Office of Strategic Services

British diplomats, who share Churchill’s high regard for Donovan, privately suggest to the State Department that Donovan would make a better U.S. Ambassador to Britain than the then-ambassador, Joseph P. Kennedy, whose defeatism and sympathy for appeasers causes concern. Political columnist Walter Lippmann later observes that Donovan’s findings about Britain’s resilience “almost singlehandedly overcame the unmitigated defeatism which was paralysing Washington.”

Donovan also undertakes an inspection of U.S. naval defences in the Pacific, which he finds severely lacking, and acts as an informal envoy to several Mediterranean and Middle Eastern countries, encouraging their leaders to resist Nazi influence. Meanwhile, in New York, he maintains frequent contact with British Security Co-ordination chief William Stephenson, known as “Intrepid”, and his Australian-born deputy Dick Ellis, an MI6 officer credited with drafting the blueprint for Donovan’s envisioned American intelligence agency. Donovan and Stephenson, become so close that they are often referred to as “Big Bill” and “Little Bill”.

Dick Ellis is requested to draft a blueprint for an American intelligence agency, the equivalent of British Security Co-ordination and based on these British wartime improvisations. Detailed tables of organisation are disclosed to Washington, among these are the organisational tables that lead to the birth of General William Donovan’s Office of Strategic Services.

In the summer of 1941, Millard Preston Goodfellow is recalled to active duty, now holding the rank of Major in the United States Army. He is reassigned to G-2, the military intelligence section, in Washington, D.C. During his posting at G-2, Goodfellow encounters William Donovan, who shares with him the concept of creating an entirely new civilian organisation responsible for strategic operations. Goodfellow readily endorses the idea, and the two men quickly form a close friendship.

Accounts vary regarding when Goodfellow first meets John Grombach, but it is clear that from their earliest acquaintance, Goodfellow holds him in high regard.

At this juncture, Goodfellow already bears significant responsibility, overseeing the deployment of soldiers and marines to the Far East, North Africa, and Europe in order to monitor and assess the evolving situation concerning the Axis powers.

Office of the Coordinator of Information

From January 1941 on, Colonel Goodfellow, negotiates with the National Park Service to secure three tracts of land dedicated to training camps for Special Activities/Goodfellow and Special Activities/Bruce. By March, he appoints Garland H. Williams as Training Director. Commander N.G.A. Woolley, loaned by the British Royal Navy, assists Donovan and Goodfellow in organising underwater training and craft landings.

After submitting the “Memorandum of Establishment of Service of Strategic Information,” Donovan was appointed Coordinator of Information on July 11^th, 1941, heading the new organisation known as the Office of the Coordinator of Information.

Ellis, described as Donovan’s “right-hand man,” effectively directs the organisation’s development. Ellis liaised daily with Donovan, with future Director of Central Intelligence Allen Welsh Dulles acting as a liaison between Donovan and British Security Coordination at Rockefeller Center.

Despite Donovan’s appointment, his responsibilities carries little real authority, and existing U.S. agencies remained sceptical and even hostile towards British involvement. Until several months after Pearl Harbor, the majority of Office of Strategic Services intelligence originates from British sources. British Security Coordination, directed by Ellis, trains the first Office of Strategic Services agents in Canada, until dedicated training stations are established in the United States, with British Security Coordination instructors providing guidance on tradecraft and the organisation of operations based on Special Operations Executive models. The British also make their short-wave broadcasting capabilities available for American use in Europe, Africa, and the Far East, and supply essential equipment until American production facilities could meet demand.

Colonel Goodfellow assumes a far more active role in shaping Donovan’s brainchild, the Office of the Coordinator of Information. In September 1941, he is officially appointed as the Liaison Officer between Donovan and the G-2 section of military intelligence.

Working closely with Dick Ellis, Donovan establishes the Office of the Coordinator of Information’s New York headquarters in October 1941, located in Room 3603 of the Rockefeller Center. He recruits Allen Dulles to manage the office, strategically situated one floor above the operations of Britain’s MI6.

