades a staff man is carrying, and the man is blown apart. A mortar bomb cuts down a Feldwebel at the command post door. One salvo comes in while Oberstleutnant von der Heydte is on hand; he clears the ground-floor window in a graceful bound. Volz, plastered in dust and with splinters singing past, burrows deeper beneath the table. Through it all a field telephone rings on, ignored. When the fire slackens and Volz answers, a Major Schacht at the headquarters of 1 Fallschirmjäger Armee scolds him. Leaving a senior officer holding the line, he is reminded, offends against protocol.

Over on the British side, the 5^th Coldstream Guards assume the very tip of the bridgehead on September 12^th, 1944, with the Dutch frontier scarcely 1.5 kilometres off. The 2^nd Irish Guards’ tanks pull back over the Albert Canal. The 3rd Irish Guards settle into a belt of pine forest on the perimeter’s left. Wilson’s 2^nd Company draws the job of guarding Battalion headquarters at close quarters. What looks a comfortable posting sours once the men find they must dig the headquarters staff’s slit trenches as well as their own. Intermittent German shells break the monotony, and so does a pestering night raid by some unidentified light aircraft.

The plan hands the western sector to Fallschirmjäger Regiment 6: take the hamlet of La Colonie, then cross Heunel Heath to reach the bridge. Off to distract the defenders, Fallschirmjäger Ausbildungs Regiment Hoffmann and Hauptsturmführer Dr Segler’s battalion of SS Panzergrenadier Regiment 19 are to strike astride and east of the Hasselt-Eindhoven highway. Jagdpanzer IVs of Hauptsturmführer Roestel’s SS Panzerjäger Abteilung 10 support them. Zero hour is 08:00 on September 14^th, 1944, under a light drizzle and cloud low enough to ground the Allied fighter-bombers. Some troops may creep forward before first light; one British unit at least reports infiltrators carrying machine-guns and Panzerfausts. Von der Heydte’s men sweep over a few forward posts short of La Colonie. Then British defensive fire, summoned at 08:30, stops them, and the push stalls amid the houses. The eastern diversions ease little of the strain. Off the roads the Jagdpanzers’ slender tracks flounder in the mire, and their arrival seems to invite a British armoured riposte. As many as three of Roestel’s machines may be destroyed across the day.

Beaten off or not, the assault bears down heavily on the 3rd Irish Guards, and hardest of all on Number 3 Company at the wood’s edge. In timber so dense, German infiltrators prove near impossible to keep out, and Lieutenant Humphrey Kennard’s platoon draws the weight of a resolute attack. It swells until Wilson’s platoon, still tied to Battalion headquarters, has to peel off a rifle section to help. That section, under a Sergeant Sullivan, walks into a German assault and is swallowed whole; one man at least is killed and the others taken. Only at dark does the pressure lift, the Germans slipping away behind a heavy curtain of shell and mortar fire while the Guards pull into a closer perimeter. The day leaves the 3rd Battalion with seven dead, Lieutenant Kennard among them, twenty-three wounded and five missing, the last of these plainly Sullivan’s lost section. Night grants no rest to all. Wilson is sent out to find whether the enemy still sits before Number 3 Company’s old ground, and in what force. He goes with two volunteers, loses his way at the start, then edges past two burning farms his briefing had said nothing of. Beyond them he settles the question: von der Heydte’s Fallschirmjäger hold the woods roughly 550 metres to the Battalion’s front. Some two hours on, the patrol slips back inside, coming in only a few metres from where it left.

Relief reaches the Guards Armoured Division on September 15^th, 1944, when elements of the 50th (Northumbrian) Division come up. The 1^st Hampshires of 231^st Infantry Brigade take over the 3^rd Irish Guards’ line. Wilson sees their advance party arrive as he breakfasts, cold, on bully beef and looted German champagne, cold because a German shell had wrecked the 2^nd Company cook truck the day before. Around midday the changeover is done, and the Guards tramp back to their transport at a derelict factory just south of Joe’s Bridge, from where they ride to billets farther south. In the eleven days from the freeing of Brussels to their departure from the bridgehead, the Division loses 113 killed, 405 wounded and 80 missing. The weight of it is borne by the 1^st Welsh, 3^rd Irish and 5^th Coldstream Guards. The 3^rd Irish Guards perhaps fare worst; officer losses dating from September 8^th, 1944 force the Battalion to reorganise eight days later. Even so, the mood runs to impatience, and to bewilderment that the advance is not driven on harder. Wilson says as much. By September 15^th, 1944, Joe’s Bridge has been in hand four whole days. The delay unsettles everyone and defies explanation. Each wasted day, he thinks, only hardens the resistance waiting ahead. Later fighting proves him right, and hints that the risk of pressing straight on might well have paid.

