Operation Jedburgh

Gubbins believes that every available resource under his authority must be concentrated to support the success of Allied operations. For this to be realised, French resistance activities must be synchronised with the advancing Allied ground campaign. The central challenge for both conventional and special operations planners lies in determining how best to harness local guerrilla forces to support the post-invasion effort.

Since its establishment on July 22^nd, 1940, by the Minister of Economic Warfare, Hugh Dalton, and with the full backing of Prime Minister Winston Churchill, the Special Operations Executive builds a vast network of contacts and agents across occupied Europe. Its operatives gather intelligence, conduct sabotage, and orchestrate low-level psychological warfare.

A critical strategic question now emerges. Should Special Operations Executive continue with its standing operations, or pivot towards expanding its coordination with the Maquis, the rural French resistance fighters? As the Allied liberation of the continent draws near, expectations mount that the Maquis, if properly prepared and equipped, could rise en masse. Their objectives would be to disrupt German logistics, damage infrastructure, and delay reinforcements racing to repel the invasion forces at the coastline.

The current Special Operations Executive strategy, targeting roads, bridges, and power installations, delivers nuisance value but limited tactical impact. Moreover, planners remain wary of deploying large, poorly trained guerrilla units against battle-hardened German troops supported by armour, artillery, mobile reserves, and air power. Without proper guidance, resistance fighters, despite their local knowledge and civilian support, would likely suffer high casualties and provoke brutal German reprisals, including massacres that would alienate the local population.

The key dilemma for Allied planners, therefore, lies in choosing between isolated acts of sabotage, with minimal tactical effect but low risk, or attempting to integrate resistance forces into the broader Allied campaign, thereby risking greater loss but offering potentially decisive outcomes.

Gubbins and his staff identify specific opportunities. If the Maquis can be mobilised to destroy German telephone lines, the Wehrmacht would be forced to rely on radio communications, which the Allies could intercept and jam. Similarly, targeted strikes against fuel depots, ammunition stores, and supply convoys would not only degrade German combat effectiveness but also sap morale.

Yet political complications abound. French resistance groups are not ideologically uniform. Some support General Charles de Gaulle’s Free French forces, others remain sympathetic to the Vichy regime of Marshal Pétain, while a number are aligned with the Communist Party. Allied operatives must carefully manage these internal divisions while ensuring that resistance activities serve the broader objective of liberation.

In a memorandum to the Special Operations Executive’s Security Section, Gubbins outlines his concept and requests a codename:
“A project is under consideration for the dropping behind enemy lines, in cooperation with an Allied invasion of the Continent, of small parties of officers and men to raise and arm the civilian population to carry out guerrilla activities against the enemy’s lines of communication. These men are to be recruited and trained by Special Operations Executive. It is requested that “Jumpers” or some other appropriate codename be allotted to this personnel.”

Shortly thereafter, the initiative receives its name: Jedburgh. The name Jedburgh is selected at random from a British Ministry of Defence codebook. However, many of those who take part later remark on the appropriateness of the title, given that the Scottish Borders town of Jedburgh was, in the Middle Ages, infamous for its Border Reivers, raiders and outlaws who engaged in irregular warfare along the Anglo-Scottish frontier. It is also said that the name Jedburgh is derived from that same Scottish border town since many of the volunteers conduct their initial training.

Multimedia

Exercise Spartan

As the Jedburgh concept circulates among British military and intelligence circles, General Sir Bernard Paget, Commander-in-Chief Home Forces, prepares to stage a major training exercise, codenamed Exercise Spartan, in early spring 1943. The exercise involves 250,000 personnel and 72,000 vehicles. Its purpose is to simulate an Allied invasion against a well-entrenched German defence force familiar with the terrain and capable of deploying mechanised reinforcements.

General Headquarters Home Forces requests twelve Jedburgh teams for participation in Exercise Spartan. Though no such teams or dedicated command structures yet exist, Special Operations Executive quickly assembles a staff to meet the demand. The impromptu Jedburgh organisation comprises Special Operations Executive officers, wireless operators, and instructors, many of whom are assigned notional Jedburgh roles for the duration of the exercise.