In that same month, Goodfellow becomes the Director of the newly established Special Activities/Goodfellow (SA/G) branch, taking over the responsibilities previously held by Robert Solberg within the COI. Alongside SA/G, another unit, Special Activities/Bruce (SA/B), is created under the leadership of David K. E. Bruce.

In December 1941, following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the United States formally enters the war, presenting Goodfellow and Donovan with the opportunity to deploy uniformed soldiers, no longer having to depend solely on covert operations. Goodfellow, Bruce, and Donovan collaborate to establish the first Operational Groups, special warfare guerrilla units, which at this stage remain under the organisational framework of the Office of the Coordinator of Information. They select Camp X, a training facility operated by the British Special Operations Executive, as the site where these early operatives will receive their training.

Donovan also works closely with Charles Howard ‘Dick’ Ellis, an Australian-born British intelligence officer, who has been credited with significantly shaping the blueprint. The blueprint for an American intelligence agency, equivalent to the British Security Coordination and based on British wartime improvisations, is drafted. Detailed organisational tables are submitted to Washington, among them those that ultimately led to the creation of General William Donovan’s Office of Strategic Services.

Ellis is not merely drafting blueprints but was also involved in logistical operations, helping to establish training centres, primarily around Washington. Ellis, effectively runs Donovan’s intelligence service.

In 1942, the Coordinator of Information ceased being a White House operation and is placed under the aegis of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

In January 1942, Goodfellow plays a key role in negotiating with the National Park Service to allocate extensive areas of land for the establishment of three new training camps for members of Special Activities/Goodfellow and Special Activities/Bruce, as well as developing the training curriculum for operators and officers. Primarily, Goodfellow employs a team of War Department inspectors to condemn the properties and then approaches the National Park Service with a proposal: the Office of the Coordinator of Information would lease the land for a nominal fee of one dollar per year, provided they maintain the premises in good order during their occupation.

In February 1942, Goodfellow recruits Garland H. Williams from the Federal Bureau of Narcotics as Director of Training. Williams draws upon his previous experience with the Special Operations Executive at Camp X to model his curriculum.

On February 23^rd, 1942, Goodfellow is appointed head of the newly activated Coordinator of Information Service Command, overseeing a staff of 51 officers.

Goodfellow also conceives a mission that would later be known as Detachment 101. The first American unit ever assembled to conduct guerrilla warfare, espionage, and sabotage behind enemy lines, which Donovan formally activates in April 1942.

Acting on a directive from Donovan, Goodfellow is tasked with establishing a communications network for the Coordinator of Information. Goodfellow is longstanding friends with John “Frenchy” Grombach from New York prior to the outbreak of war. Given Grombach’s extensive experience in the radio industry and his intricate understanding of radio station operations, Goodfellow recruits him into the Coordinator of Information to assist in building the network.

Grombach proves indispensable to Goodfellow in the creation of this system. Together, they develop a radio intelligence programme encompassing collection, decryption, and analysis for the Coordinator of Information in Washington. This operation is subsequently expanded to a larger centre in New York. To conceal its true nature, Grombach establishes the Foreign Broadcast Quarterly as a front, while the Coordinator of Information purchases NBC’s Long Island radio station to support the initiative.

However, Donovan soon grows distrustful of Grombach. In one memorandum to Goodfellow, Donovan explicitly states, “…do not use Grombach!” In another, he writes, “I am disturbed by this talk of Grombach… It is clearly not evident to you, but I am told by all sides that he talks too much.”

There is some truth to these concerns, as leaks concerning the Foreign Broadcast Quarterly’s operations within the government emerge. Donovan becomes aware of three particularly troubling issues: Grombach’s unauthorised plans to establish a Black Chamber in New York; his marriage to a woman whom he subsequently appointed as assistant director of the Foreign Broadcast Quarterly without proper security vetting; and his recruitment by Donovan’s rival, General George Strong, along with the State Department, to assist in forming a competing intelligence agency within the Military Intelligence Service, later known as The Pond.

