Raid on Makin Island

Operation

The Makin Island raid, executed on August 17, 1942, by the United States Marine Corps’ 2nd Raider Battalion, serves as a significant tactical maneuver during World War II. Its objectives are multifaceted: to divert Japanese attention and resources away from Guadalcanal, where major engagements are ongoing, to disrupt enemy reinforcements, and to gather crucial intelligence. Moreover, the raid aims to destroy enemy personnel and facilities, undermining the Japanese presence and capability in the region.

Makin Island, part of the Gilbert Islands chain, plays a strategic role due to its location and physical characteristics. The island, primarily Butaritari at the southwest tip of the atoll, is the focal point of the raid. Butaritari is a narrow strip of land, approximately eight miles in length and less than half a mile wide, densely covered with coconut palms which stretch right up to the waterline. This dense vegetation provides both cover and concealment, factors critical for the element of surprise in military operations.

The Plan

The landing for the operation is planned on the ocean side of the island. This approach is chosen likely due to strategic considerations such as the direction of prevailing winds and currents, the layout of Japanese defenses, and the desire to achieve surprise. The ocean side, being potentially less guarded, offers a tactical advantage to the raiders. The raiders have three tactical Objectives:

1. Diversionary Tactics: By engaging Japanese forces at Makin, the raiders aim to create a diversion, pulling Japanese resources and focus away from Guadalcanal. This is intended to relieve some pressure off the Allied forces actively engaged in that critical area.
2. Intelligence Gathering: Understanding enemy positions, strength, and future plans is crucial. The raiders are tasked with capturing documents, equipment, and potentially prisoners of war that could yield valuable insights into Japanese operations in the Pacific.
3. Demolition of Facilities and Personnel: The destruction of installations, equipment, and the reduction of enemy personnel on Makin would degrade the Japanese ability to use the island as a support or forward base, thereby limiting their operational reach and effectiveness in the region.

The Makin raid, though small in scale compared to other engagements in the Pacific theater, is intended to have a disproportionate impact on Japanese strategic calculations and troop deployments. By forcing the enemy to redirect resources to Makin, the Allies gain a tactical advantage elsewhere, demonstrating the interconnected nature of military operations across different theaters of war.

August 8th, 1942

The raiding force, known as Task Unit 7.15.3, consisted of a carefully selected group of 13 officers and 208 enlisted men. This group included Company A, led by Lieutenant Merwyn C. Plumley, and Company B, under Captain Ralph H. Coyte, each slightly reduced by one rifle section to optimize the teams for this specific mission. Their journey begins at 09:00 from Pearl Harbor, aboard two specifically chosen transport submarines: the U.S.S. Nautilus (SS-168) and the U.S.S. Argonaut (APS-1). These vessels are to approach their target independently, with the Nautilus arriving early to perform crucial reconnaissance tasks, facilitated by its ability to operate effectively near the surface and its equipped periscope. The voyage to the target is uneventful with regard to enemy contact, allowing the submarines to travel predominantly on the surface.

August 16th, 1942

Just before dawn at 03:00, the U.S.S. Nautilus reaches the vicinity of Makin Island. Despite challenges posed by strong tides and the absence of clear landmarks, the submarine conducted a submerged reconnaissance of both the primary and secondary landing sites to ensure the accuracy of the planned operations.

Later that evening, at 21:16 on August, in the midst of a heavy rain squall, the U.S.S. Nautilus successfully rendezvoused with the U.S.S. Argonaut. Together, they proceed to the debarkation point.

August 17th, 1942

Both Submarines arrive at the debarkation point at 03:00 under a night sky partly obscured by scattered clouds. The unloading process is fraught with difficulties: a westward current of one and one-half knots threatens to push the submarines toward the reef, necessitating careful maneuvering and constant engine reversals to maintain a safe distance of 500 metres from the hazardous coral structures.

Amidst the challenges of heavy swells and the urgent, last-minute requirement for several boats launched from the U.S.S. Argonaut to pick up additional landing force personnel from U.S.S. Nautilus, the teams manage to clear all rubber boats on schedule. The conditions make voice communications nearly impossible, drowned out by the roaring surf and the noise of sea water washing through the limber holes of the submarines.

Originally, the raid is planned with two separate landing beaches designated for disembarkation. However, due to several outboard motor failures and confusion during the launch process, Lieutenant Colonel Carlson makes a decisive last-minute alteration to the plan. He directs all boats to follow him to a single landing site, beach Z, located opposite Government Wharf. This change, while sudden, is necessary to maintain the cohesion and momentum of the operation.

The change in plan sees fifteen of the boats landing together at the intended spot. However, two other boats are unable to follow the revised course and end up landing about a mile north of the main group. Despite this separation, the members of these two boats manage to regroup with the main force amidst the initial exchanges of fire with the enemy. One additional boat, facing even greater difficulty, lands over 1.5 kilometres south, positioning itself inadvertently behind enemy lines.

The landings themselves are initially unopposed, allowing the troops a critical window to disembark and form up. Unfortunately, the silence and stealth are disrupted when one of the troopers accidentally discharges his rifle. This mishap alerts the Japanese forces to the presence of the raiders, prompting immediate enemy engagement.