With its losses of September 14^th, 1944 to nurse, Kampfgruppe Walther settles for hemming the British in, though Joe’s Bridge draws one last, unorthodox effort. On the afternoon of Friday, September 15^th, 1944, a party of Kriegsmarine combat swimmers turns up unheralded at the headquarters of SS Panzergrenadier Regiment 21, out on the perimeter’s eastern edge. Its first commander, Hauptsturmführer Krause, seems by now to have given way to Hauptsturmführer Friedrich Richter. Richter vets their papers from Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, grasps that they mean to blow the bridge with a 500-kilogram sea mine, and hands them on to the company beside the Meuse-Escaut Canal under his adjutant, Obersturmführer Heinz Damaske. A truck runs the swimmers and their load to a farm near the front once darkness falls, and there the plan comes apart. The only hands to spare are a few signallers from company headquarters, too few to work the mine quietly in the dark. A three-metre drop to the water makes it worse. What follows is no surprise. The scuffling, the hushed voices and the splashing all carry, and the British across the canal loose off machine-guns and mortars at the racket. Damaske had not cared to imagine a mortar round finding the mine, and the naval party, it turns out, imagines exactly that. Judging the thing impossible in such conditions, they abandon the soldiers to their package.

After this, the bridge is largely left undisturbed, while the German forces surrounding the lodgement restrict themselves to observing British activity. Richter’s men hear heavy vehicles moving along the Hechtel–Valkenswaard road to the south and occasionally see their lights. Other elements of Kampfgruppe Walther make similar reports.

During the night of September 15^th and 16^th, 1944, 719. Infanterie-Division records an almost continuous flow of traffic on the roads behind the Albert Canal. Kampfgruppe Chill also expects a major British attack once sufficient armour has been concentrated inside the bridgehead.

Operation Market Garden

Field Marshal Montgomery devises an enlarged plan to bypass the German West Wall and cross the Rhine towards the Ruhr. He proposes committing the whole First Allied Airborne Army. The scheme also answers a pressing need. V-2 rocket sites in the Netherlands are striking London, and the British government wants them silenced. The design enlarges the earlier Operation Comet to three airborne divisions. It aims to seize the crossings across some 100 kilometres from Eindhoven to Arnhem. The airborne insertion is codenamed Market; the ground relief is Garden. The overarching aim is a bridgehead across the Rhine at Arnhem.

Wretched communications form the backdrop to what follows. Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force had moved its forward headquarters from Portsmouth to Granville on August 7^th, 1944. The advance has since left it more than 640 kilometres from the front. No direct links reach its Army Groups. Eisenhower’s September 5^th signal on supply priority and command arrives in halves. The first part is transmitted at 09:00 on September 7th, the remainder at 10:15 on September 9th. The strain eases only at the end of September 1944, when headquarters moves to the Trianon Palace at Versailles.

On Sunday September 10^th, 1944, Montgomery pitches the plan to General Eisenhower in Brussels. Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder attends. The meeting takes place aboard Eisenhower’s aircraft, a knee injury having nearly immobilised him. No official record survives. It appears to open badly. Montgomery, still smarting at the loss of the ground command, vents at Eisenhower. Eisenhower reaches over, pats his knee, and reminds him who is his boss. Montgomery apologises, and the talk grows more amicable. Eisenhower approves the plan warmly. He calls it a design in exact concordance with all their understandings.

The two men leave with different understandings all the same. Tedder tells Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal the meeting has cleared the air. Yet he notes Montgomery insisting that priority means absolute priority. The day after, Montgomery is already badgering Eisenhower. He claims the operation cannot launch before September 23^rd, and probably not before September 26^th. Delay, he warns, lets the Germans prepare. On September 12^th Eisenhower sends his chief of staff, Lieutenant-General Walter Bedell Smith, to Brussels. On September 13^th Eisenhower tells Montgomery that 1,000 tonnes a day by air is impossible without stripping Market. He agrees instead to 500 tonnes a day by American road transport until October 1^st. American units are immobilised to move it. In practice, Market Garden thus receives only limited priority within the wider strategy. Montgomery reads the compromise as total victory. He tells Lieutenant-General Sir Archibald Nye he has personally killed the Saar advance, and calls it a great victory. On September 14^th he even directs the British Second Army to plan a further drive on Hamm. Eisenhower has not authorised it.