In May 1942, Donovan dismisses Grombach from the Coordinator of Information, an event which fuels Grombach’s enduring animosity and distrust towards Donovan and the Coordinator of Information. Despite this, Goodfellow occasionally continues to use Grombach as an undercover operative throughout the remainder of the war.

Simultaneously, the Foreign Broadcast Quarterly is dismantled. Donovan’s rivals successfully persuade President Roosevelt to order the Coordinator of Information to relinquish control over all communications and propaganda operations, which precipitates the abrupt dissolution of the Coordinator of Information.

By mid-1942, the Office of the Coordinator of Information is structured into several key divisions, each concentrating on different aspects of intelligence and special operations.

• The Research and Analysis Branch, led by William L. Langer, recruits academics from a wide range of disciplines to analyse political, economic, and military information. Their work provides crucial strategic insights for policymakers, forming an essential foundation for broader intelligence assessments.
• The Foreign Information Service, under the direction of Robert E. Sherwood, is tasked with psychological warfare and propaganda operations. This division oversees overseas broadcasts, notably contributing to the establishment of the Voice of America. The Foreign Information Service is responsible for both overt and covert information campaigns aimed at undermining enemy morale and reinforcing Allied messaging abroad.
• Several Special Activities Branches are created to undertake more direct action:
  • Special Activities/Bruce (SA/B), under the leadership of David K. E. Bruce, focuses primarily on espionage activities and the creation of intelligence networks overseas.
  • Special Activities/Goodfellow (SA/G), led by Millard Preston Goodfellow, specialises in guerrilla warfare, sabotage operations, and the training and organisation of resistance movements behind enemy lines.
• The COI also establishes a Field Photographic Unit, directed by the renowned filmmaker John Ford. This unit documents operations and produces a range of training and propaganda films to support the organisation’s wider strategic aims.
• Complementing these efforts, the Visual Presentation Branch utilises visual media to convey strategic information and assist psychological operations, ensuring that complex intelligence and operational plans are effectively communicated to policymakers and operatives alike.
• Finally, the Oral Intelligence Division plays a critical role by gathering first-hand accounts from travellers, refugees, and other sources. These personal testimonies supplement traditional intelligence reports, offering valuable insights into conditions in occupied territories and enemy-held regions.

Collectively, the divisions of the Coordinator of Information lay the groundwork for the broader activities that will later be expanded under the Office of Strategic Services, significantly shaping American intelligence and special operations during the Second World War.

Office of Strategic Services

As the U.S. fully engaged in World War II, the need for a more robust and militarized intelligence organisation became apparent. The Office of Strategic Services is formally established by a Presidential military order issued by Roosevelt on June 13^th, 1942 with Donovan continuing as its director. At the same time the Coordinator of Information is dissolved. However, the Office of Strategic Services absorbs many of the Coordinator of Information’s functions. Its purpose is to collect and analyse strategic information required by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and to conduct special operations not assigned to other agencies. Although the Office of Strategic Services provides policymakers with intelligence and assessments, it never exercises jurisdiction over all American foreign intelligence activities. The Federal Bureau of Investigastions retains responsibility for intelligence operations in Latin America, and the Army and Navy continues to develop and rely upon their own intelligence sources.

Meanwhile, Edgar Hoover is out for Donovan’s scalp and any type of co-operation is pretty well one-sided. Not only Office of Strategic Services, but the British Secret Intelligence, many of whose investigations are bound to lead to America, are constantly being hounded by the Federal Bureau of Investigastions. They are warned by the Department of Justice that Edgar Hoover believes we are penetrating embassies and that he is annoyed is Office of Strategic Services.

Becoming the Office of Strategic Services, the unit is extensively reorganised. The Special Activities/Goodfellow evolves into the Special Operations Branch, with the staff being divided between Goodfellow and Lieutenant Colonel Ellery C. Huntington, Jr. Meanwhile, Special Activities/Bruce transitions into the Secret Intelligence Branch.