Post-landing, Lieutenant Colonel Carlson issues orders for Company A to traverse the island to secure the lagoon road and assess their position relative to the key strategic points such as the Government Wharf and Government House. By 06:00, Company A has successfully reported from Government Wharf and confirmed the capture of Government House, which occurs without opposition. As they move southward, the 1st Platoon of Company A encounters robust enemy defenses along the lagoon road.

The Japanese defence is formidable, equipped with four machine guns, a flamethrower, two grenade launchers, and infantry armed with automatic weapons. These forces are further bolstered by well-concealed snipers, creating a challenging scenario for the raiders. In response to the stiff resistance, a platoon from Company B is deployed to reinforce the right flank of Company A. This strategic reinforcement plays a crucial role in overcoming the Japanese defenses, and by 11:30, the raiders successfully break through the enemy lines.

The dynamics of the battle shift dramatically when two Japanese ships—a 3,500-ton transport vessel and a 1,500-ton patrol craft—enter the lagoon. These ships represent a significant escalation in the operational capacity of the Japanese forces on the island. However, their threat is quickly neutralized by the precise and effective use of the deck guns from the submarines supporting the raid, which succeed in sinking both vessels.

The situation escalates further when the area comes under aerial reconnaissance and attack. Initially, two Type-95 reconnaissance planes scout the area, dropping bombs before departing. This initial aerial engagement is a precursor to a more sustained air assault at 13:20, involving a mixed formation of 12 aircraft, including 2 Kawanishi flying boats, 4 Zero fighter planes, 4 Type-94 reconnaissance bombers, and potentially the same 2 Type-95s from earlier. For over an hour, these aircraft execute bombing runs and strafing attacks, adding to the chaos and danger on the ground.

Amidst these challenges, Lieutenant Colonel Carlson employs a tactical maneuver designed to expose and neutralize hidden Japanese snipers who are pinning down his forces around a key resistance point. He orders the center and right flanks to withdraw 200 metres to a position that offers a clearer field of fire, hoping to lure the snipers into a more vulnerable position. Meanwhile, the left flank remains in place, set to enfilade any advancing enemy troops. Unfortunately, this tactic does not yield the desired result, and the Japanese snipers remain a significant impediment.

The raiders’ positions, particularly those recently vacated under Carlson’s orders, become the target of a final intense bombing at 16:30, which results in casualties not only among the raiders but also some of the advancing Japanese elements. As dusk approaches on August 17^th, 1942, the situation on Makin Island grows dire for the raiders. Scheduled for withdrawal at 19:30, they have failed to capture prisoners or destroy key facilities. The decision to withdraw is made to avoid jeopardising the mission further and to adhere to the tight schedule. The flanks are repositioned, and by 19:30, the boats are ready to enter the surf. The raiders, despite extensive surf launch practices, are unprepared for the fierce and relentless breakers.

The struggle against the surf is intense and nightmarish. Crews fight for up to an hour, often being washed back to the shore. Many men loose their equipment, and several likely drown in the attempts. By the scheduled time, less than a third of the raiders have managed to reach the submarines. Adding to the chaos are heavy rains, the loss of weapons, the anticipated arrival of Japanese reinforcements, and renewed air attacks.

At dawn on August 18^th, 1942, further attempts to conquer the surf fail. The submarines, after multiple air alerts, submerge but set a new rendezvous for 19:30. Facing another day ashore, Lieutenant Colonel Carlson sends patrols to search for enemy food and weapons. They discover that few Japanese remain alive on the island. Patrols encounter little resistance, shooting two enemies and counting 83 enemy dead from the previous day. The remains of 11 raiders are recovered, and three others who have harassed the enemy throughout the day manage to reboard the U.S.S. Nautilus successfully.

In the late afternoon, a patrol finds nearly 1,000 barrels of aviation gasoline, which they ignite with TNT. They also recover documents and charts from the office of the deceased Japanese commander. In the evening, the remaining rubber boats are moved to the lagoon side of the island, lash to a native outrigger, and set off at 20:30. By 23:08, they reach the U.S.S. Nautilus at Funk Point. The raiding force returns to Pearl Harbor and disembarked on August 25^th, 1942.

Aftermath

The raid resulted in 30 raider deaths: 14 killed in action, 7 drowned, and 9 tragically left behind and later executed by the Japanese. The exact circumstances of how these men were left behind remain unclear. The Japanese suffered at least 85 fatal casualties and probably a a large amount of wounded.

The evaluation of the raid is mixed. Casualties were higher than expected, and equipment losses were significant. General Holland M. Smith later commented that the raid served no useful military purpose and alerted the Japanese to Allied intentions in the Gilberts, leading to the heavy fortification of Tarawa. However, the raid destroyed two ships, two aircraft, petroleum stores, and radio facilities. It also forced the Japanese to divert reinforcements from Truk to Guadalcanal.

In retrospect, the Makin Island raid served as a testing ground for the raider concept. While inconclusive on its own, it provided valuable lessons for future operations. The raid’s legacy lies in its contribution to refining tactics and strategies that would benefit later Allied engagements in the Pacific.

Multimedia