Kommando der Kleinkampfverbände

Organisational History

Mid of 1941, Abwehrstelle II in Hamburg revisits the concept of World War 1 combat swimmers and establishes the initial two German Marine Einsatz Kommandos (MEK). Throughout the duration of the war, German combat swimmers maintains a technological edge. While the Allies employ a diving apparatus created by Jacques-Yves Cousteau, the pioneering Austrian diver Hans Hass, in collaboration with the DrägerLübeck patent company, develops a closed oxygen circuit breathing apparatus known as the Dräger-Gegenlunge. Its key advantage lay in its operation without emitting any conspicuous air bubbles that might have attracted the attention of vigilant sentries.

Unlike other major wartime powers such as Great Britain, Italy, or Japan, the German Reich initiated the formation of small combat units as a tool of surprise and as a strategy for the weaker side only when it became evident that the war situation was worsening and a transition to a defensive stance was inevitable. This decision coincided with the looming Allied invasion in Northern France. By 1943, the Kriegsmarine has effectively lost its combat-ready surface forces, and the U-boat warfare has ground to a halt. The need arises to find ways to revitalise naval warfare.

It is believed that the severe damage inflicted on the battleship “Tirpitz” by British midget submarines “X 6” and “X 7” on September 23^rd, 1943, served as a pivotal moment. This event, with significant consequences for the German war effort, demonstrates the substantial damage that a few brave soldiers can inflict on the enemy.

The responsibility for forming the small combat units falls to the Oberbefehlshaber der Kriegsmarine, Großadmiral Karl Dönitz. Flottenchef Generaladmiral Otto Schniewind is tasked with overseeing this initiative, while Konteradmiral Hellmuth Heye serves as the Chief of Staff in the Fleet Command. Another special staff is established under his leadership, with former U-boat commander Fregattenkapitän Fritz Frauenheim (“U 21,” “U 101”) serving as the 1. Admiralstabsoffizier. The formation staff also includes prominent figures such as Korvettenkapitän Hans Bartels, known for his role as the commander of “M 1” during the occupation of Norway in 1940, and Kapitänleutnant der Reserve Friedrich Wilhelm Michel Obladen, formerly the head of Marine-Einsatz-Kommandos Marei/Mares, Marko, and 20.

The fundamental idea in the planning is to utilise small, highly trained, and completely dependable commando units in numerous individual missions. These missions involve the use of ever-changing combat equipment to surprise and disrupt the enemy, thereby diverting their forces away from decisive fronts.

Based on these considerations, several subsequent planning steps were taken:

1. Development of a practical mini submarine for individual operations.
2. Design of a small torpedo carrier for various purposes, akin to the Italian approach using explosive boats and similar weaponry.
3. Establishment of naval assault teams, inspired by the English model, to carry out operations against strategically or tactically significant enemy positions in their operational area.

Building on these plans, a wide array of small combat equipment is designed in the final year and a half of World War II. Some of these designs appeared futuristic, while others were audacious. These were intended to be operated by soldiers who had to undergo rapid training due to the urgency of the wartime situation. Many of these small combat units were developed without the luxury of sufficient time for careful design and prototype testing. In several cases, their testing and deployment occurred simultaneously during initial missions, resulting in significant challenges for the hastily trained operators of the small combat equipment.

Amidst mounting pressures, the formation and doctrine of the small combat units evolved differently than originally envisioned by Konteradmiral Heye and his special staff at the Marinegruppenkommando Nord / Fleet Command. It became evident that economic capacities only allowed for the production of larger series of a few types of small combat equipment, rather than the simultaneous development, thorough design, and production of numerous smaller series. In retrospect, Heye recognized that “the supply of conventional combat equipment for the German fleet had dwindled to such an extent that, apart from U-boats, it could no longer be replenished. Consequently, the units being formed in large series by the Kommando der Kleinkampfverbände were viewed as replacements for missing fleet forces. Although the original command tasks remained, they began to take a backseat.”

This transformation also manifested in the organisational structure of the small combat units. While the “Marine-Einsatz-Abteilung,” presumably formed around two days after its initial mention in the Feldpostübersicht on November 16^th, 1943, consisted of numerous small groups (ranging from “A” to “Z” and “AA” to “ZA”) with diverse responsibilities, the core of the Command of Small Combat Units, established on April 20^th, 1944, as a successor to the Marine-Einsatz-Abteilung, was comprised of just eight training units. This restructuring was significant, even though Rear Admiral Hellmuth Heye, promoted to Vice Admiral on August 1^st, 1944, held extraordinary decision-making authority within his role.