Led by Lieutenant Colonel Peter Wilkinson, the Special Operations Executive team generates a liaison cell for First Canadian Army Headquarters and eleven three-man Jedburgh teams under the codename Boykins. Four hundred troops from the Royal Welch Fusiliers serve as the designated Maquis for training purposes.

Wilkinson and his team prepare a mixture of real and simulated scenarios for inclusion in the exercise. Despite the rushed nature of the planning, Exercise Spartan offers an ideal opportunity to test the concept under near-operational conditions.

General Andrew McNaughton of the Canadian Army, a scientifically minded former artillery officer, commands the Allied Second Army in the exercise. His force includes six divisions and an armoured brigade. An advocate of innovation, McNaughton readily embraces the Jedburgh concept. General Headquarters Home Forces also incorporates espionage, counterintelligence, and guerrilla resistance as components of the simulation, giving the Opposing Force commanders additional challenges.

During the exercise, the Jedburgh teams operate as if already inserted behind enemy lines prior to and during the invasion. Their responsibilities include observing road traffic, demolishing bridges and installations, ambushing supply convoys, attacking communications hubs and headquarters, and disrupting traffic control elements. A major aim is to evaluate the survivability of Jedburgh teams and their associated resistance groups operating without direct support behind enemy lines.

The scenario assumes a capable German signals intelligence force attempting to intercept and locate Jedburgh transmissions. Allied commanders assess the timing of insertions, operational endurance of the teams, and their effectiveness in interdicting the enemy.

General McNaughton and his Chief of Staff, Guy Simonds, a close associate of Field Marshal Montgomery, are impressed by the results. The Jedburgh teams succeed in demolishing supply depots, destroying enemy vehicles, and neutralising key Opposing Force installations. As Gubbins’ biographer later observes, “The concept was validated at the Spartan wargames of March 1943, which convinced the British Army that Special Operations Executive could, with limited expenditure, stimulate resistance and provide reliable support to an advancing conventional force.”

The post-exercise analysis highlights several vital lessons. Jedburgh teams must be assigned clear operational areas and missions directly aligned with the objectives of the Allied ground campaign. Insertions must occur close to the designated zone of operations. Time planning proves critical; each mission requires a 72-hour cycle to allow for insertion, contact with the local Maquis, establishment of communications, arrangement of supply drops, reconnaissance, planning, rehearsals, and execution.

Operational depth is also a factor. The immediate rear areas of German lines are too heavily patrolled for sustainable guerrilla operations. Jedburgh and resistance activities must therefore focus on the enemy’s flanks and rear echelon, where German presence is thinner.

Exercise Spartan further demonstrates that while Jedburgh teams are effective for sabotage and guerrilla coordination, commando or airborne units may be necessary to conduct high-risk, direct-action missions beyond the capacity of lightly armed resistance groups. Finally, invasion planners recommend establishing contingency plans for Jedburgh evacuation should the Allied campaign falter. Fortunately, this is never required, but the foresight proves prudent.

For Gubbins and his team, Exercise Spartan confirms the operational viability of the Jedburgh concept. What begins as an experimental doctrine now takes shape as an integral component of Allied special operations planning for the liberation of Europe. Following the compilation of lessons learned from Exercise Spartan, both the Special Operations Executive and the Office of Strategic Services commence the process of advancing similar position papers through the British and American military hierarchies, seeking formal approval, support, and the necessary personnel for the Jedburgh project.

Exercise Spartan also forms the basis of a classified directive issued on April 6^th, 1943 by Colonel M. W. Rowlandson, head of Special Operations Executive’s Planning Section.

On July 19^th, 1943, Lieutenant General Frederick R. Morgan, Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander, recommends that the Special Operations Executive proposals be approved. His understanding is that the Special Operations Executive will provide small liaison staffs and signals detachments to each army and army group headquarters, as well as to the Supreme Allied Commander’s headquarters, to facilitate the control and coordination of local resistance groups. Additionally, a strategic reserve of fifteen Jedburgh teams is to be maintained in England until D-Day, intended to supply leadership and equipment to any resistance groups identified as requiring assistance.