In August 1942, Goodfellow formally relinquishes his duties at G-2 and transfers fully to the Office of Strategic Services, finally able to dedicate all his efforts to the new agency and to Special Operations. Until this point, he had been simultaneously serving as Chief of the Contact and Liaison Section of G-2, Director of SA/G, and G-2 liaison to the OSS.

Around this time, with Huntington being appointed as a Director of Special Operations, the original staff under Goodfellow and that under Huntington become embroiled in what official reports describe as a “bitter rivalry.” This division between the two groups persists even after Huntington’s deployment to Europe.

At this stage of the war, the Office of Strategic Services Assessment Unit has not yet been established, and recruitment into the organisation is carried out without regard to future assignments. Goodfellow is a particularly prolific recruiter, although the exact number of individuals he brings into the agency remains unknown.

In December 1942, the issuance of the “Golden Directive” by the Joint Chiefs of Staff fundamentally reorganises the Special Operations Branch. Henceforth, it is no longer authorised to operate within the Western Hemisphere, and the Operational Groups are placed under the direct control of Theatre Commanders whilst deployed.

The Operational Groups are separated from the Special Operations Branch and granted independent status within the Office of Strategic Services, forming the newly established Operational Group Command. It is important to note that the abbreviations “OG” and “OGs” refer to two distinct entities: OGs denote the individual Operational Groups, whereas OG refers to their overall command structure.

Goodfellow is subsequently promoted from Director of Special Operations to the position of Assistant Director for the entire Office of Strategic Services, a role he holds for the remainder of the war.

By 1943, Donovan’s relations with British officials have become increasingly strained, owing to turf wars, strategic and tactical disagreements, stark differences in style and temperament, and divergent visions of the post-war world. British officers disparagingly describe the Office of Strategic Services’s methods as resembling a game of “cowboys and red Indians.” Furthermore, while Britain seeks to preserve its empire, Donovan views imperial structures, at least in certain instances, as obstacles to democracy and economic development.

The Chief of MI6, Stewart Menzies, is particularly hostile to the notion of Office of Strategic Services operations within the British Empire. He firmly forbids the Office of Strategic Services from conducting activities on British soil or from dealing directly with Allied governments-in-exile headquartered in London. Nevertheless, by May 1944, Donovan commands a network of approximately eleven thousand American officers and foreign agents, operating across every major capital in the world.

During the war, Donovan also benefits from intelligence gathered by a clandestine network of Catholic priests across Europe, many of whom engage in espionage activities without the knowledge or sanction of the Pope.

Before the month is out, Donovan is in Italy, overseeing reforms within Office of Strategic Services operations in the Mediterranean theatre. During this visit, he meets with Pope Pius XII to discuss intelligence activities conducted out of the Japanese embassy within the Vatican. In the weeks leading up to the Valkyrie plot against Hitler, Donovan remains informed through Allen Dulles, his representative in Switzerland, who maintains contact with the German conspirators.

One particular success for the Office of Strategic Services is its contribution to the intelligence-gathering effort ahead of the Allied landing on the French Riviera on August 15^th, 1944. Thanks to information provided by the Office of Strategic Services, Colonel William Wilson Quinn later notes that the invading forces “knew everything about that beach and where every German was.” Donovan is present for this landing as well, after which he travels to Rome for a secret meeting with Hitler’s envoy to the Vatican, Ernst von Weizsäcker. Shortly thereafter, he meets Marshal Tito to discuss the Office of Strategic Services’s support of operations in Yugoslavia.

In August 1944, Donovan comes into conflict with Winston Churchill over Office of Strategic Services support for Greek anti-royalist factions. As the war in Europe nears its conclusion, Donovan spends much of his time in London, operating from a command centre occupying an entire floor of Claridge’s Hotel. From there, he directs operations across the continent, receiving reports that reveal the Wehrmacht’s disintegration; it is said that he “knew their positions on the battlefield better than German generals did.”

