Unternehmen Danzig, Sturmgruppe Granit

Allied Forces

• Régiment de Forteresse de Liège
• 2^e Régiment de Carabiniers
• 18^e Régiment de Ligne
• Fort de Pontisse and Fort de Barchon

Axis Forces

• Sturmabteilung Koch
  • Sturmgruppe Granit
  • 17. Staffel, Kampfgeschwader zur besonderen Verwendung 5
  • Flak-Sonder­einheit „Aldinger“

Fort Eben-Emael

Located between Maastricht and Visé, Eben Emael is built between 1932 and 1935. It covers the Visé Gap to the north. It also controls the main crossings over the Albert Canal from the Netherlands into Belgium to the south. These crossings include the bridges at Veldwezelt, Vroenhoven, and Kanne.

The fort is situated on Sint Peter’s Hill near Caestert. It rises approximately 60 metres above the Albert Canal. Eben Emael is designed as a reinforced artillery position. It forms one of four new forts constructed east of Liège after the First World War. These strongholds are intended to defend Belgium’s eastern approaches.

At the time of completion, Eben Emael is regarded as the most technologically advanced fortress of its era. Construction costs amount to 24 million Belgian francs. This equals approximately £2 billion in modern value. The fort is constructed in the shape of a rough equilateral triangle. Each side measures approximately 800 metres. The total surface area measures about 75,000 square metres. The superstructure alone covers roughly 45,000 square metres.

Eben Emael functions as a self-contained underground city. It consists of three levels. The lowest level lies almost 60 metres below ground. This level serves as the living area. It contains large galleries, central staircases, and lifts. Oil tanks and water tanks are installed there. Electrical power is generated by six diesel engines. Barracks house the enlisted men. Separate sleeping quarters are provided for officers. Toilets, showers, and washrooms are present. An armoury and a prison are also located on this level.

The intermediate level lies about 40 metres below ground. It consists of tunnels and galleries with a total length of 4 kilometres. With few exceptions, all combat bunkers are accessed only from this level. Ammunition storage rooms are located beneath each bunker. These rooms are connected to the bunkers by lifts and stairways. The ventilation system is also housed on this level.

The upper level contains all firing and observation installations. It includes artillery cupolas and observation cupolas. It includes machine-gun bunkers on the surface. Thick armoured doors separate the various levels and compartments. These doors are hermetically sealed and resemble naval bulkheads. Technical innovations include air conditioning and central heating. A filtration and overpressure system continuously cleans the air and expels dangerous gases.

The garrison numbers approximately 1,200 men. Around 1,000 serve as artillery personnel. Around 200 serve in support roles. With its underground layout and extensive defences, the fort is widely considered impregnable. In the event of war with Germany, the French General Staff expects resistance for at least five days. The Belgian Army’s eighteen divisions rely on the border forts as their first line of defence.

The forts are not intended to stop the German Army alone. Their purpose is to deter attack by increasing the cost of offensive operations. They are also intended to delay an advance. This delay is meant to gain time for Belgian and Allied mobilisation.

On paper, Eben Emael appears well designed for this mission. Its defences include moats and anti-tank ditches. Trenches, minefields, and barbed wire are installed. Blockhouses and artillery cupolas are constructed. False cupolas and observation cupolas are also present. Provision is made for emergency evacuation. Three main exits are built. Six additional emergency exits are constructed.

The fort contains seventeen bunkers. Two additional bunkers are located at Kanne and Hallembaye. Six observation posts are positioned outside the fort. These posts are located at Loën, Caestert, Opkanne, Vroenhoven, and Briegden. All positions are connected to Eben Emael by telephone. The fort is also connected by telephone and radio to the Belgian Army General Staff in Liège.

Eben Emael mounts artillery providing all-round defence. Its primary mission is artillery support for field troops. The guns are manned by two artillery groups. Each group numbers about 500 men. These men rotate weekly between service in the fort and rest. Rest and recuperation take place at barracks in Wonck. Wonck lies four kilometres to the south. Approximately 200 additional personnel serve as electricians, armourers, cooks, medical staff, and clerks. These men are billeted with civilians in the village of Eben-Emael or housed in wooden barracks near the fort entrance. The garrison is commanded by a Major of the Belgian Army. Personnel work eight-hour shifts.

The command structure governing the fort’s artillery is highly complex. This structure dilutes the effective use of Eben Emael’s firepower. The fort commander and his fire-control office may issue firing orders. Target selection remains the responsibility of field commanders. Cupola 120, armed with two 120-millimetre guns and capable of full rotation, falls under Belgian I Corps. Cupola North and Cupola South are retractable cupolas, each mounting two 75-millimetre guns. These are allocated to the commander of the Belgian 7^th Infantry Division.

Maastricht 1 and Maastricht 2 each mount three 75-millimetre guns. These positions fall under the commander of the 18^th Infantry Regiment. Visé 1 and Visé 2 also each mount three 75-millimetre guns. Visé 1 is controlled by the commander of the 2^e Grenadier Regiment. Visé 2 falls under the Lower Meuse regional command.

Defence of the Albert Canal is shared with the Belgian 2^e Grenadier Regiment. The regiment is authorised a strength of 3,400 men. This includes 3,000 enlisted soldiers, 300 non-commissioned officers, and 100 officers. Like many Belgian units, it is understrength. It numbers approximately 2,600 men.

The regiment defends a frontage 9 kilometres wide and 1.5 kilometres deep. It deploys in depth along the Meuse River and the Albert Canal. The 2nd and 3rd Battalions hold the forward line from Kanne through Emael, Loën, and Lixhe. The 1st Battalion occupies a rear line from Fall to Weer and Wonck.

Artillery support is provided by the 105^th Artillery Battalion. This unit belongs to the Belgian Army’s 20^th Motorised Artillery Regiment. On paper, the defences appear imposing. In reality, serious deficiencies remain. Barbed wire, minefields, and trenches are insufficient near the bunkers and on the superstructure.

The designers do not anticipate an airborne assault. Major Jean Fritz Lucien Jottrand commands the garrison. He recognises the flat roof as suitable for aerial resupply. It instead serves as a football field. This supports morale in a force with weak esprit de corps. This use largely explains the absence of obstacles.

Several cupolas lack firing periscopes. These installations are therefore ineffective. The fort lacks sufficient explosives to seal the main gallery after a breach. Belgian Army regulations require such measures. Many telephone sets are removed for use at a rifle range located 30 kilometres away.

The surrounding hills restrict effective fire toward Aachen and Maastricht. If Maastricht falls, the fort cannot engage the area effectively. The original ventilation system is defective. A replacement system is only partially installed. Anti-aircraft defence is inadequate. Only four anti-aircraft machine guns are available. All are positioned on the superstructure.

Training standards within the garrison are poor. Many soldiers have never fired live ammunition. Although trained as artillerymen, they are expected to fight as infantry. They are also required to launch immediate local counter-attacks after a penetration. Morale is low. Absenteeism is common. Many soldiers suffer throat infections caused by dust and mould. Others are absent on special leave granted to miners, farmers, and fathers of large families.

These shortcomings are known to the Belgian senior command. Efforts to correct them are underway. The war begins before these measures can be completed.

Multimedia

Operational Planning

Together with Oberstleutnant Bruno Bräuer, Kommandeur des Fallschirmjäger-Regiments 1, Student selects the assault leaders. He assigns Hauptmann Walter Koch the task as operational leader. He assigns Oberleutnant Rudolf Witzig the task of capturing Fort Eben-Emael.

The task of the assault is assigned to a parachute engineer platoon because no other qualified engineers exist within the airborne forces at that time. The German airborne arm remains small in 1940. Luftwaffe engineer personnel lack the specialist training required for complex assault operations. These men are regarded as infantry engineers rather than fully trained combat engineers. The platoon assigned to the mission originates from the Heeres-Pioniertruppe. Its members are identified by the black piping worn on their shoulder straps. Although the unit is transferred to the Luftwaffe, its training, doctrine, and professional identity remain those of Army combat engineers.

The platoon benefits from long and comprehensive preparation, particularly for assault missions. It is regarded as confident and disciplined. The engineers, like the parachute infantry of Hauptmann Walter Koch, are considered superior soldiers in training and morale. No recorded instance exists of a soldier attempting to withdraw. Every member of the unit is a volunteer. Each man first volunteers for parachute training. He then joins a Fallschirmjäger infantry battalion. From there he volunteers again for parachute engineer service. The unit is composed entirely of motivated and experienced personnel.

High morale characterises not only the airborne formations. At this stage of the war, the Heer, Luftwaffe, and Kriegsmarine all display exceptionally strong morale. Reactions to stress are not always restrained. Nevertheless, overall confidence within the German armed forces is high during this period.

A clear distinction exists between Army-trained parachute engineers and Luftwaffe parachute engineers. Luftwaffe engineer units are initially trained for a narrow mission profile. Their task focuses on demolition operations. These units are expected to jump in, destroy assigned objectives, and attempt to return by any available means. During manoeuvres in 1937, recovery by aircraft is planned but not executed. In practice, returning personnel are issued railway tickets. By contrast, the Heer organises its airborne units from the outset for a wide range of tactical and operational missions.

The Army parachute engineers are trained and prepared for more than a supplementary role. Their qualifications are such that during the winter of 1938 to 1939 they are tasked with instructing other soldiers in demolition techniques and engineer skills within the regiment.

For the assault on Eben Emael, the parachute engineer platoon is reinforced. Its original strength of 40 to 50 men is increased to between 70 and 80. The additional personnel are Fallschirmjäger drawn from the parachute infantry company of Hauptmann Koch.

Orders for the operation are issued in November by General der Flieger Kurt Student. A meeting is held at the divisional staff at Berlin-Tempelhof. At this meeting, Oberleutnant Rudolf Witzig, Hauptmann Walter Koch, and Oberst Bruno Bräuer, Kommandeur des Fallschirmjäger-Regiments 1, are informed of the mission. Shortly thereafter, Koch’s 1. Fallschirmjäger-Kompanie and the reinforced parachute engineer platoon are detached from the 7. Flieger-Division.

Later that month, General der Flieger Student orders the formation of a special airborne task force at Hildesheim. The unit is organised at battalion strength and designated Sturmabteilung Koch. It consists of carefully selected officers and men from the German airborne forces. Strict security measures are imposed. Training begins using Polish fortifications at Gleiwitz to practise assault techniques.

Sturmabteilung Koch is commanded by Hauptmann Koch. The formation consists of 11 officers and 427 men. This includes 42 glider pilots and 4 reserve glider pilots under Leutnant Walter Kiess. The air component includes an additional 16 officers and 182 men. It incorporates 44 Junker 52 tow pilots with 4 in reserve. A second reserve group includes 6 Junker 52 pilots with 1 pilot in reserve. In total, 84 gliders and tow aircraft are allocated.

The air component is organised into four Staffeln. Each Staffel supports one assault group. Each Staffel is divided into two Startegruppen. Each Startgruppe contains between 3 and 6 Ju 52 aircraft. A fifth Staffel holds all reserve aircraft and crews.

For the assault phase, Sturmabteilung Koch is divided into four Sturmgruppen. Each group corresponds roughly to an understrength company. Each group is tasked with seizing and holding a specific objective until relieved by advancing Heer formations.

Sturmgruppe Granit is commanded by Oberleutnant Rudolf Witzig. Its mission is to neutralise the outer works of Eben Emael and hold the position until relieved by Pionier-Bataillon 51. The group consists of 2 officers and 83 parachute engineers. It deploys in 11 gliders.

Sturmgruppe Eisen is commanded by Leutnant Martine Schächter. It is tasked with securing the bridge at Kanne until relieved by Infanterie-Regiment 151. The group consists of 2 officers and 88 men. It deploys in 10 gliders.

Sturmgruppe Beton is commanded by Leutnant Gerhard Schacht. Its mission is to secure the bridge at Vroenhoven until relieved by Infanterie-Regiment 162. It consists of 5 officers and 129 men. Because of the importance of this objective, Hauptmann Koch accompanies this group.

Sturmgruppe Stahl is commanded by Leutnant Gustav Altmann. Its task is to secure the bridge at Veldwezelt until relieved by Infanterie-Regiment 176. The group consists of 1 officer and 91 men.

With Sturmabteilung Koch deployed against Belgian objectives, the remainder of the 7. Flieger-Division is assigned operations against Dutch airfields and bridges.

Every member of the parachute engineer platoon is an experienced Fallschirmjäger. All are veterans of the Polish campaign. All are trained demolition specialists. The unit is unique within the airborne forces in being composed entirely of engineers. All members are volunteers. Many are accomplished glider pilots from the pre-war period. Over two years, the unit develops into a cohesive formation characterised by strong mutual trust.

At Hildesheim, the unit is housed in a gymnasium at the airfield. The mission is explained without naming the objective. Security restrictions are extreme. The area is guarded continuously. Movement is strictly controlled. All outgoing and incoming correspondence is censored. Soldiers are forbidden to use telephones or send mail.

Parachute insignia and distinctive uniform items are removed. This measure proves deeply unpopular. Special meals are provided. Contact with other units is prohibited. Leaving the quarters without permission is forbidden. Violations are punished severely. In one instance, three soldiers leave the Kaserne for coffee. They are apprehended, tried, and sentenced to death. The sentence is not carried out, but the incident demonstrates the seriousness of the security measures.

A detention cell is made available for disciplinary purposes. Because of security requirements, only members of the unit are permitted to guard it. Informal assistance to detained comrades occurs when possible.

Security is regarded as vital. Operational success and survival depend entirely on surprise. No leave is granted. Units operate under false names. All parachute insignia and uniforms are removed. Glider training is conducted on the smallest possible scale. Gliders are dismantled, transported to Köln in civilian vehicles, and reassembled in guarded hangars surrounded by wire obstacles.

Because transport capacity is limited, the parachute engineer platoon is relocated to Köln and Düsseldorf. This reduces travel time to the departure airfields at Köln-Ostheim and Köln-Butzweilerhof. Personnel live under assumed identities. Their role and mission remain unknown to outsiders.

Training intensifies under close supervision. Glider landings are rehearsed repeatedly. Assault procedures are refined in detail. Preparation time is limited to 10 to 14 days. The initial target date for the attack is November 13^th, 1939.

At this stage, confidence in the mission is high. Trust in the command structure is absolute. No part of the assignment is regarded as impossible. Morale and discipline replace doubt.

Planning responsibilities rest with the assigned officers. Technical expertise in assaulting fortifications shapes training and preparation. Logistical and administrative support is provided by higher command. Tactical planning is developed through detailed discussion with non-commissioned officers. Sand-table models are used to refine the plan.

By February 1940, demolition training takes place on the former Czechoslovak Beneš Line. Casemates are assaulted using flamethrowers and heavy explosives, including Bangalore torpedoes. These fortifications prove more robust than anticipated. At the time, however, the relative strength of Belgian defences remains uncertain.

Additional instruction is conducted at the Pionierschule at Karlshorst. Fortress construction principles are studied in detail. Belgian deserters are interrogated. Their information confirms existing intelligence assessments. Confidence increases steadily.

Detailed intelligence on Eben Emael is provided. This includes aerial photographs and comprehensive engineering drawings of the fort. Stereoscopic images allow the identification of elevations and depressions. Key structures are highlighted by intelligence officers. All references to the fort’s name and the Albert Canal are removed from documentation. No soldier is informed of the objective’s identity or location. Absolute secrecy is maintained throughout preparation.

For the assault, Oberleutnant Rudolf Witzig and every Fallschirmjäger under his command carry miniature maps of Eben Emael. These maps are stored in small pocket-sized cases and are issued individually before the operation.