Heye, as a ministerial official, led the Ministerialbeamter das Generalreferat Sonderkampfmittel in the Naval Operations Staff of the OKM (Oberkommando der Kriegsmarine). He reported directly to the Chief of the Naval Operations Staff, Admiral Wilhelm Meisel, which placed him as the head of a “large department” on the same level as the Chiefs of the Operations Department, Submarine Command Department, Signal Intelligence Department, or the Naval Intelligence Service. This alone was quite unusual. However, Heye not only had the right to have direct access to the Chief of the Naval Operations Staff, but he also held the position of Admiral of Small Combat Units, effectively making him the front commander of a military branch within the Kriegsmarine. In other words, he could bring forward demands from the front, demands born out of practical needs, to the Naval Operations Staff, and, having embraced these demands himself, attempt to influence decisions by the Chief of the Naval Operations Staff regarding their feasibility considering available production capacities and potentially at the expense of other military branches. The following diagram illustrates Heye’s unique position and the integration of the Command of Small Combat Units into the organisational structure of the Kriegsmarine in late autumn 1944 and the structure of the Kommando der Kleinkampfverbände Units as of January 15^th, 1945.

As part of the command structures of the Kommando der Kleinkampfverbände, which had its headquarters in Timmendorf, several key units were established. These included the Command Staff, the Quartermaster Staff, the Court of K-Units, the Personnel Office of K-Units, the Development Group, and the Scientific Group. The leadership of the K-Units in various theaters of war was executed through K-Staffs (e.g., K-Staff West, K-Staff North, K-Staff South). In specific cases, K-Divisions were subordinated to the K-Staffs, and under these K-Divisions were the Operational Units, each equipped with a specific type of overwater or underwater small combat equipment, known as K-Flotillas.

Notably, the Marine Einsatz Kommandos (MEK), along with the MEK Training Department, held a unique position. They were directly under the command of the Kommando der Kleinkampfverbände and were not part of the command hierarchy described above. Another distinguishing feature of the Marine Einsatz Kommandos was their full motorization, unlike the K-Staffs, K-Divisions, and K-Flotillas. The motorization of the latter was managed by the K-Regiment (mot.) 1, which consisted of four divisions. These divisions evolved from the 3rd, 4th, and 5th Marine Motorized Usage Units, which were subordinated to the Kommando der Kleinkampfverbände between spring 1944 and March 1945.

For the testing of new small combat equipment and the training of soldiers for the use of this equipment, the Command of Small Combat Units had the Command of Test and Training Commands under its purview. The Test Commands included the Test Command 106 (no specific information available), Test Command 206 in Berlin (Sprengboot “Linse”), Test Command 207 in Schlutup near Lübeck (Klein-U-Boot “Biber”), Test Command 306 in Neustadt i. H. (Klein-U-Boote “Hecht” and “Seehund”), and Test Command 456 in Kiel (e.g., Klein-U-Boote “Schwertwal,” “Seeteufel,” “Manta,” and deep-sea diving equipment “Grundhai”).

The Training Commands were responsible for the training of individual fighters designated for various weapon systems, as well as the equipment and outfitting of the K- (“Kampf-” or combat) Flotillas and their supply. They were equipped according to training requirements with salvage ships, capture boats, security boats, diving ships, torpedo recovery ships, and target ships.

In addition to the Command of Test and Training Commands, there was an Training and Deployment Department located in Waren an der Müritz. The Training Commands, along with all other units of the Kommando der Kleinkampfverbände situated in the German-Danish region, were accommodated in training and deployment camps. These locations were given names ending with “-koppel” for camouflage purposes.

The headquarters of the Admiral der Kommando der Kleinkampfverbände was located in “Strandkoppel,” specifically the Hotel-Pension “Zur Kammer” in Timmendorfer Strand. Shortly before the end of the war, the headquarters was relocated to Ellenberg near Kappeln on the Schlei.

The initial six-week “basic training” for Kommando der Kleinkampfverbände personnel took place at “Schwarzkoppel” camp, a former Reich Labor Service camp located about 30 kilometers east of Rostock in Bad Sülze, which had been taken over by the Kommando der Kleinkampfverbände.

The Lehrkommando 200 was initially stationed in Priesterbäk near Waren an der Müritz (“Grünkoppel”) and later moved to Plön in Holstein to the “Netzkoppel” camp. “Grünkoppel” camp consisted of barracks from a former Reich Labor Service Unit 7/64 “Paul Pogge,” located near the small village of Speck on the Specker See (now Priesterbäker See), about ten kilometers east of the Müritz Lake.

In “Netzkoppel” camp, members of Lehrkommando 200 were housed in Blocks “Nürnberg” and “Stuttgart” within the Ruhleben Plön Barracks. The barracks were initially constructed for the III. Marine Unteroffizier Lehr Abteilung and were used for submarine training from 1940 onwards.

The large mess hall, harbor facilities, and boat shed of the barracks were also assigned to “Netzkoppel” camp. Established in July 1944, Lehrkommando 200, initially led by Kapitänleutnant Ulrich Kolbe (previously commander of the mostly Cherbourg-based 5th Fast Attack Craft Flotilla until his transfer to the KdK in March 1944) and later by Kapitänleutnant Helmut Bastian (former commander of the torpedo boat “Möwe,” sunk in Le Havre by an air raid on June 14/15, 1944), formed nine flotillas, the K-Flotillas 211 to 219.