The Office of Strategic Services is structured into several specialised branches, each responsible for distinct aspects of intelligence and operations.

• The Secret Intelligence Branch oversees espionage operations, gathering human intelligence through clandestine methods across multiple theatres of war.
• The Research and Analysis Branch comprises a corps of academics and subject-matter experts who assess and interpret political, military, and economic information, producing detailed intelligence reports to guide Allied policymakers.
• The Special Operations Branch concentrates on sabotage and guerrilla warfare, working closely with resistance groups embedded within Axis-occupied territories to disrupt enemy operations and supply lines.
• The X-2 Branch is tasked with counterintelligence, identifying and neutralising enemy espionage networks and safeguarding Allied operations from infiltration and compromise.
• The Morale Operations Branch conducts psychological warfare, distributing propaganda designed to weaken the morale of Axis forces and encourage resistance among subjugated populations.
• The Maritime Unit specialises in maritime sabotage, supporting amphibious assaults and developing techniques for operations along enemy coastlines and in harbours.
• The Operational Groups are paramilitary units trained to conduct direct action missions, including raids, ambushes, and sabotage, deep behind enemy lines in support of larger military campaigns.
• The Field Experimental Unit develops and tests new technologies and equipment to enhance espionage and sabotage missions, pioneering innovations that would later influence post-war intelligence practices.

By December 1944, the Office of Strategic Services reaches its zenith, employing approximately 13,000 personnel, of whom around 7,500 are deployed overseas, operating in theatres spanning Europe, North Africa, and the Far East.

As the Second World War moves towards its conclusion in early 1945, William Donovan turns his attention to the future of the Office of Strategic Services. Determined to secure its survival in peacetime, Donovan begins to advocate for the establishment of a permanent intelligence agency. On February 19^th, 1945, the Washington Times-Herald publishes an article revealing Donovan’s proposals, including a confidential memorandum he has submitted to President Roosevelt outlining the creation of such an agency. The article controversially draws comparisons between Donovan’s envisioned service and the Gestapo, fuelling public anxiety about the expansion of government power.

Mindful that the American public demands a significant reduction in the size and scope of federal authority following the war, Roosevelt remains cautious about Donovan’s plan. Nevertheless, Donovan believes he can eventually persuade the President of its strategic necessity. Meanwhile, J. Edgar Hoover, head of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, vehemently opposes the proposal. Hoover perceives Donovan’s vision as a direct threat to the FBI’s jurisdiction, despite Donovan’s assurances that the agency would be strictly confined to foreign operations and would not interfere with domestic security.

The death of President Roosevelt in April 1945 delivers a severe setback to Donovan’s ambitions. His successor, Harry S. Truman, does not share Roosevelt’s receptiveness to Donovan’s arguments. Although Donovan continues to champion the cause of a permanent intelligence service with determination, his political standing weakens considerably.

The contributions of the Office of Strategic Services during the war receive widespread commendation from many senior military leaders. General Dwight D. Eisenhower, in particular, describes the Office of Strategic Services’s efforts as “vital” to the Allied war effort. Nevertheless, critics persist in their attacks. Some dismiss the Office of Strategic Services as little more than an appendage of British intelligence, while others, echoing the sensationalist tone of the Times-Herald article, warn that Donovan’s proposals could result in the creation of an American equivalent of the Gestapo.

While British authorities, along with the United States military and State Department, display relative indifference towards the question of prosecuting war criminals after the war, William Donovan is already lobbying President Roosevelt as early as October 1943 to make preparations for such trials. Roosevelt tasks Donovan with investigating the legal and technical considerations involved, and over the ensuing months, Donovan assembles a substantial body of evidence concerning war criminals. He gathers testimonies and information from a wide variety of sources. Beyond seeking justice, Donovan also wishes to avenge the torture and murder of Office of Strategic Services agents at the hands of the enemy.

When President Truman appoints Supreme Court Justice Robert H. Jackson as Chief United States Counsel for the prosecution of Nazi war criminals, Jackson discovers that the Office of Strategic Services is the only American agency to have made any serious preparation for such proceedings. He subsequently invites Donovan to join the trial staff.