While that argument runs on, the operational planning is already under way. Eisenhower has his own reasons to embrace the plan. Pressure from the United States to employ the First Allied Airborne Army weighs on him. The airborne forces have been pulled back from the front and sit idle. They comprise three British and three United States divisions, with the Polish 1^st Independent Parachute Brigade. From this pool, three divisions and the Polish brigade will be committed. A run of proposed operations has been cancelled by the speed of the Allied advance. Eisenhower judges that Market Garden could carry the Allies across the Rhine.

On September 10^th, 1944, he directs Lieutenant-General Lewis Brereton to plan the operation. Brereton commands the First Allied Airborne Army. He is to devise the airborne assault, Market, to run in concert with the ground offensive, Garden. The proposed date, weather permitting, is September 14^th. Brereton has little time. He adapts the framework of the cancelled Operation Linnet I and II to the new objectives. He restricts glider missions to single-tows, one glider to each tug aircraft. Linnet had envisaged the more complex double-tow. Poor weather, heavy resupply demands, and scant August training for the IX Troop Carrier Command all count against it. Brereton judges double-tows without practice too risky.

He also settles on a daylight operation. Extensive air support from the Royal Air Force and the United States Air Force makes this feasible. The choice is meant to avoid the dispersal that marred the Normandy landings in June. Weather and logistics push the start to September 17^th, 1944. Brereton times the final plan to the dark of the moon that night, to reduce the risk of detection. With daylight already shortening, he rules out two lifts per day. The shortage of troop carrier aircraft then dictates the pace. The airborne phase will need three consecutive days to land every formation in the Netherlands. The approach balances effect against the safety of his troops.

The finished plan rests on two linked operations. Market is the airborne effort. Brereton’s First Allied Airborne Army is to seize the key bridges and terrain. It operates under the tactical command of I Airborne Corps and Lieutenant-General Frederick Browning. Garden is the ground thrust, spearheaded by the British Second Army. Its XXX Corps, under Lieutenant-General Brian Horrocks, is to drive north and link up with the airborne troops. D-Day for Market Garden is set for Sunday September 17^th, 1944.

Operation Market

Operation Market involves the deployment of four airborne units from the First Allied Airborne Army. The First Allied Airborne Army is established on August 2^nd, 1944, following an order from General Dwight D. Eisenhower, the Supreme Allied Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force. This formation is designed to unify and command all Allied airborne forces in Western Europe, operating under the Allied Expeditionary Force from August 1944 until the end of the war in May 1945.

The First Allied Airborne Army encompasses a broad array of units, including all British airborne forces, which includes the 1^st Airborne Division, 6^th Airborne Division, the 52^nd Airlanding Division as well as the 1^st Polish Independent Parachute Brigade. As well as the U.S. IX Troop Carrier Command and the U.S. XVIII Airborne Corps, which oversees the 17^th Airborne Division, the 82^nd Airborne Division, and the 101^st Airborne Division, along with several independent airborne units. Additionally, the formation controls This structure ensures a coordinated effort among the various Allied airborne divisions during key operations in Western Europe. The British strongly suggest that a British officer, specifically Lieutenant General Frederick Browning, be appointed as its commander.

However, since the majority of the troops and aircraft are American, Eisenhower appoints U.S. Army Air Forces officer Lieutenant General Lewis Hyde Brereton to command the First Allied Airborne Army on July 16^th, 1944, with his official appointment confirmed by Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force on August 2^th, 1944. Despite his lack of experience in airborne operations, Brereton brings extensive command experience, most recently as commander of the Ninth Air Force, providing him with crucial operational knowledge of IX Troop Carrier Command. For Operation Market Garden, five airborne units of the First Allied Airborne Army are assigned to three different areas, Eindhoven Nijmegen and Arnhem.

The 101^st Airborne Division of the United States, known as the “Screaming Eagles” and led by Major General Maxwell D. Taylor, is tasked with securing the area around Eindhoven. The planned drop zones for the division are strategically located in Best, Son, Sint-Oedenrode, and Veghel. Their mission is to capture key bridges: the bridge over the River Aa and the Zuid-Willemsvaart Canal at Veghel, the bridge over the Dommel River at Sint-Oedenrode, and the bridge over the Wilhelmina Canal at Son. After successfully securing these bridges, the division is to advance towards Eindhoven, where they are expected to link up with the advancing ground forces of the 30^th Corps.