Training for the assault is comprehensive and continuous. Aircraft loading procedures are rehearsed repeatedly. Rapid embarkation, unloading, and immediate exit drills are practised under realistic conditions. Training is never conducted as a single complete exercise. Individual tasks are broken down into isolated components. This method prevents outside observers from understanding the purpose of the training.

Demolition training and ground assault techniques are conducted at the Pionierschule in Dessau. Further training takes place in the Sudetenland. There, Czech fortifications are used as training objectives. These fortifications prove more difficult to assault than those at Eben Emael. Joint training is conducted with the glider pilots. These pilots are required to master infantry and pioneer combat skills. They are trained not only to understand these tasks but to execute them under combat conditions.

For the operation, Oberleutnant Witzig organises his force into eleven squads. Each squad consists of two or three Unteroffiziere and four to six enlisted soldiers. This structure reflects the carrying capacity of the Junker 52 tow aircraft and the DFS 230 gliders. Each squad is assigned sufficient equipment to complete its task independently. Every squad is responsible for capturing two emplacements or casemates. All squads are also required to be capable of assuming the mission of any other squad rendered ineffective. The first nine squads receive specific objectives. The tenth and eleventh squads are designated as the reserve.

Unlike conventional aircraft pilots, a glider pilot retains command authority until landing. After landing, the pilot cannot disengage from combat. For this reason, glider pilots are fully integrated into the assault detachments as combat engineers. Each pilot is assigned to a specific squad. This ensures reliability and cohesion during ground combat.

Command arrangements place Oberleutnant Witzig initially with the eleventh squad. His deputy company commander, Leutnant Delica, accompanies the first squad. The planned date of the operation is postponed several times. Training continues without interruption during these delays. Precision landing with explosives on prepared airstrips and open terrain is rehearsed. Rapid disembarkation while fully equipped is practised repeatedly.

Special equipment for the assault includes flamethrowers and collapsible assault ladders. These ladders are designed and constructed by the assault troops themselves. The operation also requires approximately two and a half tonnes of explosives. Most of these explosives consist of hollow charge devices. These devices are employed for the first time in combat during the assault on Eben Emael. Their primary purpose is the penetration of armoured cupolas.

Two secret weapons are prepared for the operation. The first is the combat glider. The DFS 230 is developed to transport assault squads intact and ready for immediate action. This capability is unattainable with conventional parachute insertion.

The glider also enables the assault force to transports approximately five tonnes of explosives. This load includes twenty-eight shaped charges weighing fifty kilograms each, twenty-eight shaped charges weighing twelve point five kilograms each, eighty-three charges weighing three kilograms each, and more than one hundred additional explosive devices. The assault force is also equipped with six medium machine guns, eighteen submachine guns, fifty-four rifles, eighty-five pistols, more than thirty thousand rounds of ammunition, and nearly seven hundred and fifty hand grenades. Each assault squad carries a substantial combat load.

The second secret weapon is the shaped charge. These devices are employed operationally for the first time during the assault. Witzig introduces his men to these charges in January 1940. No prior doctrine exists for their tactical use. No formal training programme is available. Instruction is provided directly by engineers and technicians from the explosives industry involved in their development.

Two types of shaped charge are issued. One weighs fifty kilograms. The other weighs twelve point five kilograms. The larger charge is transported in two hemispherical sections. It is capable of penetrating armoured cupolas with thicknesses up to twenty-five centimetres. Where armour thickness reaches twenty-eight centimetres, internal damage is still sufficient to disable weapons and crews through fragmentation. In areas of greater thickness, repeated detonations at the same point are required. The smaller charge penetrates armour between twelve and fifteen centimetres. It is also used for precision demolition of embrasures and artillery openings. All charges are fitted with ten-second fuses.

The assault troops are trained to place shaped charges directly onto armoured cupolas. The large charge is assembled on site from its two halves. Detonation causes fragments from the interior of the cupola to ricochet at high velocity. This effect destroys equipment and incapacitates personnel inside. Breaching the armour is not always required. Rendering the position inoperable is sufficient to neutralise the weapon.

Extensive experimentation determines the minimum safe distance between the operator and the charge. A ten-second delay is selected as optimal. All assault troops receive training with the shaped charges. Only a limited number of soldiers carry the devices due to restricted availability. Remaining personnel carry standard infantry weapons.

As a final deception measure, parachute-deployed dummy figures in uniform are dropped west of the Albert Canal. These decoys are intended to simulate additional airborne landings. The measure successfully creates confusion within Belgian command channels and contributes to operational surprise.

Multimedia

The Way In

After six months of strict isolation and repeated postponements, the alert is issued during the afternoon of May 9^th, 1940. On that day Adolf Hitler releases a proclamation to German soldiers on the Western Front. The proclamation declares that the battle beginning that day will determine the fate of the German nation for the next thousand years and calls upon the troops to fulfil their duty with the blessing of the German people.

That evening, the assault detachment moves by truck from the Seldorf Flakkaserne to the airfield at Köln-Ostheim. The unit is quartered in a newly constructed building isolated from other formations. Equipment is loaded inside the hangars. The troops then await further orders. Platoon leaders conduct final inspections and confirm readiness. At 21:00, all platoons report prepared for action.

In the early hours of May 10^th, 1940, reveille is sounded at 02:45. The men of Sturmabteilung Koch assemble at the airfields of Köln-Ostheim and Köln-Butzweilerhof. At 03:30, the troops form up in full equipment and prepare to embark. Final instructions are issued. The order to board the aircraft follows. The men move to the gliders and take their seats. At exactly 04:30, the tow aircraft begin their take-off into the pre-dawn darkness. The take-off time is selected to allow all four assault groups to land simultaneously. The planned landing time is 05:25, five minutes before formations of the Wehrmacht cross the frontier.

The aircraft depart in complete darkness and climb by circling southwards. By 04:50, all forty-two unmarked gliders are airborne. They then turn west and follow a route previously marked by radio beacons and searchlights. A bonfire burns at a crossroads near Effern. A stationary blue-white searchlight pierces the darkness at Frechen, three kilometres on. By the time the formation reaches Aachen, the aircraft and gliders have climbed to a height of 2,500 metres. At this altitude, the gliders possess a gliding range of approximately 30 kilometres. The Belgian border lies only 10 kilometres ahead. Fort Eben Emael is 25 kilometres distant.

Sturmgruppe Granit proceeds toward its objective in eleven DFS 230 assault gliders. Each glider is towed by a Junker 52. The corrugated aluminium fuselage of the DFS 230 amplifies engine noise within the cabin. Communication inside the aircraft relies on hand signals, klaxons, and lights. The interior is stripped to essentials. Canvas seating lines the fuselage. German Fallschirmjäger are transported to the objective under these conditions.

During the flight, two gliders are lost, including the glider carrying Oberleutnant Rudolf Witzig. Shortly after crossing the Rhine, the glider drops without warning. Every man inside freezes. A passing aircraft has come dangerously close. The Junker 52 pilot reacts on instinct and pushes into a sudden dive. Pilz shoves his stick forward hard to follow. The tow rope cannot absorb the sudden load. It snaps. The loose end cracks back like a whip against the plexiglass nose. The roar of the slipstream drops to a quiet whistle. The glider flies alone. Pilz hauls back on the stick at once. He wrings every last metre of altitude from the aircraft’s fading momentum. He then eases into a slow rightward bank. Once the danger passes, Witzig later recalls, the cabin fills with the colourful curses of frustrated men.

Witzig turns to Pilz. Can they still reach the fort? The answer is no. Pilz has barely 900 metres of altitude remaining. Fort Eben Emael sits 40 kilometres to the west. Witzig weighs his options. He can press west into Holland and risk capture. He can set down in Germany and attempt to recover the mission. He chooses the latter. Pilz swings east and scans through the nose for the Rhine below. He finds it. The glider descends steadily and touches down in an unploughed field thick with waist-high weeds. The field lies roughly six kilometres outside Cologne.

Eight minutes after the tow rope parts on Witzig’s glider, a second problem strikes. The Junker 52 towing Gefreiter Bredenbeck’s glider begins waggling its wings. It flashes its tow-position lights. This is the signal to release. Bredenbeck refuses. The flight has already been rough. Several times the aircraft ahead has bucked and lurched at the far end of the rope. Then the Junker 52 drops sharply to the left. It pulls the glider with it. Bredenbeck has no choice and cuts loose. He sits at 1,500 metres. Fort Eben Emael lies 40 kilometres away. The situation is beyond recovery. A post-mission debrief later concludes that the two pilots misread each other’s signals. The assault force, already lean from the start, now numbers seventy men. This represents roughly eighty percent of its planned fighting strength. Not a single shot has yet been fired. Bredenbeck’s glider belongs to the Gruppe 2 under Feldwebel Max Maier.

The main formation fares no better. An unexpectedly strong tailwind pushes the gliders 460 metres below their planned altitude. It also delivers them ten minutes ahead of schedule. The Flugführer faces two equally poor options. Releasing early risks the gliders falling short of the fort. Releasing on time at insufficient altitude risks the same result. Arriving ten minutes early will also break the coordination between the airborne assault and the ground attack. The Flugführer presses on and continues into Dutch airspace for another ten minutes. At approximately 05:15, the searchlight on the Vetschauer Berg northwest of Aachen comes into view. This is the final beacon. The Junker 52 pilots begin cutting their gliders loose. The altitude is workable. However, Dutch and Belgian Anti-Aircraft crews may already have heard the approaching transports.

At 05:25, the remaining nine gliders arrive over the fort. Defensive fire is finally opened from four Belgian anti-aircraft machine guns mounted on the superstructure of Eben Emael.

Multimedia

Belgian Defenders

At 02:30 hours on May 10^th, 1940, Fort Eben Emael receives an alert message from headquarters in Liège. The report warns of German troop movements near the frontier. It causes little concern. It is the third alert of the month and is assumed to be another exercise. The fort commander, Commandant Jottrand, is asleep in his villa. He is woken and briefed. He telephones Liège for clarification and orders the standing alert procedure to be executed.

Adjudant Dieudonné Longdoz, senior leader of the anti-aircraft machine-gun crews, enters the barracks. He informs the men that this is a genuine alert. Sirens echo through the corridors. The soldiers murmur quietly among themselves. Many still expect another false alarm. Commandant Van der Auwera, deputy commander of the fort, arrives shortly afterwards and confirms that hostilities have begun.

The standing alert requires a warning signal to the canal defences. Twenty blank rounds are to be fired from the 75-millimetre gun in cupola 31 at thirty-second intervals. This warns the bridge detachments and recalls off-duty gun crews from the surrounding area. Meanwhile, the four anti-aircraft crews receive initial orders to evacuate the wooden barracks outside the fort. Furniture, documents, food, and bedding are carried inside. Crews from Mi Nord and Mi Sud are included in this task. This decision later proves costly.

Throughout the fort, officers and soldiers rush to assigned posts. Activity is intense and disordered. Barbed-wire obstacles are inspected and repaired. Pre-positioned chevaux-de-frise and anti-tank tetrahedrons are dragged into place to block the entrance approaches. Outside, the night remains calm. No lights or sounds come from the village of Eben-Emael. Everything appears normal.

At 04:25 hours, the calm is shattered. The 75-millimetre guns of Cupola Sud fire warning shots in all directions. Twenty rounds are discharged. Any remaining doubt disappears. War has arrived. During the firing, brush near the southern turret catches fire. Maréchal des Logis Franco, Brigadier Boussier, and Soldat Paque extinguish the flames.

The anti-aircraft crews complete their evacuation work. Burdened with heavy personal equipment, they climb the slope behind Bloc 1 toward the fort roof. Brief greetings and wishes of luck are exchanged as men pass each other in the darkness. The gunners reach their positions on the roof. Four machine-gun pits occupy the corners of a square measuring twenty-five metres on each side. Each gun is mounted on a tripod. A small shelter stands at the centre. It houses the Adjudant and the telephone operator. It also stores spare weapons, reserve ammunition, and personal equipment.

At 05:00 hours, further reports reach Commandant Jottrand. Unidentified aircraft are also reported over the Kanne Bridge. No engine noise is heard. The aircraft appear to hover. Jottrand orders the Kanne Bridge destroyed. Responsibility for the bridges at Vroenhoven and Veldwezelt lies with Capitaine-Commandant Giddelo at Lanaken. No demolition order is issued for those crossings.

Shortly after 05:00 hours, Adjudant Longdoz telephones the duty officer and reports that the machine guns are ready. The men wait in silence. Thick mist lies across the ground. Sunrise is still hours away. The gunners scan the sky. Gun Number One is crewed by Soldats Morelle, Frédéric, Parmentier, Pasques, and Pire. Gun Number Two is manned by Soldats Servais, Sluismans, Willems, Seret, and Prévôt. Gun Number Three is served by Soldats Antoine, Pairoux, Reichert, and Kips. The fourth gun is manned by Soldats Fonbonne, Boîte, and Heine. Adjudant Remy operates the telephone.

Around 05:25 a dark shape suddenly passes overhead. Its nature is unclear. A shout rings out. Aircraft are above the fort. Their engines are silent. They appear to hang motionless in the air. German gliders descend, roughly two hundred and fifty metres above the roof. Grey shapes circle slowly. From the postern entrance, Commandant Jottrand observes the manoeuvre and asks Capitaine Hotermans why the anti-aircraft guns are not firing.

The telephone rings in the shelter. Adjudant Remy answers and hands the receiver to Adjudant Longdoz. Capitaine Hotermans asks what is happening. Longdoz reports aircraft overhead but cannot identify them. Asked what action he will take, he replies that he will fire. Longdoz rushes outside and blows a shrill whistle. It is the signal to open fire.

Tracer rounds streak into the sky. Fire is uneven. Several weapons jam. The gliders are already landing. One touches down near Cupola Nord. Another lands directly beside the anti-aircraft position. Its wing strikes Gun Number Three and knocks it over. Soldat Antoine drops flat into the pit just in time. The glider slides to a halt. Its door bursts open. German troops spill out onto the roof. Complete surprise is achieved.

At 05:24 on May 10^th, 1940, the first German glider starts landing on the roof of Fort Eben Emael. Each Glider carries a gruppe of German Fallschirmjäger carrying six Rifles, two MP-38 Submachine guns, one M34 Machinegun and one flamethrower. The glider also carries one 4 metre folding ladder, one Flare pistol, two 50-kilogram hollow charges, three Bangalores torpedoes, two 12.5-kilogram, one 6-kilogram pole charges, five 3-kilogram, one 20-kilogram crate, five bags of charges and two large flag markers

Gruppe 1, Maastricht 2 (Objective 18)

The north-facing casemate Maastricht 2 mounts three 75-millimetre guns and contains artillery observation post Eben III. This objective is assigned to Feldwebel Niedermeier and Gruppe 1 of Sturmgruppe Granit. Leutnant Delica accompanies the assault as deputy commander of the Sturmgruppe.

The DFS 230 glider is flown by Feldwebel Raschke. The approach speed is high and results in a heavy landing. Glider 1 encounters intense antiaircraft fire on approach. The pilot takes evasive action. The hard landing stuns Leutnant Delica, Feldwebel Niedermeier and Gruppe 1. The glider lands cleanly at 05:25 hours in open ground between Maastricht-2 and the 120-millimetre turret bloc. The men recover quickly and execute their rehearsed drill.

Inside the observation post, the Belgian sergeants do not observe the landing. The first indication of the attack comes when unfamiliar boots appear on the roof. A warning is shouted to the gun crews below. Before further action can be taken, a hollow charge detonates. The charge is placed by Obergefreiter Drucks and Feldwebel Niedermeier.

The first detonation does not penetrate the armour. It creates a shallow crater. Despite this, the internal effects are severe. Steel fragments tear loose inside the cupola. Both Belgian sergents inside the observation post are killed.