On May 17^th, 1945, Donovan travels to Europe to assist in the preparations for the prosecutions. In time, he brings no fewer than 172 Office of Strategic Services officers into Jackson’s team. These officers engage in interviewing survivors from Auschwitz, tracing SS and Gestapo documents, and gathering critical evidence.

Unbeknownst to most observers at the time, Donovan also succeeds in persuading the Americans to block the Soviet Union’s attempt to attribute the Katyn massacre to German forces. Convinced by Fabian von Schlabrendorff, a German opponent of Hitler who is informally attached to his staff, Donovan becomes aware that the Soviet Narodny Komissariat Vnutrennikh Del, rather than the Wehrmacht, is responsible for the mass execution of around 4,000 Polish officers in the Katyn Forest.

It is Donovan who proposes Nuremberg as the location for the trials. He introduces Jackson to important foreign contacts and releases Office of Strategic Services funds to help finance the prosecution effort. Jackson, who had previously been a political rival of Donovan in New York, soon comes to view Donovan as indispensable, describing him as a “godsend.” Acknowledging the vital contribution made by the Office of Strategic Services, Jackson personally lobbies President Truman in an effort to support Donovan’s plan for a permanent post-war intelligence service.

However, tensions soon arise between Donovan and Jackson. In Nuremberg, Donovan personally interrogates many prisoners, including Hermann Göring, with whom he holds ten separate conversations. Yet Donovan grows increasingly critical of Jackson’s strategy, particularly Jackson’s insistence on indicting the entire German High Command regardless of individual culpability, a stance Donovan considers incompatible with American principles of justice. A seasoned prosecutor, Donovan also expresses concerns regarding Jackson’s courtroom methods, finding him inexperienced in building strong cases and conducting examinations. As a result of their disagreements, Jackson removes Donovan from the prosecution team. Donovan returns to the United States.

Despite all the efforts to keep the Office of Strategic Services, the campaign does not succeed. On September 20^th, 1945, Truman signs an executive order formally abolishing the Office of Strategic Services.

Headquarters and training locations

Following its expansion from the Office of the Coordinator of Information, the bulk of the Office of Strategic Services establishes its headquarters near the junction of 23^rd Street and E Street in Washington, D.C. This complex, appearing to nearby residents as an unremarkable mix of government offices and apartment buildings, becomes widely known as the “Navy Hill Complex,” “Potomac Hill Complex,” or simply the “E Street Complex.”

Training for Office of Strategic Services personnel is a significant undertaking. At Camp X near Whitby, Ontario, an assassination and elimination training programme is operated by the British Special Operations Executive. Here, notable experts such as William E. Fairbairn and Eric A. Sykes instruct trainees in knife combat and other close-quarters techniques. Many Office of Strategic Services members receive their initial training at this facility, which George Hunter White, an alumnus of the course, later famously refers to as “the school of mayhem and murder.”

From these initial efforts, the Office of Strategic Services establishes multiple training camps across the United States and, subsequently, abroad. Prince William Forest Park, then called Chopawamsic Recreational Demonstration Area, becomes the site of extensive communications training (Area C) and some Operational Groups (Area A). Meanwhile, Catoctin Mountain Park, now the site of Camp David, hosts Training Area B, where Special Operations personnel receive parachute, sabotage, self-defence, and leadership training, following the model established by the British Special Operations Executive.

The Office of Strategic Services’s Secret Intelligence branch, considered the most clandestine of all, establishes Training Areas E and RTU-11, “The Farm”, in country estates converted for espionage instruction. Recruits in this programme are introduced into the murky world of espionage, learning tradecraft within spacious manor houses surrounded by horse farms. Morale Operations training, focusing on psychological warfare and propaganda, is also developed during this period.