Two days later, on July 21^st, 1943, the British Chiefs of Staff formally approve the Special Operations Executive proposal, with American approval following on August 24^th, 1943. By October, Special Operations Executive and Office of Strategic Services agree to each provide sufficient personnel to field thirty-five operational Jedburgh teams, supported by a further fifteen reserve teams, amounting to a total force of approximately three hundred men organised into one hundred teams.

The Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force establishes a Special Forcesdetachment within each army and army group headquarters to coordinate resistance operations directly with the field armies. These detachments serve as vital links between the field commands and the Special Operations Executive and Special Operations branches. Each Special Forces detachment is composed of approximately twelve officers and twenty enlisted men. The Special Forces Detachment was an orthodox military staff organised to provide the Commanding General of the Army with a direct means to exercise control over the organised resistance elements and to utilise these elements in connection with military operations.

However, the detachments possess no independent means of contacting either the resistance groups or the Jedburgh teams operating in the field. Instead, they rely on the Special Operations Executive/Special Operations network, which compiles reports from agents and resistance units, summarises the information, and forwards these summaries to the respective Special Forces detachments for operational planning and coordination.

All these actions evolve into the formal Jedburgh directive, issued on December 20^th, 1943, outlining plans to produce 300 Jedburgh teams by April 1^st, 1944. Although this ambitious figure is never realised, due in part to time constraints and a lack of suitably qualified personnel with the necessary language and cultural proficiency, an intensive programme of selection and operational training is initiated. The formation of the three-man teams begins with candidates drawn initially from the Special Operations Executive and Office of Strategic Services, supplemented by carefully selected volunteers.

Creation of Operation Jedburgh

In July 1943, France is invited to contribute personnel for the new plan. The creation of the French Comité National de la Résistance in May 1943 had already facilitated closer ties between France and the Allies. The leader of the Free French General de Gaulle accepts the invite, and commandant Saint Jacques of the Bureau Central de Renseignement et d’action undertakes a tour of the regiments stationed in North Africa to recruit suitable candidates.

When recruitment for the U.S. Jedburgh program begins, the initial approach is made to the existing parachute regiments, seeking suitable volunteers from among their ranks. The selection criteria are clearly defined. It is not merely a question of recruiting adventurers, but of identifying men possessing courage, intelligence, and the ability to assess local political situations, as well as the capacity to assert authority over resistance leaders and existing civil administrations.

The selection process prioritises military personnel with recent combat experience and proficiency in small arms, demolitions, and tactical instruction. Radio operators, meanwhile, must demonstrate exceptional skill in their specialist field. Each team is required to include at least one French-speaking member, essential for liaising with, training, and supporting the Maquis. This linguistic requirement is central to operational success. The Office of Strategic Services Special Services Field Manual underscores this necessity, noting that operatives must possess intelligence, courage, resourcefulness, stamina, and fluency in the local language, ideally being of a nationality acceptable to the local population.

American volunteers arrive in Great Britain in late December 1943. Early 1944, a shortage of French-speaking personnel threatens to impede team formation. While the Allies readily fulfil their assigned quotas, France encounters greater difficulties. Commandant Saint Jacques primarily draws his recruits from units not designated for the forthcoming Italian campaign. His task proves challenging, largely due to the reluctance of French corps commanders to release personnel. Consequently, the French quota is not fully met until April 1944, by which time training courses had already commenced.

Although the Special Operations Executive and the Office of Strategic Services are theoretically equals within Special Operations Executive/Special Operations, and later within Special Forces Headquarters, the Special Operations Executive remains the dominant partner. The Special Operations Executive provides the training facilities and the majority of the instructors for the Jedburgh teams.

The officers undergo two weeks of psychological testing near Petersfield, south of London, before being divided into three groups and rotated through Special Training Schools: No. 6 Special Training School at Walsingham, No. 45 Special Training School at Fairford, and No. 40 Special Training School at Gumley Hall. Meanwhile, the non-commissioned officers attend the Special Operations Executive communications school at Henley-on-Thames. In addition to their specialist training, the personnel also undergoes extensive psychological testing, weapons handling, self-defence instruction (taught by former members of the Shanghai Police), and physical conditioning.