A second shaped charge weighing 12.5-kilograms is brought forward by Obergefreiter Kramer and Obergefreiter Graf in the embrasure of the first 75-millemetre gun. The explosion tears the gun from its mounting. The weapon is hurled into the rear of the gun chamber, killing additional defenders. The blast leaves an opening measuring 60 by 60 centimetres. Niedermeier and two others throw grenades through the opening and enter firing.

Two Belgian gunners are dead. One is wounded. Others are burned or stunned by the blast. Two signallers are missing. As wounded personnel are dragged down toward the intermediate level, a three-kilogram charge detonates inside the barrel of Gun Number Two. While the wounded receive aid, the explosion destroys the barrel of the second gun. The Belgian Sergent Poncelet orders the remaining crew to withdraw to the lower level. The Germans pursue them inside and down the stairway. Poncelet’s men quickly seal the lower airlock doors. Access to the intermediate level is secured.

Machine-gun fire rattles above them. Smoke and dust fill the casemate. The gap is large enough for a man to crawl through. Entry is delayed until visibility improves. Feldwebel Niedermeier and two Fallschirmjäger enter the vacated casemate wearing gas masks. Several MP 38 bursts are fired down the stairwell to hasten the Belgian retreat.

On the intermediate level, Belgian personnel attempt to seal the access. Steel beams are fitted into their channels. Sandbags are packed between the steel doors. Fear of pursuit into the interior of the fort is evident. Meanwhile, the mortally wounded Caporal Verbois is carried out through the shattered embrasure. Medical treatment is impossible. He dies shortly afterwards.

Within the opening minutes of the assault, a second offensive casemate is neutralised. Of the remaining artillery positions, three are under direct attack. Two remain untouched, likely due to incomplete identification during intelligence preparation.

Fire from Cupola Sud begins to fall near Maastricht 2. Niedermeier orders his men into the casement for cover. As planned, Feldwebel Niedermeier dispatches Obergefreiter Drucks north across the open surface to locate Oberleutnant Witzig and report success at Objective 18. While the Gruppen reorganise and secure prisoners, glider pilots not engaged in prisoner handling lay out aircraft recognition panels beside the captured casemates. These panels serve as signals for Junker 87 dive bombers standing by to support Sturmgruppe Granit if further resistance proves difficult.

Leutnant Egon Delica’s Glider Gruppe 1 attacks Objective 18, known as Maastricht-2. Its guns, together with Ma-1, cover the three northern glider landing zones. Sergent Poncelet, commander of Maastricht 2, orders emergency barriers erected. Three defenders are dead and seventeen wounded. Sandbags and steel rods seal access doors to block entry into the tunnel system.

Gruppe 2, Cupola 120 (Objective 24)

At the centre of the open upper surface stand the fort’s most powerful weapons. These consist of twin 120-millimetre guns mounted in a large revolving steel cupola. The structure closely resembles the false cupolas at Objectives 14 and 16, which have already been attacked on the northern part of the surface. Cupola 120 is assigned to Feldwebel Max Maier and Gruppe 2 of Sturmgruppe Granit. Their DFS 230 glider, however, fails to reach the fort after the tow rope parts. As a result, the cupola is not neutralised during the first wave of the assault.

This failure presents a potentially serious danger. German armoured spearheads are expected to advance into the effective range of the 120-millimetre guns. Inside the steel cupola, Sergent René Cremer observes events through the gun sight. He watches gliders skid to a halt on the surface and hears the repeated heavy detonations of hollow charges against neighbouring casemates. His observation is severely restricted. The cupola lacks a functioning periscope. To survey the area, the entire cupola must be traversed slowly.

Because no rapidly rotating periscope is available, the only observer capable of reporting from Cupola 120 can provide only fragmentary information. Despite repeated requests from the command post, details remain incomplete. Cremer observes a group of German paratroopers sheltering beneath the wing of a glider located between Cupola Nord and his own position. This information is transmitted immediately to the command post together with a request for permission to open fire.

Eventually an order is received to engage targets on the slope in front of Bloc I using shells with very short-delay fuses. Orders are issued inside the cupola. The turret begins to traverse. Ammunition is placed into the hoist. At this point, a series of mechanical failures occurs. The hoist ceases to function. The ammunition loader discovers that the shafts of the loading pincers are missing. A man is dispatched to the repair workshop. While waiting, the crew attempts to repair the hoist and open ammunition crates manually.

The command post is informed that the hoist is inoperative. Without the pincers, the crew opens ammunition boxes by hand using pocket knives and hammers. Eventually, shells intended for surface clearance are unpacked and carried up to the guns. Cremer attempts to aim the cupola by sighting through the barrel of one gun. He realises that the line of fire passes above Cupola Nord. Despite this, the decision is made to fire regardless.

A further malfunction occurs within the turret mechanism. The counterweight components cannot be separated. This problem is reported by Caporal van Gelooven. Observers are assigned to monitor the sight telescope from the dugout while Cremer descends to the Intermediate Level. Inspection reveals that the clutch does not disengage and the counterweight fails to drop. Attempts to operate the loading mechanism manually also fail. Either the shell weight or insufficient pressure from the rammer prevents proper loading. Each attempt ends with the mechanism returning to its original position.

The corporal continues efforts to repair the system. He is experienced but expresses doubt that the mechanism can be restored. This assessment proves accurate. Without coming under direct attack, Cupola 120 is rendered inoperative. The Belgian crew remains occupied with repair attempts while the battle unfolds elsewhere.

Gruppe 3, Maastricht 1 (Objective 12)

The final position capable of threatening the bridges is Maastricht 1. This western cupola mounts three 75-millimetre guns. Maastricht 1 is assigned to Feldwebel Arent and Gruppe 3 of Sturmgruppe Granit. Further tasks assigned to Feldwebel Arent include destruction of the generator exhaust tower and action against Bloc II. These objectives are assessed as low priority. Neither forms part of the fort’s offensive artillery system.

The glider is flown by Hauptfeldwebel Supper. The glider circles the fort twice before landing. During the landing approach, the DFS 230 glider comes under machine-gun fire at a height of approximately thirty metres. A steep banking dive brings the aircraft down safely. The glider skids to a halt roughly 20-metres east of the objective. Feldwebel Arent exits first and urges his men forward as they struggle under the weight of the shaped charges.

A search for an external access door proves unsuccessful. The casemate is silent and without observation capability. Maastricht 1 has no observation cupola. No obvious method exists to neutralise the position except through the gun embrasure. They attempt to fix a charge to the gun barrels. Preservation grease prevents adhesion. A 50-kilogram charge proves too large for the embrasure of Gun Number One. It is replaced by a 12.5-kilogram charge. Arent attaches the 12.5-kilogram charge to the ball joint at the base of gun number three. The fuse is ignited. Feldwebel Arent withdraws for cover.

The assault troops remain too close to the casemate at the moment of detonation. Familiarity gained during training contributes to the error. The explosion throws the Fallschirmjäger to the ground and stuns them. After a brief interval, the men return to examine the effect. Inside Maastricht 1, conditions are chaotic. The explosion hurls the Belgian gunner Langelen from his position beside the gun into the telephone room. The seventy-five millimetre gun is torn from its mounting. It is flung across the casemate, crushing Soldat Borman against the ventilator, before tumbling into the stairwell where it comes to rest.

Daylight penetrates the interior through the breach, carrying dust and smoke. Sergent Gigon, badly concussed, locates two wounded men by their voices and carries them down to the lower level. The blast has also ignited propellant charges from the 75-milimetre ammunition. Thick black smoke fills the casemate. The black smoke pours from a wide breach. Groans echo inside. The lights fail. The air smells of burned propellant.

A breach less than sixty centimetres square is torn through concrete and steel. Thick, oily smoke pours from the opening. Moans are audible from inside. Belgian gunners regain consciousness amid burning propellant charges ignited by the blast.

Sergent Gigon returns for a third ascent toward the gun chamber. The propellant charges are now burning fiercely. Smoke becomes so dense that his gas mask obstructs breathing. The sound of MP fire and nine millimetre Parabellum rounds ricocheting from the concrete walls forces him back. He staggers down the stairwell and collapses into the arms of one of his men. Before evacuation to the fort hospital, he reports to Lieutenant Deuse, who is assembling gunners for a counter-attack toward the upper level. Sergent Gigon reports that wounded personnel remain in the gun chamber. Enemy movement is clearly audible above.

Arent throws two hand grenades into the opening before entering the casemate feet first through the breach. He advances by touch through the smoke-filled interior. He reaches a wounded Belgian gunner who is barely conscious but not severely injured. The prisoner is dragged to the opening and handed over to Gefreiter Kupsch and Gefreiter Stopp, who have also entered the casemate. Two further Belgian soldiers are located. One suffers gunshot wounds. Both are removed through the opening.

The surviving crew faced with further explosions, grenades, and German sub-machine gun fire, withdraws to the lower level. Fire from Cupola Sud soon falls outside the position. The section takes shelter within the casement. Arent notices a stairway descending into the fort. From below, he hears the Belgian troops moving back up the stairs. Sounds of a Belgian counterattack forming below become audible. To disrupt it, Feldwebel Arent drops a 2.5-kilogram explosive charge down the shaft. The detonation in the confined space produces a violent concussion. The German assault troops are thrown against the concrete walls and temporarily stunned. However, they remain unharmed. Silence follows from below. Interior lighting extinguishes.

Arent and two men go down 118 steps. Two heavy steel doors block further access. Hours later, he returns with a 50-kilogram charge. He shortens the fuse and detonates it. Six Belgian defenders are killed. The staircase to the surface is destroyed. Unable to breach the doors, Arent withdraws to the roof.

Meanwhile, artillery fire from Cupola Sud has ceased. Trupp 3 immediately attacks Block 02. A hollow charge neutralises the position. The section remains between Maastricht 1 and Block 02. It disrupts Belgian patrols as they approach. In a remarkable reversal, the men use one of the captured 75-millimetre guns to fire against those patrols.

Gruppe 4, Mi Nord (Objective 19)

Mi Nord is sited to dominate the open upper surface of the fort. The site is equipped with three heavy machine guns, two armoured searchlights, one artillery observation cupola, and one light machine gun covering the entrance. The Eben 2 observation post sits on top of the bloc. Only a small part of the bloc crew is present. These men have moved to the lower level on their own initiative. The remainder assist with evacuating the external barracks. It is capable of delivering lethal machine-gun fire onto the southern casemates, where the main body of Sturmgruppe Granit is engaged. The position is therefore of critical importance.

Shortly before 05:30, 2 Belgian non-commissioned officers, Vossen and Bataille, occupy the observation post Eben II on top of Mi Nord. They observe the gliders and movement on the fort surface. Before further action is possible, an explosion strikes the position.

The glider lands 80 metres from the target. Wenzel suffers a bloodied nose during the landing. The assault is led by Feldwebel Wenzel. Immediately after landing, he advances at once toward the bunker. Vossen and Bataille spot the Germans as they approach the bloc. They open fire immediately. Wenzel climbs the earth bank on the right and reaches the roof. A small opening exists in the observation cloche roof for the periscope. The periscope is withdrawn when the Germans are seen. Feldwebel Wenzel carries a 1 kilogram charge with a 4 second fuse. The charge is armed. After a brief delay, it is dropped through the periscope opening into the casemate.

At the same time, the remainder of Gruppe 4 arrives with the 50 kilogram hollow charge. It is placed directly on top of the cupola and detonated. Both Belgian non-commissioned officers in the observation post are killed. A 12.5 kilogram charge is then used against the south-facing machine-gun embrasure. The blast detonates but does not penetrate the armour. The concussion forces the Belgian crew to abandon the position.

The second 50-kilogram charge is brought forward in 2 parts. The rest of the Gruppe takes up firing positions in the bushes in front of the rampart. The machine gunner Polzin suppresses the machine-gun embrasures with fire. The charge is suspended in front of the embrasure and detonated. The blast produces a severe shock wave even at a distance of 4 metres. A large breach is torn into the concrete wall. Entry into the casemate is now possible. Meanwhile, a 12.5-kilogram charge destroys the south-facing machine-gun embrasure.

Wenzel and several men enter the bloc. Thick smoke fills the interior. The machine-gun crew is dead. The searchlight is destroyed. At this moment, the internal telephone rings. Wenzel answers the call. A French voice speaks on the line. Wenzel does not understand the language. He answers in English, stating simply that the Germans are present. The voice on the other end responds in shock.

The attackers place a signal flag on the roof. Overflying German pilots can identify the captured position. The team secures the bloc against counter-attack and defensive posts are established. Mi-Nord offers a commanding view of the fort. It becomes the German command post.

Feldwebel Wenzel establishes a command post against the rampart beside Mi Nord. The Gruppe is deployed in a defensive perimeter. The location provides excellent observation across most of the fort, except for the southern and western slopes obscured by vegetation. The Gruppe waits for Witzig’s arrival.

Multimedia

Gruppe 5, The Anti-Aircraft Position (Objective 29), Bloc IV (Objective 30)

The glider of Gruppe 5, commanded by Feldwebel Erwin Haug, encounters heavy resistance on final approach. The glider is flown by Feldwebel Heiner Lange. Belgian machine guns open fire as the glider descends. The fire reveals the target’s location to the pilot. He steers directly toward the muzzle flashes.

Heavy fire is encountered from both sides during the final approach. The direction of the fire clearly identifies the objective. This allows a precise landing despite intense opposition. Bullets tear through the fabric skin of the glider and strike the steel framework.

The glider descends extremely low. The left wing strut strikes a machine-gun position and tears the weapon from its pit. The aircraft comes to a halt beside a second emplacement. One Belgian gun is knocked over by the impact. The glider stops immediately next to the remaining position.

Feldwebel Lange opens the cockpit, releases his harness, and climbs onto the edge of the glider. He jumps directly into the shallow machine-gun pit. Four Belgian gunners are sheltering inside. Lange carries a pistol in his right hand and a dagger in his left. The Belgian soldiers immediately surrender.

At the same moment, Feldwebel Haug throws a Stielhandgranate into the pit, unaware that Lange has entered it. The grenade malfunctions and only the detonator functions. No one is injured. The incident narrowly avoids friendly casualties. Seeing that Lange has control of the situation, Feldwebel Haug turns his attention to a second machine-gun pit.

Three Belgian gunners in the adjacent position continue firing sustained bursts. Feldwebel Haug advances with the remainder of Gruppe 5. Two Fallschirmjäger rush forward, firing MP 38 submachine guns as they move. A second Stielhandgranate is thrown into the pit. This grenade detonates fully. One Belgian soldier is killed. Two others are stunned and taken prisoner.

With the surrender of the anti-aircraft crews, the Fallschirmjäger of Gruppe 5 are free to assist in suppressing resistance in the nearby hut. Feldwebel Lange remains behind to secure the prisoners. He orders them out of the pits. Additional Belgian gunners arrive from neighbouring positions. Lange suddenly finds himself guarding between fourteen and sixteen prisoners.

Gruppe 5 attacks the small observation bell on top of Bloc IV. The bell is located close to the former machine-gun pits. Inside, the Belgian observer Furnelle has a severely restricted field of vision. He does not observe the glider landings. As he attempts to report activity, a hollow charge detonates against the bell. Furnelle is killed instantly. Simon is seriously wounded. The remaining crew inside the bloc are deafened but remain at their post.