The Congressional Country Club in Bethesda, Maryland, known as Area F, becomes the primary Office of Strategic Services training facility. On the West Coast, the facilities now occupied by the Catalina Island Marine Institute at Toyon Bay on Santa Catalina Island previously serve as an Office of Strategic Services survival training camp. The National Park Service later commissions a study of these Office of Strategic Services training sites by Professor John Chambers of Rutgers University.

The principal Office of Strategic Services training facilities abroad are initially located in Great Britain, French Algeria, and Egypt. As Allied forces advance, a further school is established in southern Italy. In the Far East, training centres are set up in India, Ceylon, and China. The London branch of the Office of Strategic Services, its first overseas installation, is located at 70 Grosvenor Street, W1. Besides training local agents, overseas Office of Strategic Services schools provide advanced instruction and field exercises for graduates from American training camps, as well as for new recruits in theatre. One of the most celebrated of these agents is Virginia Hall, who operates with distinction in France.

The Office of Strategic Services Mediterranean training centre in Cairo, Egypt, often referred to as the “Spy School,” occupies a lavish palace formerly belonging to King Farouk’s brother-in-law, known as Ras el Kanayas. This facility is modelled on the British Special Operations Executive’s training school Special Training School No. 102 in Haifa, Palestine. Americans of Italian, Yugoslav, and Greek heritage are trained at Ras el Kanayas and Special Training School No. 102, undergoing parachute, weapons, and commando training, as well as instruction in Morse code and encryption.

Upon completing their training, these agents are deployed to missions across the Balkans and Italy, where their language skills and cultural familiarity aid their assimilation into local populations. Their operations contribute significantly to Allied intelligence and resistance activities throughout the final phases of the Second World War.

Into Action

The Office of Strategic Services proves especially effective in providing a global overview of the German war effort, identifying its strengths and weaknesses. In direct operations, it plays a crucial role in supporting Operation Torch in French North Africa in 1942, where it identifies pro-Allied sympathisers and suitable landing sites. Office of Strategic Services operations in neutral countries, particularly in Stockholm, Sweden, deliver in-depth intelligence on German technological advancements. In Madrid, the Office of Strategic Services establishes agent networks within France that later support the Allied invasion of southern France in 1944.

Among the most renowned of Office of Strategic Services operations are those run from Switzerland by Allen Dulles, which yield extensive information on German military strength, air defences, submarine production, and the V-1 and V-2 weapons programmes. Intelligence gathered also reveals German activities in chemical and biological warfare. The Swiss station further supports resistance movements in France, Austria, and Italy, and plays a role in facilitating the surrender of German forces in Italy in 1945.

Throughout the war, the Office of Strategic Services conducts a variety of missions including espionage, sabotage, psychological operations, coordination of anti-Nazi resistance groups in Europe, and military training for anti-Japanese guerrilla forces in Asia. At its peak, the Office of Strategic Services employs nearly 24,000 personnel.

Between 1943 and 1945, the Office of Strategic Services plays a major role in training Kuomintang forces in China and Burma, and in recruiting Kachin and other indigenous irregular forces for sabotage missions and as guides for Allied troops in Burma. In addition to these efforts, the Office of Strategic Services assists in arming, training, and supplying resistance groups across Axis-occupied territories, including Mao Zedong’s Red Army during the Dixie Mission and the Viet Minh in French Indochina. Office of Strategic Services officer Archimedes Patti holds a key role in French Indochina, maintaining frequent contact with Ho Chi Minh in 1945.

One of the Office of Strategic Services’s greatest achievements during the war is its penetration of Nazi Germany through agents it trains and deploys. These operatives include exiled Communists, Socialists, labour activists, anti-Nazi prisoners of war, and German and Jewish refugees. Among the most valuable is Fritz Kolbe, a German diplomat who provides vital intelligence.