All the volunteers attend the parachute school at Ringway, where they complete a three-day course, training to jump through the restricted opening, known as the “joe hole”, of a Royal Air Force bomber.

On February 3^rd, 1944, Lieutenant Colonel Frank V. Spooner of the British Army establishes the Jedburgh training school at Milton Hall, a large estate situated 6.5 kilometres from Peterborough. Operational training for the Jedburgh teams begins in February 1944 and focuses on guerrilla warfare tactics and skills, including demolitions, the use of enemy weapons, map reading, night navigation, agent circuit operations, intelligence gathering, sabotage, escape and evasion techniques, counterespionage, ambush planning, security protocols, courier operations, and hand-to-hand combat.

The training syllabus includes demolitions, enemy weapons, map reading, night navigation, agent circuits, intelligence, sabotage, counterespionage, escape and evasion, ambushes, courier use, and hand-to-hand combat. A training priorities document categorises mission objectives: Priority A includes rail cutting and delaying panzer divisions; Priority B addresses communications sabotage and targeting enemy command structures; Priority C covers demolitions and observation reporting; Priority D targets railway infrastructure without causing long-term damage.

Almost all Jedburgh trainees practise French language skills, Morse code transmission, and undertake extended marches. They also receive detailed briefings on the history and organisation of the French and wider European resistance movements. The arrival of 73 Free French officers in March 1944 from North Africa and the Middle East, significantly strengthening linguistic and cultural capabilities and enhancing credibility with the Maquis.

Jedburgh teams are formally constituted during March and April 1944, between large-scale training phases. In early April, Lieutenant Colonel George Richard Musgrave of the British Army assumes command of the Jedburgh training school at Milton Hall. By the end of that month, training is largely complete.

From May 31^st, 1944 to June 8^th, 1944, many Jedburgh teams participate in Exercise Lash, the final large-scale training exercise held in Charnwood Forest, Leicestershire. During this exercise, the teams rehearse receiving orders, linking up with resistance groups, and leading attacks against targets based on radio instructions. Special Forces Headquarters expresses overall satisfaction with the exercise, though notes several minor criticisms. Observers comment that some guerrilla groups move in large, visible formations during daylight, contrary to good guerrilla practice. Orders issued during the exercise are considered vague, leading to occasional confusion, and deficiencies are identified in escape and evasion techniques.

Jedburgh Teams

Each team typically consists of three members:

• A team commander
• An executive officer
• A non-commissioned radio operator

One of the officers is mostly a British officer from the Special Operations Executive, a American from the Office of Strategic Services, and another officer representing the country in which the team is to be deployed, most often a French, Dutch, or Belgian national, depending on the operational theatre. The third member, the radio operator, may be of any nationality, selected based on technical proficiency and operational need rather than national affiliation. The officers hold ranks typically ranging from lieutenant to captain, with a small number of majors. Radio operators are generally selected from the rank of sergeant.

In addition to personal weapons, which typically include the M1 carbine and a Colt automatic pistol for each operative, the Jedburgh teams are equipped with sabotage materials and radio equipment essential to their mission. Each team deploys with the Type B Mark II radio set, more commonly referred to as the B2 or, informally, the “Jed Set.” This wireless transmitter-receiver is vital for maintaining direct communication with Special Force Headquarters in London.

To streamline radio transmissions, each team is also issued a piece of silk printed with five hundred commonly used operational phrases, each substituted with a unique four-letter code to reduce transmission time. One-time cipher pads are used in conjunction with these phrases to ensure message security.

Financial resources are carried on the person of each team member. Officers wear money belts containing 100,000 francs, equivalent to approximately £210 sterling in 1944, as well as 50 dollars in U.S. currency. Radio operators carry half that amount, 50,000 francs. These funds are intended for distribution to local resistance fighters, known in France as the Maquis, many of whom support families and rely on external financial assistance to sustain their operations. In Belgium and The Netherlands they carried an equivalent in Belgium Francs or Dutch Guldens.