Other defenders fire from a rear window toward Cupola Nord and Gruppe 8. As Cupola Sud opens fire across the fort roof, Trupp 5 responds. Two 50-kilogram hollow charges are placed on the cupola. The detonations shake the structure and dislodge gun mountings. Belgian gunners continue firing but require lengthy realignment after each salvo. Haug then observes trouble near Cupola Nord. Feldwebel Unger’s glider has landed under heavy fire. One man lies wounded on the wing. The rest are pinned down. Haugh moves forward to assist and comes under fire himself. The two sections combine their efforts. They destroy the machine-gun position at close range. The cost is severe. Two men are killed. One is badly wounded. Several others are injured. Despite the damage, artillery from Cupola Sud resumes fire across the fort roof.

Cupola 120 remains active. This central position mounts 120-millimetre guns. Responsibility for its destruction lies with Feldwebel Maier and Gruppe 2. Their location is unknown. Inside the casemate, Sergeant Cremers, the Belgian commander, observes the glider landings. At 05:30 he orders his gunners to engage the attackers. When the crew attempts to operate the ammunition hoists and rammers, they discover that electrical power has failed. Repairs are attempted under pressure.

Heiner Lange, the glider pilot from Gruppe 5, escorts prisoners toward headquarters. As he passes Cupola 120, the guns swing toward him. Shells from Cupola Sud land nearby and wound him multiple times. Lange orders the prisoners to lie down. He retrieves a 50-kilogram hollow charge from his glider. He places it on the cupola and detonates it. The blast causes no visible damage. A soldier from Trupp 5, Grechza, approaches the position. Having consumed alcohol earlier, he is intoxicated. He climbs onto the gun barrels as they rotate. Oberfeldwebel Wenzel arrives and places a 3-kilogram charge into each barrel. The explosion kills the gunners inside and disables the casemate.

Multimedia

Sturmgruppe Granit, Gruppe 6 and 7, the Northern Cupolas (Objective 14 and 16)

The northern cupolas are designated Objectives 14 and 16. German intelligence assesses these positions as among the most powerful elements of Fort Eben Emael’s armament. Both are believed to be 120-millimetre artillery cupolas positioned at the northern apex of the fort. Because of their perceived importance, each objective is assigned a full Gruppe from Sturmgruppe Granit.

At the same time, Feldwebel Fritz Heinemann leads Gruppe 7, and Feldwebel Siegfried Harlos leads Gruppe 6. Their objectives are these two northern turret blocs.

The two Gruppen land to the north-east and north-west of Mi Sud. Their landing points place them between approximately one hundred and forty metres and one hundred and sixty metres from their respective objectives. Feldwebel Harlos and Feldwebel Heinemann lead their men forward across the open surface of the fort. Progress is obstructed by extensive barbed-wire entanglements. Bangalore Torpedoes are employed to blast lanes through the wire and permit further advance.

The assault groups then move towards the two northern blocs. Harlos and Heinemann quickly identify the true situation. The armoured turrets in the northern angle of the fort are light metal decoys. The Belgian deception functions as intended. It causes brief confusion. It has no influence on the outcome of the assault.

German intelligence has also identified another cupola, designated Objective 32, located beyond the southern boundary of the fort. This position is likewise a false installation. Either its true nature is recognised in advance or its location is judged beyond the practical reach of the airborne assault. In either case, the position is ignored by the Fallschirmjäger and no attempt is made to attack it.

The two Gruppen then establish defensive positions facing west toward the Geer River.

Gruppe 8, Cupola Nord (Objective 31)

The first to land are Oberjäger Karl Unger and Gruppe 8. The glider is piloted by Pilot Diestelmeir. At an altitude of 300 metres, the glider starts circling to lose height. They descend steeply towards the fort under anti-aircraft machine-gun fire. To avoid the fire, he rapidly loses height. Flying low, he swings south and approaches from that direction. It lands at 05:24 hours, 30 metres from Objective 31, Cupola Nord.

Immediately after landing, the pioneers exit the glider at maximum speed. Each man grabs his 25-kilogram explosive load and rushes towards the cupola. Inside Cupola Nord, Sergent Joris observes the landings through the periscope. He sees gliders touching down in the open area to the north. He lowers the retractable cupola into its chamber and reports to the command post that aircraft have landed near Mi Nord (19).

As Diestelmeir’s glider comes to a halt, Belgian troops sheltering in the hangar (25) open fire on Gruppe 8. Being first to land and close to the hangar, Unger’s section draws most of the small-arms fire. Unger, Bruno Hooge, and Ernst Hierlaender exit the glider at once. Feldwebel Meyer is wounded only metres from the glider. Weinert takes cover beside the glider. He deploys the bipod of his MG 34, feeds the 7.92 mm ammunition belt, and returns fire.

Under cover of the machine-gun fire, Gefreiter Else and Gefreiter Pliz dash towards the hangar. As they reach the building, Feldwebel Hauge’s section joins the fight. This section has already secured its own objective at position 29. Else places a conventional 2.5 kilogram charge at the door. The explosion neutralises the defenders inside. Soldat Remy and Soldat Heine are killed. Adjudant Longdoz is wounded. A potentially dangerous Belgian group, led by an officer, is eliminated within minutes.

Meanwhile, Feldwebel Unger, assisted by Hooge and Hierlaender, runs towards Cupola Nord. Inside, Sergent Joris shouts for ammunition. Cupola Nord has not yet received its allocation of boîtes-à-balles ammunition. With such rounds, the turret could have swept the surface at close range. No one expects close combat so early in the action. Had they been ready, the outcome of the attack might have been different. Instead, Soldat Hanot arrives with two high-explosive rounds carried up from the magazine. The rounds are loaded into the breeches. As the crew prepares to raise the cupola, a violent explosion shakes the structure.

From beside his glider, Pilot Diestelmeir observes two men placing a 50-kilogram charge on the cupola. The charge is fused and ignited. The detonation is immense. The ground heaves and throws him into the air. With this blast, Cupola Nord is put out of action.

Obergefreiter Else positions a machine gun to provide covering fire. Inside Cupola Nord, Sergents Kip and Joris man the 75-millimetre guns from 05:30. They report enemy movement on the fort roof. Sergent Joris, the cupola commander, carries antipersonnel ammunition up the stairway when the first heavy charge detonates. No one is inside the turret at that moment. Seeing no external damage, Unger orders another 50-kilogram charge placed near the steel exit. The explosion disables electrical systems and renders the cupola inoperable.

Inside, Sergent Joris experiences the explosion as it penetrates the steel cupola. The blast twists the guns in their mountings. The ammunition mechanism is damaged. Control cables are severed. The cupola is neutralised before firing a single round.

Outside, Feldwebel Unger posts a man to cover the heavy steel door of the infantry sally port. This is the most likely direction of a counter-attack. Unger then places a 12.5-kilogram hollow charge against the door. The explosion rips it from its hinges. Large blocks of concrete collapse into the opening and seal it.

The Belgian defenders do not attempt a counter-attack. They instead bring a machine gun into action. It fires at Fallschirmjäger attacking other structures along the southern edge of the fort. A conventional 2.5 kilogram charge is placed beneath the mount. It fails to silence the weapon.

With the enemy on the Upper Surface and his troops under concrete cover, Major Jottrand requests artillery support from headquarters Position Fortifiée de Liège. As the shells begin to fall, Feldwebel Unger completes his task near Cupola Nord. He sees a signal, likely from Feldwebel Wenzel or one of his men, ordering him to move to Mi Nord. Unger orders his section to disperse into open formation to reduce losses. While crossing scrub on the crest of the Tranchée de Caester, a shell fragment kills Unger. Only Obergefreiter Else and two other Fallschirmjäger reach Wenzel’s command post. Else takes command of Gruppe 8.

Up to this point, Sturmgruppe Granit suffers unusually light casualties. Other sections that breach casemates remain well protected from Belgian fire. They must still leave cover to complete neutralisation tasks or move towards Mi Nord to form a defensive perimeter.

At 05:45, Major Jottrand orders the tunnel sealed and Cupola Nord abandoned. The Belgian crew retreats down the stairway. The airlock doors at the base of the bloc are closed. They are reinforced with steel beams and sandbags. The Germans do not follow the defenders to the lower level.

Multimedia

Gruppe 9, Mi Sud

Mi Sud is assigned to Gruppe 9 of Sturmgruppe Granit. Gruppe 9 is led by Oberjäger Neuhaus. The DFS 230 assault glider is piloted by Hauptfeldwebel Schultz. The glider faces antiaircraft fire near Maastricht. The glider is shaken but remains airborne. The Glider lands approximately forty-five metres east of the objective. The target is one of two machine-gun casemates whose three embrasures dominate the open upper surface of the fort and pose an immediate threat to Fallschirmjäger operating in the open.

On landing, the men find themselves trapped in barbed wire. The obstacle is cut quickly. Oberjäger Ewald Neuhaus leads the men forward. He cuts through barbed wire to reach the bloc. At first, the position appears abandoned. The Belgian crews of the Mi Sud and Mi Nord casemates are expected to be among the last to come into action. Their weapons are intended for use only after enemy forces advance on the fort from the direction of Maastricht. At the time of the glider landings, the machine-gun crews are tasked with moving documents into the interior of the fort and destroying the external barrack blocks. As a result, both casemates are temporarily unmanned at the critical moment of the airborne assault. This circumstance is not anticipated by German planning and represents a decisive element of chance combined with operational surprise.

Unlike the southern artillery positions and the anti-aircraft emplacements, Mi Sud is protected by extensive barbed-wire entanglements. Feldwebel Neuhaus encounters immediate difficulty while attempting to breach the wire. Fire is received from other Belgian positions on the fort, including initially from the area of the hangar. While cutting through the wire, clothing and equipment become entangled, delaying progress. Men following through the breach carry hollow charges and a flamethrower. Fire from the southern sector intensifies to such an extent that the Fallschirmjäger are temporarily forced into cover on the northern side of the earth bank.

Once resistance from the hangar area is suppressed and Adjudant Longdoz and his men are neutralised, Feldwebel Neuhaus and two soldiers are able to crawl forward around the casemate. By this time, Belgian troops have reoccupied Mi Sud. The south-facing machine gun opens fire. Fallschirmjäger Ernst Schlosser avoids the field of fire and manoeuvres into a position suitable for employing the flamethrower. A jet of dark, smoking flame is directed into the embrasure. The Belgian machine-gun crew is forced to cease fire.

This allows the German pioneers to place a 12.5-kilogram charge is placed against the embrasure of Mi Sud. The fuse is ignited and the men withdraw. The Belgian crew, observing the activity through the sight opening, reacts quickly. The breech of the machine gun is opened. Using a cleaning rod pushed up the barrel, the defenders dislodge the charge. It falls to the ground and detonates with little effect.

Further charges are brought forward. Two additional 12.5-kilogram charges and three 50-kilogram hollowcharges are employed in succession. The south-facing embrasure is destroyed. A 50-kilogram hollow charge is then placed against the observation bell. The detonation penetrates the armour.

The blast opens a man-sized breach. Grenades are thrown into the casemate to ensure it is clear. After only a brief occupation of the position, the Belgian defenders withdraw down to the Intermediate Level. By the time Neuhaus enters the position, several Belgian soldiers are found inside, stunned and left behind during the withdrawal. Neuhaus posts guards to secure the position. He then advances towards his secondary objective at the north end of the fort. Additional turret blocs are believed to be located there.

Feldwebel Neuhaus does not pursue the retreating defenders into the interior of the fort. He blocks the steel sally-port door. Another 50-kilogram hollow charge is emplaced. The explosion tears the door inward and wrenches the frame from the structure. His secondary task is to provide covering fire for the assault elements operating in the northern sector of the fort. His men are positioned in firing points both within the casemate and along the eastern slope. No immediate threat develops from the north.

Neuhaus organises a defensive perimeter. A runner from Gruppe 9 is dispatched to Oberleutnant Rudolf Witzig. The report confirms that Mi Sud has been captured and that the group is ready to receive further orders.

Multimedia

Sturmgruppe Granit, Gruppe 10, Visé 1 (Objective 26)

Feldwebel Hübel and Trupp 10 are designated as the reserve element. Their glider lands without opposition. A runner is dispatched immediately to report their position to platoon headquarters. Oberfeldwebel Wenzel assumes command, as Oberleutnant Witzig is still unaccounted for. Wenzel orders an attack on Visé 1.

Visé 1 is set into the large earth bank on the eastern edge of the fort. The casemate is oriented to engage targets to the south. From this position, the crew has a clear view of events unfolding along the southern edge of the upper surface. The casemate is originally assigned to Feldwebel Max Maier and Gruppe 2 of Sturmgruppe Granit. Because this Gruppe fails to land on the fort, Visé 1 remains untouched during the opening phase of the assault.

At 05:35, the Belgian gun crews inside Visé 1 receive a general order to fire several salvos. Almost immediately, air attacks by Junker 87 aircraft force the gunners down to the Intermediate Level. At the same time, detonations from hollow charges on neighbouring positions blow air-intake valves off the interior fittings of the casemate. The Belgian gunners are unable to counter these effects. Morale inside the casemate deteriorates rapidly.

Feldwebel Hubel and Gruppe 10 land less than 100 metres south of Visé 1. While moving toward Mi Nord, where his Gruppe is intended to join headquarters and become the reserve of Sturmgruppe Granit, the runner returns with the order to attack Visé 1. Hubel immediately turns his attention to the casemate and begins preparations to neutralise it. This position lies in the north-east sector of the fort. It mounts three 75-millimetre guns facing south. Within five minutes, the observation cupola is destroyed.

Throughout this phase of the battle, Junker 87 dive bombers remain on call above Eben Emael. Their presence exerts constant pressure on the Belgian defenders.

After a short interval, the crew returns to their posts. At 06:00, Sous-Lieutenant Desloover and Soldat Delcourt fire several salvos. Shortly thereafter, the officer is recalled to the command post. The crew again evacuates toward the Intermediate Level.

At 06:10, Major Jean Fritz Lucien Jottrand issues an order for general fire intended to occupy the crews. The guns are not directed against the Fallschirmjäger on the surface, as the trajectory of the shells passes over their positions.

The situation at Visé 1 remains confused. At 06:40, the command post prematurely reports to RFL that the casemate has been knocked out by German action. Five minutes later, the unsettled crew transmits a new report. Direct bomb hits are claimed against the casemate. Sounds of German movement are heard on the exterior of the structure.

At 07:00, worsening conditions inside the casemate caused by lack of ventilation force the crew to withdraw once more to the Intermediate Level.

Sturmgruppe Granit, Gruppe 11

As said earlier, Leutnant Rudolf Witzig. Unternehmen Granit’s commander also commands Glider Team 11. The team does not reach Eben-Emael with the sturmgruppe. After crossing the the River Rhine, the towing rope snap. Having progressed this far, Oberleutnant Rudolf Witzig refuses to abandon the operation or allow his men to attack Eben Emael without him. He instructs the glider pilot to cross the river Rhine into Germany and to search for a meadow large enough to permit both landing and a renewed take-off. Once the DFS 230 is on the ground, orders are issued to unload the aircraft. The glider is moved to the edge of the meadow. It is then reloaded. Witzig orders his men to clear hedges and fences. He hopes to create an improvised take-off strip.

During these actions, Witzig sets out to return to Köln-Ostheim. He begins on foot. He then requisitions a bicycle from a railway worker. He subsequently requisitions a motor vehicle from a medical officer. Using this means of transport, he reaches the Luftwaffe headquarters at Köln-Ostheim.

At the airfield, Witzig locates a flight commander familiar with the operational requirements. Acting on his own authority, the officer secures a reserve Junker 52 from General der Flieger Kurt Student. A parachute is issued to Witzig in case landing proves impossible. Preparations are made to resume the mission.

While airborne, Witzig briefs the Junker 52 pilot on the situation. He provides precise instructions for the landing site. At 06:05, Witzig returns with the Junker 52. The pilot lands the aircraft and taxis to the edge of the field where the glider is positioned. The engines remain running. The glider is reattached without delay. Orders are given for the tow flight to proceed toward Aachen. The route follows the same course toward the western German border. The assigned altitude is set at 750 metres. Subsequent events beyond this point are considered secondary to reaching the objective.