The 82^nd Airborne Division, also from the United States and known as the “All American” division, is under the command of Brigadier General James Gavin. This division is assigned the area around Nijmegen, with designated drop zones in Groesbeek, Overasselt, and Grave. The division’s primary objectives include securing the high ground around Groesbeek, which is vital for controlling the surrounding area, and capturing several key bridges: those over the Waal River at Nijmegen, the Maas River at Grave, and at least one bridge over the Maas-Waal Canal. The Waal Bridge at Nijmegen, however, is initially given lower priority, leading to its capture only after several days of intense combat. The high ground at Groesbeek is particularly important because it dominates the Reichswald, an alternative route that bypasses the northern end of the Westwall.

The British 1^st Airborne Division, commanded by Major General Roy Urquhart, is responsible for the operation near Arnhem. The division plans to land in drop zones at Wolfheze, Oosterbeek, and Ede. Their crucial task is to capture the road bridge in Arnhem and hold it for a minimum of 48 hours, awaiting reinforcements from the south. The division is supported by the Polish 1^st Independent Parachute Brigade, under the command of Major General Stanisław Sosabowski, which is scheduled to be dropped south of the road bridge after the initial landings. Once contact is made with the advancing ground forces, the plan is to secure Deelen Airfield on the Veluwe, where the 52^nd Airlanding Division will subsequently be deployed. The 52^nd Airlanding Division is planned to land on the fourth day of Operation Market.

Initially known as the 52^nd “Lowland” Infantry Division, the division is trained for mountain warfare, with the expectation of participating in a proposed invasion of Norway. However, this operation never materialises, and the division is not deployed in this capacity. Following June 1944, the 52^nd Airlanding Division undergoes a significant reorganisation and is retrained for airlanding operations. In its new role, the division is transferred to the First Allied Airborne Army. By this time, the division is under the command of Major-General Edmund Hakewill-Smith, who leads the unit through its transition and preparation for its new responsibilities in the Allied airborne forces.

Lieutenant General Frederick Browning, commander of the 1^st Airborne Corps, establishes his headquarters near Groesbeek to oversee the operation. Browning, eager to bring his entire staff, plans to establish a field headquarters during the operation, using 32 Airspeed Horsa gliders for administrative personnel and six Waco CG-4A gliders for U.S. Signals personnel. Taking up a huge amount of essential glider capacity.

Operation Market is the largest airborne operation in history, involving the deployment of over 34,600 troops from the 101^st Airborne Division, the 82^nd Airborne Division, and 1^st Airborne Division, along with the Polish Brigade. Of these, 14,589 troops land by glider, while 20,011 arrive by parachute. The gliders also deliver 1,736 vehicles, 263 artillery pieces, and 3,342 tons of ammunition and supplies.

To transport these 36 battalions of airborne infantry and their support troops to the continent, the First Allied Airborne Army has operational control of the 14 groups of IX Troop Carrier Command, and from September 11^th, 1944, it also receives support from 16 squadrons of 38 Group Royal Air Force and a transport formation, 46 Group. The combined force includes 1,438 C-47/Dakota transports (1,274 from the United States of America Air Force and 164 from the Royal Air Force) and 321 converted Royal Air Force bombers. The Allied glider force, significantly rebuilt after Normandy, now numbers 2,160 CG-4A Waco gliders, 916 Airspeed Horsa’s (812 Royal Air Force and 104 United States Army), and 64 General Aircraft Hamilcars. However, due to a shortage of pilots, U.S. gliders fly without co-pilots, carrying an extra passenger instead.

Given the dual roles of the C-47’s as paratrooper transports and glider tugs, and because IX Troop Carrier Command provides all transport for both British parachute brigades, the force can only deliver 60 percent of the ground troops in a single lift. Consequently, the troop-lift schedule is split over successive days. On the first day, 90 percent of the United States of America Air Force transports drop paratroopers, with the same proportion towing gliders on the second day, while Royal Air Force transports are almost exclusively used for glider operations. Despite the capability to conduct two airlifts on the first day, Brereton decides against it, citing the need for a half-day bombardment of German flak positions and a favorable weather forecast predicting clear skies for four days.

The operation begins on September 17^th, 1944 under a dark moon. Allied airborne doctrine prohibits large-scale operations without sufficient light, so the mission is executed in daylight. The risk of Luftwaffe interception is deemed low due to Allied air superiority, but concerns persist regarding the increasing number of German flak units, particularly around Arnhem. Brereton, confident in the ability of Allied tactical air operations to suppress flak, orders the mission to proceed.