From 1943 onwards, the Office of Strategic Services also maintains contact with the Austrian resistance network around Kaplan Heinrich Maier. Through this connection, Allied forces gain access to detailed plans and information regarding the production of V-2 rockets, Tiger tanks, and various aircraft, including the Messerschmitt Bf 109 and the Me 163 Komet. This intelligence allows for more accurate Allied bombing raids. The Maier group also reports early evidence of the mass murder of Jews through contacts at the Semperit factory near Auschwitz. However, the network is gradually dismantled by German authorities following the infiltration of a double agent linked to both the Office of Strategic Services and the Gestapo. Several members of the group are ultimately executed after trials at the Nazi People’s Court.

In 1943, the Office of Strategic Services establishes operations in Istanbul, recognising Turkey’s strategic significance as a neutral state situated at the crossroads of Europe and Central Asia. Istanbul becomes a hub for intelligence collection under Project Net-1, aimed at infiltrating and influencing territories formerly part of the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian Empires.

Lanning “Packy” Macfarland, a Chicago banker, leads the Office of Strategic Services operation in Istanbul under the cover of a lend-lease banker. He recruits Alfred Schwarz, codenamed “Dogwood,” an Austrian businessman, who in turn recruits Walter Arndt. Posing as an employee of the Istanbul Western Electric Company, Schwarz establishes a significant information network. Through Schwarz and Arndt, the Office of Strategic Services is able to infiltrate anti-fascist groups across Austria, Hungary, and Germany. Romanian, Bulgarian, Hungarian, and Swiss diplomatic couriers are persuaded to smuggle intelligence to Istanbul, using techniques such as memorisation or concealment of microfilm within hollowed pencils and footwear.

Initially, the “Dogwood chain” yields extensive information, but by May 1944, British intelligence raises serious doubts regarding its reliability. Collaboration between British and American intelligence services reveals that much of the information is deceptive, intended to mislead the Allies. Consequently, the Dogwood chain, the Office of Strategic Services’s largest intelligence operation within occupied Europe, is dismantled shortly thereafter.

On D-Day, on June 6^th, 1944, Donovan is aboard one of the ships participating in the Normandy landings. Upon going ashore, he and Colonel David K. E. Bruce, his commander of covert operations in Europe, come under fire from a German aircraft before moving towards the American front lines, where they encounter German machine-gun fire.

Eventually, they reach General Omar Bradley’s newly established tent headquarters on the beach. Upon returning to Washington, Donovan reports directly to President Roosevelt on his observations. He asserts that the success of the invasion demonstrates that German naval and air forces are no longer of “Big League” calibre and that “something has died in the German machine.”

In late 1944, the Office of Strategic Services acquires Soviet code and cipher material from émigré Finnish army officers. Although Secretary of State Edward Stettinius protests, citing Roosevelt’s agreement with the Soviet Union to avoid interfering with Soviet communications, it is suspected that the Office of Strategic Services copies the material before its return. This information later proves instrumental in the Venona Project, which uncovers widespread Soviet espionage activities in North America.

Operation Rype is launched in March 1945, when an airborne Office of Strategic Services unit is dropped into the Norwegian mountains near Snåsa to sabotage railway lines and hinder the withdrawal of German forces from northern Norway. Operation Rype is the only U.S.-led operation conducted on German-occupied Norwegian soil during the war. The group, largely composed of Norwegian-Americans from the 99^th Infantry Battalion, is led by William Colby.

Meanwhile, during Operation Varsity in March 1945, the Office of Strategic Services dispatches four two-man teams under Captain Stephen Vinciguerra, with codenames such as Alsace, Poissy, S&S, and Student, tasked with infiltrating enemy lines. However, none of these teams achieve their objectives. Team S&S, disguised in Wehrmacht uniforms and using a captured Kübelwagen, suffers damage during glider landings, with their vehicle and long-range radio destroyed by enemy fire.

Among the final wartime initiatives, the Office of Strategic Services dispatches teams composed of French, Danish, Norwegian, and Polish nationals to identify Gestapo officers attempting to disguise themselves among civilian populations in Allied-occupied territories. Acting under Donovan’s orders, Dulles successfully negotiates the surrender of German forces in Italy, achieving this several days before the broader German capitulation.