The renewed departure takes place under clear morning conditions. The glider is released over German territory. During the flight westwards, Luftwaffe formations are observed heading toward the front. Anti-aircraft fire is visible intermittently as small bursts in the distance. No hits are sustained. The course continues toward Fort Eben Emael, which the pilot navigates without difficulty.

Sturmgruppe Granit, Gruppe 2

Shortly after take-off, the DFS 230 glider of Gruppe 3 commanded by Walter Meier, (known as Pi-Meier because he serves with the pioneers) and piloted by Oberjäger Bredenbreck is forced to make an emergency landing near Soller, close to Düren. This occurs about ten minutes into the flight after an evasive manoeuvre to avoid collision with the towing aircraft.

Once on the ground, the occupants consider how they might still reach Fort Eben-Emael overland. A Leutnant of Pionier-Regiment 22 persuades the owners of two civilian vehicles, Adler 2.5-litre cabriolets, to lend them to the Fallschirmjäger. None of the men know how to drive. Their determination nevertheless outweighs all difficulties. With the assistance of two drivers from Organisation Todt, they set off toward their objective. Pilot Oberjäger Bredenbreck remains behind to guard the glider.

The two cars head for Maastricht. The journey proves difficult. Roads are congested with lorries and long columns of German troop transports moving west for the invasion of Belgium and the Netherlands. The group forces its way through. On reaching Maastricht, they cross the River Maas in rubber dinghies alongside the first infantrymen to reach the far bank after the bridges have been destroyed. They then seize a Dutch lorry from a market square and use it to drive the short distance to Kanne on the eastern bank of the Albert Canal.

In effect, Meier’s party becomes the first German troops to make contact with the paratroopers at Kanne. Their sudden appearance comes as a shock to the Belgian defenders, who are preparing to engage the airborne troops landed on the Opkanne heights. Shortly after entering the village, Meier’s Gruppe takes between thirty and forty Belgian soldiers prisoner. They then move toward the Canal, where they encounter a new obstacle. The bridge has been destroyed. This prevents them from reaching the rest of Sturmgruppe Granit, which is fighting less than two kilometres away at Fort Eben-Emael on the western bank.

Fire from Belgian strongpoints D and E, together with the casemates flanking the bridge, sweeps the canal bank where Meier’s men are pinned down. Max Maier is struck in the head by machine-gun fire from the position commanded by Lieutenant Berlaimont and is killed instantly. Fritz Gehlich confirms that nothing can be done to save him. Following this loss, Walter Meier decides to attempt a crossing of the Canal. The waterway is not wide, and debris from the destroyed bridge offers some concealment by breaking up movement in the water.

Meier crosses alone while the rest of Gruppe 2 remains under cover. After reaching the western bank, he proceeds on foot toward Emael. He avoids contact with enemy forces, which proves easier than expected, as his Fallschirmjäger uniform is not immediately recognised. At the entrance to Fort Eben-Emael he finds no guards. He moves on to Block II, roughly 300 metres to the left of the main entrance. On the way he is forced to take cover during a Stuka attack. Block II is also deserted.

Meier intends to return to Kanne and lead his Gruppe across to Fort Eben-Emael. When he reaches the Canal again, he comes under fire from Belgian strongpoints D, E, and C. This deters him from attempting another crossing. He withdraws back to Block II. There he encounters Oberjäger Harlos, commander of Gruppe 6 of Sturmgruppe Granit. Re-establishing contact with his own Gruppe proves impossible. Meier therefore remains under cover and waits for nightfall.

Multimedia

Belgium Defenders

One glider touches down near Cupola Nord. Another lands directly beside the anti-aircraft position. Its wing strikes Gun Number Three and knocks it over. Soldat Antoine drops flat into the pit just in time. The glider slides to a halt. Its door bursts open. German troops spill out onto the roof.

The anti-aircraft position on the fort roof is overrun within moments. German troops pour out of the glider. Grenades detonate among the gun pits. Bursts of fire from MP 38 sub-machine guns sweep the position. One German soldier leaps over the parapet of gun pit four. He fires at point-blank range. The three Belgian gunners inside are struck.

Soldat Marcel Boîte is hit twice. Despite his wounds, he breaks away and runs toward the fort to raise the alarm. Soldat René Fonbonne is captured at the position. Soldat Adrien Heine is left for dead at the bottom of the trench. The communications shelter is raked with machine-gun fire. Adjudant Longdoz crawls out through the debris. Adjudant Remy is killed inside the shelter.

The fighting at the anti-aircraft position ends almost as quickly as it begins. The German attackers now control the roof. For Fort Eben Emael, the opening blow has landed. The real ordeal is only beginning.

By 05:35 hours, ten minutes after the first glider lands, the fort is effectively blinded. Most weapons are neutralised. Only Visé 2 and Cupola Sud remain capable of firing. Around 06:00, Commandant Jottrand finally gains a clear understanding of events on the surface. He orders a sortie from Blocs 1 and 2. The attempt fails. Recently arrived Stuka dive-bombers drive the counter-attack back. Heinkel He 111 bombers also attack men working between the barracks and Bloc 1. Commandant Jottrand telephones the Régiment de Forteresse de Liège and requests artillery support. Shortly afterwards, Forts Pontisse and Barchon open fire onto the roof of Eben-Emael.

In Major Jottrand’s command post, it is now clear that German troops land by glider on the fort’s Upper Surface. Heavy detonations echo through the corridors of the Intermediate Level. Powerful air blasts confirm that casemates and cupolas are under attack. Reports arrive by telephone and runner. The two Maastricht Battery casemates are knocked out. Cupola Nord, the anti-aircraft battery, and both machine-gun casemates are also neutralised. There is no word from Adjudant Longdoz, last reported at the hangar.

To obtain direct observation of the Upper Surface, Major Jottrand orders the observer in Bloc 01 at the southern extremity to leave his post. He is to report enemy activity despite Stuka aircraft circling overhead.

Major Jottrand does not wait for the report. He orders Sous-Lieutenant Verstraeten to take roughly twelve men from Blocs I and II. The patrol climbs the eastern slope. They observe at least one Fallschirmjäger on the roof of Bloc II preparing a hollow charge. The German detonates the charge and escapes before Belgian fire can open. Stuka attacks immediately force the patrol to withdraw.

At the request of Feldwebel Wenzel, transmitted by radio, the Stukas dive-bomb casemates and cupolas lacking swastika identification panels. Major Jottrand reacts with anger and orders Verstraeten to advance again. Once inside the fort, the patrol disperses and does not re-form.

With the enemy on the Upper Surface and his troops under concrete cover, Major Jottrand requests artillery support from headquarters of the Position Fortifiée de Liège. During May 10^th and May 11^th, 1940, the 105-millimetre guns of Forts Pontisse and Barchon fire roughly 1,200 rounds at Fort Eben Emael.

As the shells begin to fall, Feldwebel Unger completes his task near Cupola Nord. He sees a signal, likely from Feldwebel Wenzel or one of his men, ordering him to move to Mi Nord. Unger orders his section to disperse into open formation to reduce losses. While crossing scrub on the crest of the Tranchée de Caester, a shell fragment kills Unger. Only Obergefreiter Else and two other Fallschirmjäger reach Wenzel’s command post.

The rest of the day

Consolidation

By 07:30, sixty-two German soldiers hold the roof of Fort Eben Emael. They have been in position for nearly two hours. Two men are dead. Eight are seriously wounded. Four are lightly wounded. Oberleutnant Witzig and Trupp 2 are still missing. All antiaircraft guns and exposed machine guns are destroyed. Mi Nord, Mi Sud, Vise 1, Maastricht 1, Maastricht 2, Cupola 120, and Cupola Nord are neutralised. Cupola Sud continues firing at reduced capacity. The surrounding blockhouses remain inactive.

Apart from intermittent artillery fire overhead, the surface of the fort lies relatively quiet. The Fallschirmjäger hold the upper works. They have no information on Majoor Jottrand’s preparations in the tunnels below. A Belgian counter-attack from any of the exits could reverse the situation. The nearest Wehrmacht spearheads lie approximately 160 kilometres distant, advancing across the Netherlands. Under Fall Gelb, infantry of the 4. Panzer-Division are to reach the walls within four hours of the gliders’ landing and relieve Sturmgruppe Granit. If the fort still holds out, the division will assume responsibility for its capture.

Only the south-eastern sector of the surface remains contested. There the hollow charges have failed for reasons that investigators do not establish. The Fallschirmjäger’s task requires them to prevent the Belgian garrison from regaining the surface installations and to hold until the 4. Panzer-Division arrives. Their numbers lie thinly distributed. Only forty men stand immediately available. Others shelter in casemates against Belgian artillery fire from the south.

Wenzel sends out runners for information. A runner shortly afterwards reports that Unger has been killed. He adds that Obergefreiter Else, second in command, cannot subdue the 75-millimetre guns at position 31. Wenzel asks whether the runner has seen any of Walter Meier’s Gruppe 2. He has not. Wenzel orders him to find Oberleutnant Witzig and request that Schwarz’s Gruppe reinforce Else. The runner returns and reports that Witzig cannot be located. None of Schwarz’s Reserve Gruppe from Witzig’s glider can be found either.

Gilg returns with the same report. The signallers cannot locate Witzig. Wenzel concludes that Witzig’s glider has not arrived. Leutnant Delica, next in line for command, also remains unaccounted for. Delica’s glider has landed approximately 460 metres south of the fort. The volume of Belgian fire from that direction indicates that Niedermeier’s Trupp, which landed with Delica, is heavily engaged.

Wenzel directs the Funker to a suitable position to establish radio contact with Sturmabteilung Koch headquarters. A radio position is established at the northern rampart. A dressing station is set up at the same location. Early fighting has already resulted in 2 dead and 12 wounded. Radio contact is made with Sturmgruppe Beton at Vroenhoven, where Hauptmann Walter Koch maintains his command post. A situation report is transmitted. Close air support is requested to suppress approaches to the fort entrances and to prevent Belgian reinforcement from the village of Eben Emael.

Wenzel assumes command of the operation. No one disputes this. Delica remains pinned in a casemate to the south under heavy Belgian artillery fire. He serves as a Luftwaffe communications officer responsible for directing Stuka support. His role lies outside infantry combat. Witzig later states that Delica had the opportunity to take command but did not do so.

Wenzel calls for Stuka support by radio. Within twenty minutes several flights arrive and attack the 120-millimetre cupola and the casemate at the fort’s entrance. Following a further request to Sturmabteilung Koch, two He 111 aircraft pass over the fort at 180 metres’ altitude. They drop ammunition containers by parachute.

The drop zone lies under heavy Belgian fire. To avoid casualties among his own men, Wenzel approaches Heiner Lange, who is wounded and in the care of Belgian prisoners. He orders the prisoners to recover the containers. Lange, who speaks French, translates the order. The prisoners comply and the supplies reach the German position.

Witzig’s Arrival

At 08:30, a Fallschirmjäger sights a glider descending in looping circles over the fort. No reinforcements have been promised. The aircraft proves to be a DFS 230. The glider draws no anti-aircraft fire and lands near Casemate 19, where Wenzel has established his headquarters. Wenzel and others approach the glider. They find that Oberleutnant Witzig has returned with it.

Oberleutnant Witzig emerges with Feldwebel Schwarz and reserve Trupp 11. By the time Oberleutnant Rudolf Witzig reaches Eben Emael, most of the fort is already in German hands. Fighting on the surface has largely subsided. Fire is sporadic and limited in intensity. Witzig proceeds to Objective 19, the designated command post location. There he reports to Feldwebel Wenzel, who, as said earlier, has assumed control of the position in the interim.

Wenzel briefs Witzig on the situation and the operation continues. Wenzel has already been receiving situation reports from various assault elements. A functioning command post is established. Essential items, including aerial photographs, call signs, radios, and command material, are assembled to sustain control of the platoon. So by the time Witzig reaches the fort, Sturmgruppe Granit has largely accomplished its principal mission. The remaining tasks require the Germans to enter the fort’s interior through the various openings, blunt Belgian counter-thrusts, and contain the garrison until ground forces arrive. The success of the relief operation is not assured. The Belgian garrison remains unaware of the extent of its defeat. It remains capable of further resistance.

The Fallschirmjäger at the northern point of the fort lie widely separated from the others. Sporadic firing indicates continuing German activity, particularly to the south-west, where Feldwebel Arendt holds his position.

Casemate 10

After disabling his casemate, Feldwebel Arendt sends Merz to destroy Casemate 10. Aerial photographs have not clearly identified this installation. It appears as a high, round-topped concrete structure, but proves to be the air-conditioning outlet. Merz blows the grille off a ventilator and drops in a 2.7-kilogram charge. The crew of Arendt’s casemate soon suffer from fumes from the ventilation system.

Feldwebel Arendt then moves to assess the lower levels. Leaving Stopp and Kupsch in the casemate, he takes Merz and Mueller down the 118-step shaft. Their torches show a haze. They find a latrine and a 105-millimetre gun barrel and observe the tunnel leading towards the casemate. A massive steel door stands in place. Behind it a wall of steel beams blocks further access. On returning to the casemate they find the air has cleared.

Belgian artillery fire that has pinned Arendt’s squad inside now lifts. He moves his men into the open and sweeps westward through the woods. He finds no Belgian troops but locates unoccupied trenches. On returning to the casemate, Arendt resolves to attack Casemate 4 in the valley below. He leads, followed by Kupsch and Stopp, each carrying half of a 50-kilogram charge.

The party advances under cover of fences and brush. They close to within 27 metres of the casemate. The casemate has an observation cupola, which Arendt judges he can climb. Using the stepped concrete surfaces, he reaches the top. The others follow with the charge. Arendt centres the charge, fits the fuse, ignites it, and withdraws. He does not return to assess the damage. A Belgian patrol watching from approximately 23 metres away does not detect the operation.

Approximately fifteen minutes later, while Feldwebel Arendt lies on the turf near his casemate and the rest of the squad shelters inside, a ten-man Belgian patrol passes at a distance of about 32 metres. They move towards the casemate Neuhaus has captured. The patrol does not look in Arendt’s direction. He re-enters the casemate through the opening, where Stopp pulls him through. Merz then fires from the opening. The patrol withdraws. Belgian machine-gun fire subsequently strikes the casemate.

At 16:00, with his squad reunited, Arendt decides to demolish the stairwell. He is concerned by Belgian activity in the area and the possibility of having to withdraw northward. He wants to leave nothing usable behind. He orders the explosives and equipment moved out in preparation for demolition.

Arendt sends Merz to Witzig with a request for reinforcements. He intends to occupy the trenches he located earlier near the southern end of the fort to deny the Belgians the surface. Witzig comes forward to assess the position, approves Arendt’s plan, and dispatches elements of two Trupps.

Before Feldwebel Arendt can position the reinforcements in the trenches, a report indicates suspicious movement near the southern end of the fort. He moves his machine gun and several men to the casemate’s southern embankment. There they observe a Belgian skirmish line forming and beginning to advance under fire.

The Belgians, under Luitenant De Sloovere, close almost to the casemate. Merz, the machine gunner, suffers a wound in the arm from a grenade fragment. Arendt attempts to organise a counter-attack but finds that several of his men have fallen back. The Belgian attack ends when De Sloovere’s troops exhaust their grenades and carbine ammunition and break contact.

Feldwebel Arendt, Schwarz, and the wounded Merz return to the casemate. The Belgian attack has delayed the demolition of the stairwell. A German voice then calls out. It is Wenzel.