Thirteen teams are deployed in June 1944, ten in Brittany, prioritised by Eisenhower. Between July and September, a further seventy teams follow, most operating in the Massif Central. Resistance fighters, now organised under the Free French Forces of the Interior, harass retreating German troops. In total, 286 Jedburgh operators, comprising 90 British, 103 French, 83 American, five Belgian, and five Dutch personnel, are deployed across France, Belgium, and the Netherlands between June and October 1944.

The success achieved by the Jedburgh teams has unforeseen consequences when, in late 1944, Allied operational focus shifts towards the invasion of Germany. Unlike in France, the Special Operations Executive and the Office of Strategic Services find themselves with limited capacity to replicate the same level of support, intelligence gathering, or unconventional warfare assistance. This shortfall is primarily due to the absence of a significant organised German resistance movement, both prior to and during the Allies’ advance into the heart of the Reich.

Multimedia

Into Action

On May 2^nd, 1944, fifteen Jedburgh teams depart for North Africa, preparing for their eventual insertion into southern France from Algiers. Those teams remaining at Milton Hall continue training while awaiting their alert or warning orders. Standard procedure dictates that once a team receives its alert order, it is isolated and transported to a safe house in London, where representatives from Special Forces Headquarter’s Special Operations Executive country sections provide detailed briefings on the mission, local conditions, and background intelligence.

Although the majority of Jedburgh teams are to be inserted into France in uniform, several teams are informed during these briefings that they will be parachuted in civilian clothing, a risk that, if discovered by German forces, would result in their treatment as spies rather than soldiers.

Following their final preparations, the teams are transported to either Harrington or Tempsford airfields. While Harrington hosts the modified, black-painted bombers of the U.S. Eighth Air Force’s 801^st (Provisional) Bomb Group (Heavy), the Royal Air Force’s No. 38 Group operates from Tempsford. Other airfields are used on occasion. Special Forces Headquarters maintains a supply and packing depot, known as Area H, located approximately 55 kilometres from Harrington, near the village of Holme.

Many of the Jedburghs first learn of the D-Day landings while engaged in Exercise Lash in Leicestershire. There is a general sense of disappointment that they will not be deployed before, but rather after, the invasion has commenced.

By the end of June 1944, Special Forces Headquarters has successfully dispatched thirteen Jedburgh teams to France, six from England and seven from North Africa. By the end of July, the number of teams operating in France has risen to twenty-five, although none have yet been dropped north of the River Seine.

A five-day final field test in Sussex simulates combat conditions. Team selection is overseen by Lieutenant Colonel Spooner, the first commandant of the Jedburgh school. Notably, team members are allowed input into the composition of their units to promote cohesion.

As the Normandy invasion approaches, British intelligence services face the problem of coordinating overlapping operations. MI6 and Special Operations Executive must define their roles to support the Allied advance without duplicating effort. The Jedburgh concept raises concerns among both MI6 and Special Operations Executive personnel already operating in occupied Europe.

Gubbins proposes a compromise: Jedburgh teams will not interfere with existing networks and will operate in uniform, differentiating them from clandestine agents. These multinational teams, composed of British, American, or French members and a trained wireless operator, will focus exclusively on supporting the Maquis.

Their role encompasses liaison, training, supply coordination, and, where necessary, direct command of resistance operations. By integrating with the Maquis, Jedburghs aim to sever German lines of communication, delay reinforcements, and impair logistical operations. This strategy forces German forces to divert resources to rear-area security.

Moreover, the psychological impact of resistance operations deep in the German rear induces fear and dislocation among enemy troops, reinforcing the effectiveness of unconventional warfare.

The Jedburgh concept marks a significant shift in Special Operations Executive doctrine, embracing overt support to indigenous forces rather than clandestine sabotage alone. Teams are inserted as far as 65 kilometres behind enemy lines, carrying only light arms and demolitions to equip the Maquis.

Their ability to communicate with Special Forces Headquarters allows for the rapid delivery of weapons and supplies, transforming resistance units into formidable assets. The low cost in manpower and materiel, combined with the tactical impact of Maquis activity, validates the Jedburgh approach as an effective force multiplier.