Daylight operations, as demonstrated in the invasions of Sicily and Normandy, offer significant advantages, including improved navigational accuracy and the ability to compress successive waves of aircraft, tripling the number of troops delivered per hour. Additionally, the time required for airborne units to assemble on the drop zone is reduced by two-thirds. However, the dual tasks of towing gliders and dropping paratroopers cannot be performed simultaneously, so Brereton’s staff schedules only one lift on the first day, focusing on flak suppression and relying on a weather forecast that soon proves inaccurate. With only a week of intense preparations, Operation Market is launched.

Operation Garden

Operation Garden, the ground component, is led by XXX Corps, under the command of Lieutenant General Brian Horrocks, is positioned near Leopoldsburg. The Corps is spearheaded by the Guards Armoured Division, with the 43^rd Wessex Infantry Division and the 50^th Northumbrian Infantry Division held in reserve. The British 8^th Armoured Brigade and the Dutch Prinses Irene Brigade are integral to the ongoing operation. As of September 16^th, 1944, the Guards Armoured Division commands a formidable tank force, consisting of 276 tanks. This includes 175 Shermans, with thirty-seven equipped as “Fireflys,” forty Stuarts, fifty-eight Cromwells, and three Challengers.

The operation requires the corps to break out from the bridgehead over the Maas-Scheldt Canal, advancing through Joe’s Bridge at Lommel. Their route follows the path cleared by airborne forces, moving through key locations including Eindhoven, Sint-Oedenrode, Veghel, Uden, Grave, Nijmegen, and finally Arnhem. The timeline for this advance is precise: by 17:00 on the first day, they are expected to reach Eindhoven, followed by Veghel at midnight. On the second day, the objective is to reach Grave by 12:00 and Nijmegen by 18:00. By 15:00 on the third day, they aim to arrive in Arnhem. So, the plan expects XXX Corps to reach the 101^st Airborne Division’s area by the end of the first day, the 82^nd Airborne Division’s area by the second day, and the 1^st Airborne Division’s area by the fourth day at the latest. Once achieved, the airborne divisions would join XXX Corps in breaking out from the Arnhem bridgehead.

Upon securing Arnhem, the corps must push forward towards the IJsselmeer, specifically targeting the area around Nunspeet. The strategic goal is to cut off German forces in the Western Netherlands. Following this, the 43^rd Infantry Division is tasked with establishing bridgeheads over the IJssel River at Doesburg, Zutphen, and Deventer, enabling a direct advance into the Ruhr area, a crucial objective within Germany.

XXX Corps faces six major water obstacles along the route from their jumping-off point to the objective on the north bank of the Lower Rhine River. These obstacles include the Wilhelmina Canal at Son en Breugel, the Zuid-Willems Canal at Veghel, the Maas River at Grave, the Maas-Waal Canal, the Waal River at Nijmegen, and finally, the Rhine at Arnhem. The plan hinges on the airborne forces capturing the bridges over these obstacles almost simultaneously. Any failure to secure these bridges would result in significant delays or potentially catastrophic defeat. Anticipating the possibility of the Germans demolishing the bridges, XXX Corps prepares extensive contingency plans. This includes amassing a vast quantity of bridging materials, 2,300 vehicles to transport them, and deploying 9,000 engineers ready to reconstruct the bridges if necessary.

Highway 69, later known as “Hell’s Highway,” serves as the critical route for the planned advance during Operation Market Garden. This road is a narrow two-lane highway, partially elevated above the flat polder and floodplain terrain surrounding it. The soft ground on either side makes it difficult, if not impossible, for tactical vehicles to maneuvre off the road. The landscape is dotted with dikes and drainage ditches, while dikes themselves are often lined with trees or large bushes, and the roads and paths are similarly bordered by trees. In early autumn, these natural features severely restrict visibility, posing significant challenges for the advancing forces.

Although the area is predominantly flat, with less than 9 metres of variation in elevation, Lieutenant-General Brian Horrocks, commander of XXX Corps, notes the challenges presented by the terrain. He describes the country as “wooded and rather marshy,” making any attempts at outflanking maneuvers virtually impossible. Two key high ground areas, both reaching heights of 90 metres, are strategically crucial. One is located northwest of Arnhem, and the other is the Groesbeek ridge in the 82^nd Airborne Division’s sector. Securing these elevated positions is essential for holding the highway bridges, which are vital to the success of the entire operation.

The operation assumes that German resistance has largely collapsed, with the German Fifteenth Army in retreat from Canadian forces and believed to have no significant armored units available. The Allied command expects XXX Corps to encounter limited resistance along Highway 69, with the German defenders spread thin over a 100-kilometres front as they attempt to contain the scattered airborne landings from the Second Army in the south to Arnhem in the north.

Multimedia