Oberleutnant Witzig has ordered Wenzel to take his Gruppe and clear Belgian troops from the woods along the north-western surface of the fort. Wenzel has moved out, come under heavy fire, and judged five men insufficient to advance. Witzig has assembled additional men and returned them to Wenzel’s command, ordering a renewed move towards the woods.

On the second move Wenzel finds the area quiet. He moves south through unfamiliar terrain to Casemate 12, where he meets Arendt. Arendt advises him to enter the casemate, warning that conditions outside are unsafe. Wenzel disagrees and invites Arendt to confirm this himself. Arendt brings his men out. A volley of fire kills one of them immediately. Belgian fire on the casemate face prevents re-entry through the front.

The party moves behind the casemate, where it lies screened from Belgian fire. Feldwebel Arendt places his men in defensive positions. Wenzel announces that he will go to Niedermeier for help, then takes a hit. He reports, “Ich bin verwundet, mein Kopf,” and loses consciousness briefly.

Belgian small-arms fire intensifies and Belgian artillery begins to fall on the position. The Germans cannot locate the source of fire. Additional Fallschirmjäger arrive. Someone reports that Wenzel is dead. Wenzel responds that he is not, and calls for bandages. Kramer reaches him. A bullet has pierced his helmet at the scalp line and he is bleeding heavily. Kramer drags Wenzel into the casemate and bandages the wound. Other men enter after him. Arendt enters through the opening but does not clear it fully, and Stopp pulls him through. Schulz, finding the fire on the entrance too heavy, withdraws towards Niedermeier’s casemate instead.

Inside, Feldwebel Arendt’s men cannot approach the opening because of incoming fire. They move to the left 75-millimetre gun. Earlier in the day, during a quieter period, Arendt had had one of the Belgian prisoners taken that morning explain the operation of the gun. With a member of his squad observing from the opening, the prisoner now shows Arendt how to traverse the 75-millimetre. Arendt fires the gun as rapidly as he can load it. The Belgian fire eventually slackens.

When Belgian fire ceases, Wenzel and others withdraw northward. Arendt and his men remain inside the casemate.

Belgian Reaction

Close to 10:00, Major Van der Auwera issues orders to several gun-crew chiefs to retake their casemates and cupolas and restore their weapons to service. Sergent Cremers reaches the turret of his 120-millimetre guns and finds it essentially as he left it. He calls for a technician to repair the minor damage. By 10:00 the 120-millimetre guns are again operable. Van der Auwera passes the report to the command post.

Lieutenant Dehousse, the firing officer for these guns, awaits orders to engage the bridge at Vroenhoven, the primary target assigned to the 120-millimetre guns under the Belgian artillery fire plan.

The orders do not come. The Belgian tactical situation near the bridge remains unclear. Liège declines to authorise Commandant Jottrand to open fire. Dehousse cannot persuade Jottrand to act without higher authority. He refuses Cremers’ requests to fire on his own initiative.

At 11:30, after approximately ninety minutes’ delay, authorisation arrives. Sergent Cremers fires the left-hand 120-millimetre gun. A moment later the tube of the other gun explodes. Feldwebel Wenzel has dropped a charge into it from outside. The atmosphere in the cupola grows unbreathable and the crew withdraws to the lower level. Ten minutes later Lieutenant Dehousse returns to inspect the guns and finds them unsafe to fire. He reports this to Jottrand.

Commandant Jottrand responds that if Dehousse can return the guns to service, he should engage Maastricht-Lanaeken, the canal, and position 31. The crews work on the guns but cannot clear the breeches. The 120-millimetre guns take no further part in the battle. German advance elements subsequently cross the bridge at Vroenhoven, which had been the guns’ principal assigned target. The crew in the cupola fires a carbine at occasional German troops visible through the observation ports. It is the only functional weapon remaining to them.

At 06:35 Junker 87 Stukas in V formation pass over the fort. Their mission requires them to bomb Belgian casemates and cupolas on request. They look for signals from the Fallschirmjäger indicating targets but find none. Each captured installation has been marked with a swastika. After several minutes overhead the aircraft break away to pursue targets of opportunity, their secondary mission. They bomb the village of Eben Emael and the fort entrance.

Local inhabitants who have taken refuge in shelters excavated into a nearby hill remain largely unharmed. Others shelter in cellars. The bombing kills thirty-six civilians and wounds more.

Chaplain Meesen raises the request with Major Van der Auwera, who consents. On leaving the fort, Lecron finds that approximately half of his cottage has been destroyed. He recovers his wife and two of the children dead from the rubble. His youngest daughter, an infant, remains unhurt. He wraps her in his jacket and returns with her to the fort. An armourer shapes sheet metal into a crude cradle in the dispensary. He visits her when able between his duties at the casemate.

Chaplain Meesen, as a non-combatant responsible for the wounded and dying, enjoys free movement through the fort and observes events in several of its sectors. After a series of heavy explosions he learns that Casemate 12 has been knocked out. Wounded from the casemate then filter into the hospital. Some walk and others come carried, with lacerations, burns, smoke blackening, and bleeding. None can identify the device responsible for the explosions.

Several of the wounded report that seriously injured men might still lie in the casemate, Verbois among them. Meesen, who has administered communion to Verbois regularly, puts on a mask and moves through the tunnels, which fill with yellow smoke. He feels his way along the wall with his right hand. His lamp proves of little use.

At the junction where the tunnel from Casemate 12 meets the main tunnel, Meesen encounters Major Van der Auwera. Van der Auwera agrees to accompany him to look for the wounded. They pass the steel hatch to the casemate. Meesen notes that no Belgians remain in the area. Van der Auwera replies that Germans are present. They begin to climb the stairs, with Van der Auwera leading. They hear voices above. Meesen keeps a hand on Van der Auwera’s belt to maintain contact. Major Van der Auwera calls out in German, “Wer da; wer da?” Feldwebel Arendt and his men hold the head of the shaft. Both sides hold position. Van der Auwera advances with his pistol raised. Chaplain Meesen holds his belt to check him. Van der Auwera then observes that the Germans have placed a barrier one storey above and cannot descend. He flashes a light on the planking overhead to confirm this.

They climb three further steps. Chaplain Meesen then shouts a warning as an object passes them down the shaft. A grenade detonates below them. Both men hold the rail. They abandon the climb.They descend without helmets, feeling their way, and reach the bottom. The tunnel stands unlit. They move across debris to put distance between themselves and the shaft, expecting further grenades. After some distance Van der Auwera calls a halt and they sit down. They then move on through the steel door barrier. Meesen assists Van der Auwera in clearing debris from the doors, and both close them. Major Van der Auwera remarks that his hearing has been affected. They then move towards the command post.

Operational Awareness

Commandant Jottrand’s information on the enemy remains fragmentary. Reports from within the fort arrive in incomplete or distorted form. The nature of the German weapons compounds the difficulty. A single charge produces effects sufficient to disable emplacements designed to withstand heavy artillery and armour rated against the largest anti-tank rounds and aerial bombs.

The Belgians do not identify the weapon in use. Reports from Jottrand’s non-commissioned officers and officers, and from Belgian units in the vicinity that have observed the Fallschirmjäger, indicate that the German force on the surface, whatever its effectiveness, remains numerically small.

By 09:00 Jottrand has established a degree of order and begins considering means to retake the surface. He requires additional information. At about this time he receives a telephone call from Liège ordering him to clear the Germans from the top of the fort. Headquarters appears to have considered the scale of the German attack overestimated.

Commandant Jottrand dispatches Lieutenant Mouton to Casemate 19 on reconnaissance. Mouton reaches the entrance to the stairwell but does not ascend to the gun chambers and returns with an incomplete report. Jottrand rebukes him and sends him back at 10:00. The round trip from Jottrand’s position to Casemate 19 takes forty minutes. Jottrand directs Mouton to establish whether the guns can fire and whether the Belgians can reach the surface through the casemate. He assigns two sergents to accompany him.

The party enters the gun chamber. A large hole has been blown through the one-metre concrete wall, admitting daylight. The walls stand scorched and the floor lies covered with dust, concrete, and metal fragments. Mouton climbs the ladder to the observation cupola and hears German voices. He signals his men to withdraw and returns to report.

From Lieutenant Mouton’s report and those of Meesen and Van der Auwera, Jottrand assesses that retaking any of the casemates from the interior is not feasible. A retaking party would have to ascend between eighteen and twenty-seven metres of stairs exposed to fire from above.

Commandant Jottrand’s principal concern is that the Germans might enter the fort in force through one or several unmanned casemates. Such a move could threaten Casemate 23 and other operable positions. A successful penetration could force the fort’s surrender.

He orders the tunnels sealed using the steel barriers provided for this contingency. He directs the construction of sandbagged revetments along the tunnels between these barriers and the command post and other critical installations. Eighteen revetments are built and manned.

Commandant Jottrand has no infantry available for a counterattack. He has no artillerymen trained in infantry tactics. This reflects a Belgian Army doctrinal decision taken after the First World War. Following extended debate, the army had determined that infantry would not be assigned to the forts. Infantry tasks, including outer defence and counterattack, would fall to mobile divisions in the vicinity. Fort garrisons were trained in artillery and technical disciplines but not in infantry tactics.

Counterattack Lieutenant Verstraeten

Commandant Jottrand nonetheless carries out his orders. He directs Lieutenant Verstraeten to conduct the counterattack. Verstraeten calls for volunteers. Few respond. Two sergeants are sent to collect additional men, and Verstraeten eventually musters twelve, armed with carbines. The party leaves the fort and moves north along the wall towards Casemate 4.

At 10:00 a member of the patrol indicates the casemate to Lieutenant Verstraeten. Repositioning, Verstraeten observes a German, probably Feldwebel Arendt, on top of the casemate. The man appears occupied with his work and inattentive to the patrol. He departs before the Belgians fire. The subsequent explosion from the charge Arendt has placed is of such magnitude that the Belgians initially attribute it to heavy howitzer fire. With only light weapons, under Belgian artillery fire landing ahead of his position, and under Stuka attack, Verstraeten withdraws. Commandant Jottrand, dissatisfied with the limited results and information obtained, orders him back to the surface. In the interval Verstraeten’s men have dispersed within the fort. A new force is assembled. At 10:30 Lieutenant Verstraeten and Sergent L’Hereuse move out with a small party along the previous route.

Counterattack Capitaine Wagemans

A Belgian soldier sights troops to the west approaching the fort entrance. Verstraeten, concerned about his line of withdrawal, turns back. At the entrance he meets Capitaine Wagemans in command of forty grenadiers. Wagemans has been ordered to counterattack the Germans on the fort. Unfamiliar with the terrain, he requests guides. Commandant Jottrand assigns Lieutenant Verstraeten and Lieutenant Deuse. At 11:30 the force moves out.

Without grenades, with only light weapons, and under continuing Stuka harassment, Wagemans takes the force along the west wall. Halfway to Kazemat 4 he divides the unit, sending part under Verstraeten back towards Casemate 3. Verstraeten’s men then climb onto the fort’s surface and move into the vicinity of Casemates 12 and 9, firing on suspected German positions. At 11:15 Lieutenant Verstraeten suffers a wound and returns to the fort. Capitaine Wagemans, in the woods along the west wall, hears firing on the south-western surface but cannot coordinate with Verstraeten’s party. He concludes that something has gone wrong.

At 14:00 Capitaine Wagemans encounters Luitenant Deuse attending a seriously wounded soldier. Deuse departs and returns with two medical orderlies and a stretcher.

Stuka attention prevents Wagemans from mounting a productive attack through the rest of the day. Any aggressive movement draws an immediate air response. By nightfall his men are exhausted and without water. He orders a withdrawal to the fort entrance and sends a sergeant to Jottrand to request entry. Jottrand accepts the wounded but declines to admit Wagemans’s force, which would strain the fort’s facilities. Wagemans returns to his regiment.

During the day Commandant Jottrand periodically requests artillery fire from the sister forts Pontisse and Barchon, several kilometres distant. Some of the fire is intended to keep Witzig’s force under cover and discourage aggressive action. The requests come as a surprise to Pontisse and Barchon, which had not anticipated being asked to fire on Eben Emael so soon after the outbreak of hostilities.

The artillery fire prompts Oberleutnant Witzig to reposition his force. With his small detachment, he recognises that his hold on the surface remains tenuous. He considers it possible that the shelling is a preparatory bombardment for a Belgian infantry attack.

Counterattack Van der Auwera

Commandant Jottrand transfers responsibility for organising a further counterattack to Major Van der Auwera, who assembles volunteers from different parts of the fort. Lieutenants De Sloovere, Gigon, and Legaie, several non-commissioned officers, and twenty men leave the fort under his command. Pontisse and Barchon have by this time ceased firing. A small quantity of grenades is obtained. No machine guns are available. Recognising that the interior of Casemate 12 is in German hands, Major Van der Auwera directs part of his force to its embankment to fire at the Germans to the north as a diversion. With the remainder he moves to Casemate 3, climbs onto the surface, and advances towards Casemate 9. He leaves a non-commissioned officer and five men on top of Casemate 6 to cover the rear.

The counterattack proves poorly executed. Orders are followed reluctantly. Several men refuse to advance. Sergent Hermesse at Casemate 12 suffers a wound and withdraws, leaving Lieutenant De Sloovere with three men. Observing German movement that appears intended to dislodge his position, De Sloovere and his men expend their grenades. Van der Auwera moves over to order conservation of ammunition but arrives too late. De Sloovere then hears German orders shouted from the far side of the slope and flare pistols being fired. Red flares appear overhead, bringing Stuka attack. Major Van der Auwera’s effective force is reduced to himself, Lieutenants De Sloovere, Legaie, one non-commissioned officer, and four enlisted men.

At approximately 18:15 Major Van der Auwera orders a withdrawal. Lieutenant De Sloovere has captured a German machine gun. Other members of the party have recovered German explosives. Under cover of the fort they examine a photograph taken from a German casualty that depicts Fort Eben Emael, with casemates and defences identified.

Counterattack Lieutenant Levaque

Jottrand then orders the reserve at Wonck to the fort. He telephones at approximately 14:00.

Meanwhile, at 14:00 Casemate 4 resumes fire. The Belgians have apparently repaired the damage from Arendt’s earlier attack. Witzig sends Gramse of Harlos’s squad to silence it. Gramse moves through the woods and places an 11-kilogram hollow charge against one of the embrasures, silencing the position for three hours.

Lieutenant Levaque, commander of the reserves at Wonck sets out at 14:45 with 233 men. The distance measures five kilometres. At a forced march, arrival is expected within an hour. The column carries two machine guns, three automatic rifles, and one carbine per man. Stukas attack the column almost as soon as it begins moving. The march slows as men disperse into fields to avoid bombs. Lieutenant Levaque and fifteen others reach the fort at 17:00. Others follow in small groups. Total strength inside the fort reaches approximately one hundred by nightfall. The condition of the arriving men is visible to the garrison.

On arrival Lieutenant Levaque receives orders from Luitenant Polis directing an immediate attack on the surface to clear the Germans. He allows his men a brief rest. When Kapitein Hotermans, with Levaque and Luitenant Quitin, attempts to reassemble them, many evade detection. Approximately one hundred men are eventually collected. Commandant Jottrand obtains a heavy concentration of artillery fire from Fort Pontisse and Barchon in preparation for Levaque’s attack.

At 18:45 Lieutenant Levaque’s men move by twos and threes from the tunnel to an assembly point near Casemate 3. They pass stragglers from Major Van der Auwera’s force returning to the fort. They advance towards Casemate 12. Levaque observes Wagemans’s grenadiers at a distance but makes no attempt to coordinate. Darkness is approaching and he judges coordination impracticable.