Relations with de Gaulle’s government-in-exile remain cautious and at arm’s length. Nevertheless, cooperation does occur intermittently. One notable occasion is a meeting held in London on January 25^th, 1944, to discuss the reception arrangements for Jedburgh teams in France. During this meeting, representatives of Special Operations Executive, the Office of Strategic Services, and the Bureau Central de Renseignements et d’Action, the intelligence arm of de Gaulle’s government, agree to finance a mission for Bureau Central de Renseignements et d’Action and the F Section to establish reception committees and safe houses for Jedburgh teams.

Through extraordinary effort, de Gaulle’s government manages largely to unify the disparate French resistance movements. In March 1944, it officially announces the formation of the Forces Françaises de l’Intérieur. The Forces Françaises de l’Intérieur incorporates various groups, including the Communist-aligned Francs-Tireurs et Partisans, the largest and most active of the French resistance organisations. Nevertheless, collaboration among the many resistance factions remains fraught, as underlying political divisions and rivalries concerning the future of France persist.

In preparation for the Allied invasion of France, the Special Operations Executive and Special Operations branches are reorganised. On May 1^st 1944, they are consolidated into the Special Forces Headquarters, which reports to the G3 Branch of the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force. Although Special Operations Executive operates several sections managing clandestine circuits in France, the most significant are the RF Section, which supports the networks aligned with General Charles de Gaulle, and the F Section, which operates non-Gaullist circuits.

Besides all this, Operation Jedburgh represents the first significant collaboration in Western Europe between Special Operations Executive and the Special Operations Branch of the Office of Strategic Services. By mid-1944, the Special Operations Executive alone lacks the necessary resources to sustain such a large undertaking. For example, it has access to only 23 Handley Page Halifax aircraft for parachuting agents and supplies, barely adequate to support its existing networks.

The Office of Strategic Services, eager to play a greater role in European operations, contributes additional aircraft to the mission, including Consolidated B-24 Liberators operating from Royal Air Force Harrington as part of Operation Carpetbagger. For the Americans, the opportunity to insert dozens of agents into occupied Europe in a single campaign far exceeds what has been achieved in the entire prior course of U.S. involvement in the war.

Despite the Office of Strategic Services’s growing influence, General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force, ensures that the French take the lead in directing Jedburgh operations. On July 9^th, 1944, Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force directs General de Gaulle’s close associate, General Pierre Koenig, to gradually assume command over Special Forces Headquarters operations within France. The transfer of authority is not formalised until August 21^st, 1943. In practice, however, this change is largely political and cosmetic. Operational control remains firmly in the hands of Special Operations Executive and Office of Strategic Services deputies, who continue to manage the mechanisms of command, communication, and supply.

Most of the eleven Jedburgh teams operating in this context are deployed to eastern France, within the area designated as Region C by the Forces Françaises de l’Intérieur. Region C is commanded by the District Military Representative known by the codename “Planète”. The region encompasses the departments of the Ardennes, Marne, Meurthe-et-Moselle, Meuse, Vosges, Bas-Rhin, and Haute-Rhin. From the outset, operations in Region C prove challenging. Conditions worsen further in August 1944 as remnants of the Vichy regime, Milice forces, and their sympathisers retreat eastwards alongside the defeated elements of the German Army.

Approximately 300 Jedburgh operatives are eventually selected for service. Of them 103 are French, 90 British, 83 American, 5 Belgian, and 8 Dutch. The teams are stationed at Milton Hall near Peterborough. Their headquarters is based at Special Forces Headquarters on Baker Street in London. This location offers closer proximity to the airfields from which they are to be deployed, as well as to London and Special Force Headquarters.

Multimedia

Operation Overlord and Beyond

From June 6^th, 1944 on, Royal Air Force bases Tempsford and Harrington serve as the primary departure bases from England, while in Algeria, operations are launched from bases Maison Blanche and Blida.