He decides to attack the German force at Casemate 12. Eight men agree to follow him. The Germans halt their advance and bring machine-gun fire on the party from several directions. The Belgians lie pinned down and withdraw one by one to the slope below Casemate 12. A Junker 87 Stuka attack of approximately one hour follows. The survivors then return to the fort. Lieutenant Levaque reports to Capitaine Hotermans at 19:45.

Shortly afterwards, Capitaine Hotermans, with Lieutenants Levaque, Gigon, and Quitin and several non-commissioned officers, circulate among the garrison for further volunteers. Sixty men respond. The party moves to the exit. Stuka bombing then concentrates on the exit and prevents the force from leaving. Jottrand orders Levaque to route the force through the tunnels to Casemate 4, which has an external exit provided for counterattacks in a less observed direction.

Halfway through the tunnels a blast of air and the sound of a heavy explosion from the direction of Kazemat 4 strike the force. Oberleutnant Witzig, anticipating a Belgian use of this exit, has ordered Feldwebel Harlos to set a further charge against Casemate 4. Capitaine Hotermans halts the force and moves forward alone into the casemate, where he finds a large hole where the exit stood. Recognising that Germans are close, he orders a sandbag barrier built in the tunnel, manned by Lieutenant Levaque’s force, and abandons the idea of counterattacking through this exit.

After an interval during which he consolidates his position, Oberleutnant Witzig directs his attention to Casemate 17, which commands the canal. Sergent Henrotay’s crew continues to operate the 60-millimetre gun and machine guns. Witzig and German troops along the ridge on the far bank of the canal work jointly to reduce the position, which threatens the relief operation.

Feldwebel Harlos conducts the attack. He first lowers a hollow charge over the wall on a rope wound with primacord connected to the fuse. He manoeuvres it alongside the projecting concrete, and detonates it without effect. He repeats the attempt three times, under fire from Casemate 35 to the south and from Belgian positions near Kanne. The casemate continues to fire.

The 75-millimetre guns in Casemate 23 engage periodically during the day, firing at Oberleutnant Witzig’s force and at German columns in the distance. Witzig approves Niedermeier’s proposal to make a further attempt on the cupola. Niedermeier, with List, Graef, and Stucke, moves through brush along a hollow leading to the casemate and observes the dome rising to fire at approximately two-minute intervals. They intend to place a charge during a lowered interval. A flight of Junker 87 Stukas then attacks the dome with 230-kilogram bombs, and the German party withdraws. When Niedermeier returns after the air attack, a Belgian machine gun outside the fort opens fire. He abandons the attempt and returns to his kazemat.

German advance to Fort Eben Emael

Oberst Melzer commands the 151. Infanterie-Regiment of the 4. Panzer-Division. Oberstleutnant Mikosch’s 51. Pionier-Bataillon is attached to him. Their orders direct them to reach Witzig. Stiff Belgian resistance slows them. The destroyed bridges at Maastricht and Canne also impede them. Two columns of Mikosch’s battalion press forward regardless. By late afternoon on May 10^th, 1940, the battalion reaches Kanne. A platoon under Feldwebel Portsteffen breaks off and turns south. His task requires him to cross the Albertkanaal near the fort’s northern tip. He then links up with the Fallschirmjäger glidermen above. The remainder of the battalion crosses at Kanne, swings south, and envelops the fort from the south-west.

Feldwebel Portsteffen attempts several launches of inflated rubber assault craft. Belgian fire sweeps the canal. Casemate 17 pours especially heavy fire onto his men. The embankment forces his troops into the open while they lower the boats. He breaks off the attempt as too costly.

At 19:00 Luitenant Moreau arrives at the fort. He serves as a staff officer for the commander of the 7^e Division d’Infanterie. His inspection leaves him deeply troubled. German glider forces, sent to seize the bridge at Kanne, have crossed there despite its demolition. By 16:00 they have overrun the Belgian defenders under Luitenant Gericot. The fort now lacks protection from the north-west. Moreau warns Majoor Jottrand directly. The north-west wall lies open to imminent German attack. Defenders at Casemate 3 must remain especially alert. Casemate 4 stands silenced. The fort lies defenceless to the west and south-west.

Belgian fire intensifies. Rounds strike the canal banks and ricochet wildly. At 21:00 Feldwebel Portsteffen again tries to launch his boats. Belgian searchlights illuminate the sector. Casemate 17 fires on every suspicious movement. He fails once more.

About an hour later darkness conceals his platoon. His men shift their damaged boats to a point opposite the fort’s northern tip. A sharp whistle sends the Pioneers darting from cover with the craft. They tumble aboard and push off. Within minutes Belgian observers spot them. Flashes erupt from the fort only a few hundred metres ahead and to their left. Artillery shells throw up geysers in the canal. Dense smoke clouds the bank behind them. The platoon reaches the opposite embankment. Feldwebel Portsteffen works his men along the narrow bank on the fort’s north-west side. They skirt the flooded ground around the Geer. Late in the night they reach the moat along the north-west wall. Only the moat now separates them from the fortress.

Multimedia

Gruppe 2

After dark, Walter Meier the German commander of Gruppe 2 returns once more to the western bank of the Canal. Using field glasses, he observes German infantry now occupying the eastern bank. To his astonishment, they open fire on him. They fail to recognise his airborne uniform. Meier attempts to signal that he is German and that he can show them a safe route to the fort. The combination of the destroyed bridge and continued Belgian machine-gun fire prevents the infantry from crossing.

Frustrated, Meier exposes himself to Belgian fire and crosses back to the eastern bank. There he briefs two German infantry Lieutenants on the situation. Despite all complications, relief for the paratroopers is finally imminent. Before the infantry reaches Kanne, the three 88-millimetre batteries of Aldinger’s Abteilung move forward. They take up positions on a hill midway between Fort Sint Pieter, an old Dutch fort south of Maastricht with no strategic value, and the Albert Canal. From there, they improve the accuracy of their fire. These batteries support the attacks on the Canal crossings and provide crucial assistance to Sturmgruppe Granit, which remains cut off and in a critical situation outside Fort Eben-Emael.

At 22:30, the bridgehead established by the paratroopers after a day of intense fighting finally makes contact with Oberstleutnant Mikosch. A hazardous relief operation follows. 6. und 7. Kompanie, II. Bataillon, Infanterie-Regiment 151, reinforced by 2. und 3. Kompanie, Pionier-Bataillon 51, together with a machine-gun platoon, cross the Albert Canal in rubber dinghies. Before this crossing, German troops succeed in silencing machine-gun fire from well-concealed Belgian positions outside Kanne. Another decisive factor is the suppression of Belgian artillery fire. At 03:00, the relieving forces reach the airborne troops and take over their positions.

During these hours, Walter Meier continues his urgent search for the remaining men of his Gruppe at Kanne. He later records that he is unable to find them. An infantry officer has ordered them back to Maastricht after relieving them, in recognition of their actions at Kanne. Meier later learns that Gefreiter Bader alone has taken 121 Belgian prisoners. He does manage to locate Gefreiter Ölmann, who has remained behind. Ölmann appears exhausted and worn down after firing throughout the night toward the western bank of the Canal. Although Ölmann wishes to accompany him, Meier sends him to the dressing station. Meier then returns to Block II. There he finally meets his Sturmgruppenführer, Oberleutnant Rudolf Witzig. Shortly afterwards, infantry units arrive and complete the relief of the airborne troops.

Orders for the Night

At approximately 21:15 Commandant Jottrand issues orders for the night. He establishes a guard system for continuous manning of the barricades, arranges regular relief at guns and observation posts, and directs that he be informed immediately of any German activity. Remaining operable guns are to fire periodically to restrict German movement. Interdiction fire from Fort Pontisse is requested to discourage German activity overnight.

From inside the fort, sporadic machine-gun fire and shell bursts are audible, mainly from the direction of the canal. It remains unclear whether the fire comes from the German attackers on Casemate 17 or from its defenders. Flares illuminate the area around Casemate 33 at intervals, some Belgian and some German. German artillery falls close to the fort at intervals.

The defensive measures in place would, on paper, have been sufficient against a force many times the size of Oberleutnant Witzig’s. The garrison’s unease increases as the night continues. The hollow charge remains an unidentified weapon to the Belgians. This uncertainty affects their assessment of their ability to resist further attacks.

When a detail begins shifting explosives towards Casemate 18, apparently for more convenient positioning, rumours spread within the fort that the Germans have entered the tunnels and that the tunnel to Casemate 18 is about to be blown.

At 03:00 a heavy explosion shakes the command post and the installations near the entrance. It appears to originate from German artillery positioned behind the walls of the mill. The machine guns and 60-mm guns of Cazemate 22 return fire. Guns at the entrance casemate and at Casemate 6 engage, in order to deny an infantry assault from the direction of Casemate 19 access to the walls. Jottrand, anticipating increased German activity, sends officers to each barricade with orders to hold at all costs.

Further underground noises follow. Reports circulate within the fort that the Germans have crossed the canal and begun tunnelling beneath the works. Chief Surgeon Dr Steegen credits this report.

Germans moving in

In the early hours of May 11^th, 1940, additional Fallschirmjäger under Leutnant Meissner cross to the eastern bank of the Canal and join Feldwebel Portsteffen. Their orders instruct them to silence Casemate 4. They must prevent it from blocking a German attack from the west.

Inside the tunnels below the casemate, morale sags. The incessant pounding above wears down the garrison. Smoke seeps through the steel door of Casemate 4. Sergent Zone commands a Belgian detachment manning sand-bagged guns aimed down the tunnel. He reports that the barricade has been blown. His report proves incorrect. It nonetheless raises alarm at the command post. The staff believes the Germans are seizing control of the interior.

Feldwebel Portsteffen’s Pioniere drop explosives into Casemate 13. The blast destroys the stairs. It tears the doors and steel barriers from their supports. Crews from installations to the north withdraw towards the command post. The canal-facing side of the fort now stands undefended. Gaps remain in vital passageways between German and Belgian positions. Sensing collapse, the Germans turn to terror. They fire small arms down the long dark tunnels. They drop heavy charges into entryways they cannot descend. They keep up incessant noise and pressure to demoralise the garrison.

By dusk, Oberstleutnant Mikosch’s force reaches the blown bridge at Kanne. The Belgian 2^e Regiment de Grenadiers offers light fire. He forces a crossing in rubber assault boats. He disassembles his heavier equipment to shuttle it piecemeal over the Albertkanaal. By midnight his forces assemble on the west bank. Melzer works through the night. He positions men and anti-tank guns under artillery support at Canne. He places high-velocity anti-tank cannon behind the walls of the mill at Loverix, several hundred metres from the fort entrance. From there they are to engage Casemates 3 and 6 at dawn. Casemate 3 serves as the entrance’s defensive position and the key to the south-west corner. Sergents Debarsy and Lecron stand heroically at their posts. German anti-tank fire from Loverix and machine-gun fire from the ruins of Lecron’s own cottage batter the casemate. Despite the danger, the men stay with their guns. They fire on Portsteffen’s men working on the fort’s surface near Casemate 4. Sergents Degrange and Lecron continue firing even after the Germans take the casemate. They make the Germans pay for it.

At 09:00 Capitaine Hotermans and Lieutenant De Sloovere enter the casemate to observe the Germans through the embrasures. Commandant Jottrand is preparing another counterattack and assembling volunteers. A German anti-tank round then strikes the wall. Grenades tumble past the main entrance. Portsteffen’s troops have reached the entrance superstructure. On receiving this report, Jottrand cancels the counterattack.

Multimedia

Belgians wake-up call

At 09:00 Chaplain Meesen walks through the tunnels under the fort. Only his lamp provides light. Smoke obscures his view. Below Casemate 18 a small light hangs near sealed doors. He hears German voices beyond, tearing at the barrier. Meesen turns back to the command post. Commandant Jottrand is burning secret military papers. Meesen now grasps the gravity of the situation. Jottrand sends him to check the men at the 120’s. He finds them alert but frustrated. They cannot use their guns. Whenever they open the breeches to fire, a German grenade might tumble in. This threat recurs repeatedly and deters aggressive fire.

Later, as Chaplain Meesen stands near Commandant Jottrand, a violent explosion shakes the command post. Concrete chunks rain down. A wounded man staggers past. Men challenge each other in the dark tunnels, uncertain whether the sound ahead is friend or foe. No one knows the true situation. Lieutenant Quitin passes like a phantom with his carbine and vanishes into the blackness. Anguish and fear give way to stark terror.

A subsequent explosion shakes the command post and dislodges chunks of concrete. At 09:00 Major Van der Auwera, Lieutenant Levaque, and the defenders at the sandbag barrier in Casemate 12 see heavy smoke emerging from beneath the steel doors ahead of them.

On the surface of the fort, Witzig and Portsteffen coordinate the next phase. They move between positions and relieve glider troops who have held their casemates overnight.

The Casemate 12 explosion

Felswebel Arendt judges that relief is near. He detonates a 45-kilogram charge in the stairwell of Casemate 12. The blast destroys the shafts, the ammunition elevator, and the stairs. It blows out the steel doors. It hurls the officers and men at the sandbag barricade back into the fort’s interior. Capitaine Hotermans later compares the effect to the propellant of a bullet firing in a gun barrel. Pressure confined in the tunnel knocks some men flat. It drives others into walls. It propels debris down the tunnel at high velocity.

Shortly afterwards, Lieutenants Polis and Legaie arrive at the command post from Kazemat 18. They report the barriers there breached. De Sloovere follows with news of the Kazemat 12 explosion. Sergent Corombelle and Soldats Dejardin, Massotte, and Gillet are killed. Others lie unconscious. Major Van der Auwera suffers concussion. Lieutenant Levaque is burned and disoriented. He issues firing orders to soldiers who are not present.

The explosions rupture barrels of chloride of lime stored for sanitation. Chlorine mixes with the smoke-laden air. Men report drowsiness and severe headaches. Maintaining alertness at posts becomes more difficult. Debris clogs the tunnels. Wounded men accumulate in the passageways. Some move toward the command post. Others hold their posts or remain trapped by blocked routes of withdrawal.

Casemate 30 falls

German anti-tank guns then engage Casemate 30 on the south-east wall. Under Sergent Degrange, the position remains structurally intact. It returns fire against machine guns and anti-tank guns at several points outside the fort. A high-velocity shell disables the west 60-millimetre cannon. The machine gun in the embrasure below continues firing. A subsequent shell penetrates the 1.2-metre reinforced concrete wall. It severs electrical cables and stops the ventilation. Degrange orders gas masks and returns his crew to the remaining guns. A further shell wounds Soldat Smets. Another strikes the east embrasure and wedges between the 60-millimetre gun and the opening, disabling it. German small-arms fire continues against the embrasures, sending concrete fragments into the defenders.

Ammunition runs low. The final machine gun eventually fails. At 10:30 Jottrand orders Casemate 30 abandoned and the tunnel barricaded. This silences a key position on the south-east wall. It also opens the possibility of German penetration through these casemates into the tunnel system.

Casemates 12 and 18 have been reported destroyed. Jottrand does not accept the reports without verification. He enters the tunnels leading to them. He finds the situation less severe than reported. Only Casemate 12 is fully destroyed. No Germans are present in the tunnels. He recognises that Germans reaching the tunnels could fire directly into the command post. He relocates his headquarters to the next lower level. He leaves several staff at the main command post to coordinate the remaining artillery.

Lieutenants Quitin, Michaux, and Debrez hold the fire direction centre. Lieutenants Dehousse and Deuse remain at the barricades. Jottrand inspects the infirmary and other positions.

At 11:20 an explosion destroys the lower part of Casemate 17. Two men at the barricade below suffer serious burns. The machine guns are destroyed. Lighting reduces to flashlights and hurricane lamps. An auxiliary ventilator has stopped. Efforts to restart the main ventilation system produce only brief results before failing. Smoke and chlorine concentration in the air increases. Men at the barricades cough and request relief. Officers refuse the requests and order masks worn.

Requests for reinforcements at the barriers prompt the assembly of 25 men. The group diminishes as men slip away into side passages. One officer is later found hiding under a bed. One sergent reaches his destination with three of the ten men who set out with him.

By mid-morning conditions in the lower levels have deteriorated significantly. A few defenders still man barricades. Wounded and asphyxiated men lie in the tunnels near the hospital. Jottrand’s requests for evacuation ambulances receive no response. Some weapons remain operational. Many men are combat-ineffective from fatigue, fear, or exposure to the atmosphere.

By that time, Oberleutnant Witzig’s men have departed the fort’s surface. German ground troops now move freely over the surface and surrounding ground.

Preperations for Surrender

At 10:45 Jottrand reaches his superior at Liège, requesting relief and a counter-attack. At 11:00 he receives word that no relief will be forthcoming. Reports indicate he conveys to Liège that the enemy has reached the command post. In subsequent communications he details conditions. Continued resistance will produce casualties without tactical gain. Some weapons, notably the 75-millimetre guns at Kazemat 9, remain operable, along with the artillery direction centre and certain other facilities. Belgian losses to that point number 25 killed, along with four officers and 59 men wounded.

Commandant Jottrand then contacts the Général de 3^e Corps d’Armée, Lieutenant-général Joseph de Krahe. Lieutenant-général De Krahe and his Commandant de l’Artillerie du 3^e Corps d’Armée, Général-major Albert Jadot, face comparable difficulties. They contact the commanding Général de 1^e Corps d’Armée, who holds direct command over Eben Emael. In the three-party conversation that follows, no commander accepts responsibility for authorising surrender. The commander of the 1^e Corps d’Armée suggests they take necessary measures with Lieutenant-général De Krahe’s concurrence. De Krahe states that the fort is not under his direct command and that a decision on capitulation rests with General Headquarters. He orders Capitaine Gheyson of his staff to obtain a decision from General Headquarters by telephone. Gheyson cannot reach anyone there.

Capitaine Gheyson then drafts the following instruction. The fort’s commander alone can decide whether to cease the defence, after consulting his defence council. If surrender follows, the commander is to destroy the works after evacuation. As he writes, a report indicates German armoured units are approaching the fort. Gheyson adds that if evacuation proves impossible, the commander is to destroy the fort with its garrison inside. Lieutenant-général De Krahe approves the message, and it is transmitted to Jottrand.

Commandant Jottrand convenes a council of defence under fort regulations and formally reads the surrender articles. Present are Doctor Willems, the head surgeon; Capitaine Vamecq, acting for the wounded Major Van der Auwera; Lieutenant Michaux; Lieutenant Polis, the recording secretary; Capitaine Hotermans; Lieutenant Verstraten; and Premier Sergent Nystem.

Commandant Jottrand summarises the situation and reads Article 51 of the Instruction on the defence of a fort. Under this article, surrender stands justified only if all defensive means of the fort and its personnel prove useless and non-reparable, or if subsistence is exhausted. He asks each member for his assessment. All favour surrender. A statement committing each signatory to the decision is prepared and signed. The council agrees that evacuation should be permitted where possible, that the wounded should receive honourable treatment, and that international conventions governing prisoners of war should be observed. The council meets for 25 minutes. Jottrand then enters the tunnels to inform the garrison.

Commandant Jottrand intends to leave the fort with those willing to continue the fight and rejoin the Belgian Army. He tells the men, “We are going to attempt to leave the fort to rejoin the Belgian Army. I am your commander and I will lead the way.” The garrison responds that they wish to surrender. Jottrand then reaches Général Jadot’s administrative officer by telephone. Jadot refuses to authorise surrender and insists the fort must first be destroyed. Jottrand resolves to comply with the intent of the order. Of the fort’s 17 major works, seven remain in action. Their supplies are dwindling or exhausted. Their crews are reduced. They offer only limited fire against heavy German pressure.

Commandant Jottrand assigns surrender negotiations to Capitaine Hotermans. He instructs him to prolong discussions long enough to destroy the remaining works. Jottrand later records that it is not in Belgium’s interest to surrender at once. Sending an emissary to find the German commander and return with officials for formal negotiations, followed by a further meeting of the defence council, will yield time for demolition. Whether he communicates this strategy to his negotiators is unclear.

Capitaine Hotermans first goes to the gunners at the entrance casemate and orders them to cease fire. Sergent Debarsy, engaged against a bridge across the Geer, does not respond. Hotermans repeats the order and physically removes him from the gun. Sergent Borsu, manning the 60-millimetre cannon, withdraws. Its crew chief Sergent Lecron and the two Peeters brothers also withdraw. The men under Sergent Hermesse do the same.

Sergent Debarsy remains with Capitaine Hotermans. The escort detailed to protect Hotermans outside the fort does not materialise. The surrender party comprises Hotermans, Sergent Debarsy, Soldat Demoulin carrying the white flag, and the bugler Vervier.

When Capitaine Hotermans reaches the gate and it is lowered, he stops. He later states he considers the decision to surrender premature and declines to act as its agent. He has been among the first three officers assigned to Eben Emael on its commissioning. He asks Jottrand to reassign the mission. Commandant Jottrand assigns it to Capitaine Vamecq, who meets Hotermans at the gate and asks him not to relinquish it.

Demolition of the works

By mid-morning Oberst Melzer has reinforced Mikosch. A German artillery force under Hauptmann Hauboldt has joined Oberstleutnant Mikosch in and around the village of Eben Emael. Hauboldt dispatches units trained in destroying armoured emplacements to reduce Kazemat 17. Other casemates begin to fall.

The Germans on the fort’s surface begin to hear underground explosions not of their own making. On Jottrand’s orders, Lieutenant Delcourt destroys the electrical system. He leaves minimal lighting only in essential installations. He uses approximately 9 kilograms of dynamite against all but one generator. Lieutenant Quitin works through the interior with crowbars, axes, and sledgehammers. He destroys fuse boxes, power terminals, telephone switchboards, and elevator mechanisms. By 13:00 Hauboldt’s guns break the crew of Couple 23. The cupola’s guns had earlier demolished the bridge at Lanaye. Sergent Fourier sets heavy charges against the guns, fuses them, and withdraws with his crew. Peletier, who has served 28 hours as an observer without relief, pulls a cord routed through the tunnel to the fuses. The charges detonate.

Casemate 34, which had withstood Stuka attack the previous day, has its guns rendered inoperable by sustained fire. Sergent Janviers and his crew withdraw into the interior. Orders to blow up Casemate 9 fail when the charges in the guns do not detonate. The Germans later find the position intact. When messengers order Sergent Flamand to destroy his guns, he refuses without a personal order from an officer. No officer provides one.

Commandant Jottrand orders Lieutenant Gigot to destroy the 120-millimetre guns. Gigot reports the task will require at least 90 minutes. He must cross the barriers, move heavy charges through unlit passageways and stairways with missing treads, and reach the firing chambers to place explosives.

At 13:10 the 120-millimetre millimetre cupola remains intact. Commandant Jottrand sends Lieutenant Dehousse and six non-commissioned officers to assist Lieutenant Gigot. At approximately the same moment Soldat Ancia approaches Jottrand and volunteers to destroy Casemate 38. He reports that a charge is already in place but that a battery to initiate it is missing. Ancia goes to the power central, retrieves a battery from the maintenance shop, and returns through the tunnels. The resulting explosion at Casemate 38 is heard throughout the fort. Soldat Ancia does not return. Ancia has destroyed the casemate and himself with it. His action is the final act of demolition by the garrison.

The Surrender

At approximately 13:15 the sound of a bugle grows audible above the continuing small-arms, artillery, and anti-tank fire. As it grows louder, German troops cease firing.

Bugler Vervier stands within the recesses of the gate, exposed to ricocheting rounds and concrete fragments. He sounds the call for surrender. He continues for several minutes. Firing near the entrance ceases, and artillery fire diminishes.

Capitaine Vamecq then emerges from behind Vervier. Soldat Demoulin carries the white flag across the drawbridge and places it against the wall outside the entrance. German troops signal Vamecq forward. He advances, and the bridge is raised behind him. He walks to a gate and meets the Germans with Vervier at his side. Following German instructions, Vamecq surrenders his pistol. A French-speaking German officer arrives. Vamecq withdraws the bolt of the gate, opens it, and steps through. The gate closes automatically behind him and is not locked.

Capitaine Vamecq informs the Germans that the fort is surrendering. He requests military honours and evacuation of the wounded. Two Germans escort him towards the bridge over the Geer to meet the German commander. Looking back, he observes several hundred Belgians filing from the fort with their hands raised.

A German non-commissioned officer has opened the gate and ordered a Belgian to lower the drawbridge, which is done. Belgians standing at the foot of the bridge inside the fort begin filing out, believing a surrender has been concluded. German troops with weapons ready move through the exiting column into the fort’s interior.

At 13:17, below the command post, Lieutenant Dehousse learns of events at the exit. He climbs to the next level to report to Commandant Jottrand. Jottrand attempts to reach the guard room at the gate by telephone and fails. He then attempts to contact Liège. Lieutenant Delrez places the call. The line is apparently open, but no one answers. On Jottrand’s instructions, Delrez announces, “We have surrendered.” The time is 13:27. Liège does not respond. Both officers then work to disable the telephones and destroy remaining classified material.

Lieutenant Gigot, returning from the 120-millimetre cupola to collect additional explosives and unaware of events at the entrance, encounters men with their hands raised. Informed that the fort has surrendered, he continues with his task and returns to the cupola, where he meets Polis. They determine that they cannot carry out Commandant Jottrand’s order and return to Capaitaine Hotermans’ office, where they find Lieutenants De Sloovere, Verstraeten, and Legaie. The group then moves to the exit. The 120-millimetre guns have been seriously damaged by Oberleutnant Witzig’s troops the previous day and their reconditioning is unlikely. Demolition of the cupola would have served a symbolic rather than a tactical purpose.

Commandant Jottrand and Lieutenant Delrez complete the destruction of papers and move through the tunnels. Passing the workshop, where a German soldier is posted, Jottrand indicates that he wishes to collect personal effects from his quarters and receives permission to do so. In the tunnel outside his billet he encounters the medical staff removing the wounded. He follows the last of them past the German guards. The Germans present conduct themselves correctly towards the Belgian wounded. Outside the fort, Jottrand finds his officers unarmed and assembling for the march to the village.

Oberstleutnant Mikosch approaches Jottrand and asks, “Major Jottrand, will you give me your word of honour that you have placed no delayed mines within the fort?” Jottrand answers, “There are none. I give you my word of honour.” He can give this assurance because the Belgians hold no such weapons at the fort.

Mikosch then addresses the Belgian officers. “I congratulate you on your courage. Someone must be defeated in war. I am sorry this must happen to you. But this is war. I must send you to Germany.”

Oberstleutnant Mikosch’s troops secure the fort, searching every tunnel and gun chamber and inventorying equipment. Many of the serviceable or repairable guns are later issued to German units on the Eastern Front.

Late in the search, German troops hear muffled voices and pounding from a casemate telephone switchboard room. Opening the door, they find two young Belgian soldiers, Noel and Petit.

Multimedia

Aftermath

Leutnant Witzig orders his force to collect its equipment and assemble. His detachment has lost 26 men of approximately 80 over slightly more than 24 hours of combat, including six killed. At 16:00, after the German dead have been buried, Witzig’s force moves to the area near the fort entrance with 30 Belgian prisoners and turns them over to Hauptmann Hauboldt, one of Mikosch’s officers. Some of Witzig’s men are attached to Hauboldt’s command. The Belgian garrison, including Commandant Jottrand, is removed under guard.

Oberleutnant Witzig’s troops march past the Loverix Mill, heavily damaged by fire from the fort, by artillery, and by Stuka bombs, and continue into the village of Eben Emael. The men stop at a tavern. Some hours later the column of Belgian prisoners, approximately 1.6 kilometres long, passes the tavern.

The men of Sturmgruppe Eisen are also relieved from the morning on. Rubber dinghies operate continuously, forming a makeshift ferry. Only wounded men and Belgian prisoners remain to be transported across. By about 15:00, the last Eisen paratroopers leave Kanne and rejoin the other survivors in Maastricht. They spend the night of May 11^th, 1940, in a school building.

On May 12^th, 1940, the men of Sturmabteilung Koch travel by lorry to Cologne. In Maastricht the column is halted by a British air raid. Further delays occur en route to Cologne, where roads are clogged with German military traffic moving into Belgium and the Netherlands. After their arrival at Cologne-Ostheim aerodrome on the afternoon, the men travel again by lorry to the Cologne suburb of Dellbrück. At around 18:00, the Fallschirmjäger arrive at the Dellbrück barracks in Cologne.

Hauptmann Koch files his official report that all objectives have been met. The award of the Eisernes Kreuz Zweiter Klasse follows for all men of his assault groups.

The next day the Fallschirmjäger move to Münster. Their officers split them into their assault groups for the visit of General Kesselring, Oberbefehlshaber of Luftflotte 2. Kesselring personally awards each man the Eisernes Kreuz Erster Klasse. Only one Fallschirmjäger, Ernst Grechza of Sturmgruppe Granit, receives no decoration. During the fight at Fort Eben Emael, he is caught being drunk.

Initially all members of Sturmabteilung Koch without exception receive Eiserne Kreuze. Men who actually fought on the battlefield then complain. All non-combatants such as drivers and armourers must return their decorations. Other Fallschirmjäger also lose theirs. Members of Trupp 2 of Sturmgruppe Beton give up their awards because their glider came down inside Germany when the tow rope parted prematurely.

When Adolf Hitler learns of the capture of Fort Eben Emael, his mood of jubilation prompts an immediate decision. He awards Koch and Rudolf Witzig the Ritterkreuz the same day, May 10^th, 1940. They become the first Wehrmacht recipients of the decoration during the western campaign. The Ritterkreuz can only go to men already holding the Eisernes Kreuz Erster und Zweiter Klasse. Both classes are therefore awarded to them the same day.

It is then decided that all officers of Sturmabteilung Koch present on the battlefield on May 10^th, 1940, should also receive the Ritterkreuz. In some photographs from the Eisernes Kreuz Erster Klasse ceremony on May 13^th, 1940, several officers already wear the Ritterkreuz before its official presentation.

On May 14^th, 1940, back in their Hildesheim quarters, the men of Sturmabteilung Koch receive six days of special leave.

The official Ritterkreuz ceremony for the officers takes place on May 15^th, 1940, at Hitler’s Führerhauptquartier Felsennest near Rodert and Münstereifel. He personally decorates Koch, Witzig, Altmann, Delica, Kiess, Zierach, Jäger, Ringler, and Meissner. Others, such as Arpke and Schächter, receive theirs later. Arpke faces delay for bureaucratic reasons. Schächter lies hospitalised with serious wounds.

Approximately five hundred Belgian soldiers leave the fort and enter captivity. They are held in strict isolation until July 4^th, 1940, in order to conceal the German use of glider troops and shaped charges. Twenty-three Belgian soldiers are killed during the fighting. Sixty-two others are wounded.

Belgian sources indicate that approximately seven hundred and fifty soldiers are present at the beginning of the attack, compared to an authorised strength of one thousand two hundred. About fifteen per cent are absent on leave. Others are quartered in nearby villages and arrive later.

Of the eighty-five German paratroopers committed to the assault on the fort, six are killed. Apart from injuries sustained during hard landings, twenty are wounded.

Multimedia

Sources