The missions are organised into five main zones of operation: Brittany; the Loire Valley; the Châteauroux-Toulouse axis; the Alps and the southeast; and the northeast. During June, the principal objective of delaying German reinforcements en route to Normandy is successfully achieved. In the subsequent months, the Jedburgh teams contribute significantly to the protection of the flanks of the liberation armies advancing from both Normandy and Provence.

The deployment of Jedburgh teams is structured as follows: in June, thirteen teams are parachuted into the south, centre, and Brittany. In July, a further eleven teams are deployed towards Brittany and the centre-west. In August, following the landings in Provence, support to the maquis intensifies, with fifty-three teams parachuted into the southwest and the Alps. In September, ten teams reinforce operations in the east. Along the Atlantic front, four additional teams are landed by sea. In November, a final team is inserted into Alsace to counter the continuing German threat.

Teams are inserted by parachute, primarily under the cover of darkness, and are met upon landing by reception committees composed of Maquis or other local resistance elements. While several teams parachuted in August and September land in areas already liberated by the swift advance of Allied forces, most are deployed deep into enemy-occupied territory.

The first Jedburgh team to be deployed is codenamed Team Hugh. It parachutes into central France, near Châteauroux, during the night of June 6^th, 1944, just hours before the launch of Operation Overlord, the Allied invasion of Normandy.

Each team serves as a critical link between the French Resistance and Allied high command. Their responsibilities include providing liaison, tactical advice, operational leadership, and the coordination of guerrilla actions. Perhaps most crucially, the Jedburghs possess the capability to arrange and direct Allied airdrops of arms, ammunition, and equipment, thereby significantly enhancing the combat effectiveness of local resistance groups. It is estimated that through their efforts, they directly support and influence the operations of approximately 100,000 French resistance fighters engaged in combat against the occupying German forces.

Operating behind enemy lines carries grave risks. Under Adolf Hitler’s Kommandobefehl all Allied personnel captured while conducting sabotage or special operations are to be executed without trial, even if wearing uniform. The application of this directive to Jedburgh operatives, who deploy in standard Allied uniform, constitutes a clear violation of the laws of war.

Each Jedburgh team is deployed with approximately a dozen containers of weapons, enabling them to train the maquisards while awaiting additional parachute drops requested by radio communication. While the assumption of command over the maquis is not automatic and depends largely on local circumstances, Jedburgh supervision of resistance groups remains the consistent practice.

A total of 285 men serve as Jedburghs in France, comprising 103 French, 89 British, 83 Americans. Of these, 89 are French officers and 17 French radio operators; 47 are British officers with 38 British radio operators; and 40 are American officers accompanied by 37 American radio operators. Thirteen individuals complete a second operational mission. The anticipated casualty rate of 40 percent is, fortunately, not realised. Nevertheless, losses are sustained: 19 men are killed, including 13 in action, 4 executed following capture, and 2 as a result of fatal parachute jumps. Additionally, 25 are wounded, with 18 wounded in action and 7 during jumps. Four Jedburghs are taken prisoner.

The Netherlands

Between September 1944 and April 1945, eight Jedburgh teams operate in the Netherlands. The first team, codenamed Dudley, is parachuted into the eastern region of the country one week prior to the launch of Operation Market Garden. The following four teams are directly attached to the airborne forces participating in that operation.

In the aftermath of the mixed results of Operation Market Garden, one Jedburgh team is tasked with training former resistance fighters in the liberated southern provinces of the Netherlands. Their mission is to enhance the organisation, discipline, and effectiveness of local forces in anticipation of further Allied advances.

In April 1945, the final two Dutch Jedburgh teams become operational. Operation Gambling, forms a combined Jedburgh–Special Air Service unit. This team is dropped into the central Netherlands to support the final Allied push northwards. The second is deployed into the northern provinces as part of Special Air Service Operation Amherst.

Operating clandestinely in the Netherlands proves particularly challenging due to the flat terrain and dense population, which limit concealment and increase the risk of exposure. Nevertheless, the Jedburgh teams in the Netherlands achieve considerable success, supporting both conventional military operations and the reactivation of local resistance movements during the closing phase of the war in Western Europe.

Burma