The “Linsen” of K-Flotilla 211 were deployed from June 25^th, 1944, against the Allied invasion forces in Normandy until further operations became infeasible after August 9^th, 1944, due to the expansion of the landing area and the German troops’ retreat.

From October 1944 onwards, the “Linsen” Flotillas 211, 212, 214, and 215 were operated from Dutch bases against the supply routes to the Dunkirk fortress (Unternehmen Kameraden), especially from Hellevoetsluis against Allied supply traffic on the Westerschelde to Antwerp, and as transport for commando units of the Marine Einsatz Kommandos 60 and 65, as well as combat swimmers from Lehrkommando 700.

K-Flotilla 213 had a unique fate: On October 18^th, 1944, it arrived in San Remo for deployment against Allied landing forces in Southern France but was housed in the city’s flower hall. On October 20^th, 1944, it was completely destroyed by artillery fire from Allied destroyers and the resulting explosion of the charges of a total of 48 “Linsen.”

The “Linsen” were also used for transporting commando units on the Rhine, Danube, and their tributaries, as well as in the northern Adriatic.

The Lehrkommando 250, established in August 1944, was located in the Hohemeile forest east of Schlutup near Lübeck on the southern bank of the Trave (“Blaukoppel”). Its mission was to oversee the one-man submarines of the “Biber” type and their crews. Through Lehrkommando 250, led initially by Korvettenkapitän Hans Bartels (formerly the commander of “M 1” and “T 34”) until his assignment to the Kommando der Kleinkampfverbände in March 1944, and subsequently by Kapitänleutnant Helmut Bastian (former commander of the torpedo boat “Möwe,” sunk on June 14^th/15^th, 1944, in Le Havre), the K-Flotillas 261 to 270 were established.

K-Flotilla 261 was intended to be deployed against the Allied landing forces in Normandy from Le Havre but didn’t reach the intended deployment port at the end of August 1944 due to the abandonment of the harbor during the retreat.

The “Biber” submarines were primarily employed in one-way missions from September 1944 until the end of the war, mainly from Dutch ports such as Poortershaven and Hellevoetsluis.

The Lehrkommando 300 in Neustadt in Holstein was responsible for the two-man submarines of the types “Hecht” and “Seehund.” Barracks on the outskirts of the Wiksberg Barracks (known as “Neukoppel”) served as their accommodation and base. The K-Base Wilhelmshaven (Camp “Graukoppel”) played a crucial role in providing and, if necessary, repairing the “Seehund” submarines, which were exclusively operated from the Dutch port of Ijmuiden. The geographical location and logistics of K-Base Wilhelmshaven made it vital for these operations. The base was situated on the northern shore of the West Harbour (Tirpitz Harbour), in the area of the present-day Banter Lake. According to Mattes, “Graukoppel” was located where the building of the Kammgarnspinnerei now stands. During the Imperial Navy era, this area housed the Uto Shipyard with torpedo workshops. In the Third Reich, this complex belonged to the Deutsche Werke AG.

Starting from January 1^st, 1945, the “Seehund” submarines were deployed from Ijmuiden until the end of the war, targeting Allied supply traffic on the Thames-Scheldt route, the most critical supply route after the capture of Antwerp in mid-November 1944. In the final weeks of the war, “Seehunds” were also used for supply runs with “Buttertorpedos” to the Dunkirk fortress. The “Seehunds” were organized within K-Flotilla 312 under the command of Kapitänleutnant Hermann Rasch (previously the commander of “U 106”) and fell under the 5th K-Division led by Fregattenkapitän Albrecht Brandi (formerly the commander of “M 1,” “U 617,” “U 380,” and “U 967”).

The Lehrkommandos 350 and 400 were established in July 1944. They were stationed in Surendorf on the southern shore of Eckernförder Bucht in the “Dorfkoppel” camp and served as training units for one-man torpedoes of the types “Neger” and “Marder” (Lehrkommando 350) and one-man submarines of the type “Molch” (Lehrkommando 400). The “Dorfkoppel” camp included barracks, buildings, and the bridge of the torpedo testing facility of the Torpedoversuchsanstalt Eckernförde Ost. Lehrkommando 350 formed K-Flotillas 361 to 366, while Lehrkommando 400 established K-Flotillas 411 to 417. The one-man torpedoes of the “Neger” type were among the first small combat equipment used.

After the Allied landing on the Italian west coast at Anzio-Nettuno on January 22, 1944, K-Flotilla 361, under the command of Oberleutnant Hanno Krieg (formerly the commander of “U 81”), successfully attacked Allied landing forces on April 20-21, 1944. These attacks were successful due to the unprepared defense against these small combat equipment. Further operations took place from early July to mid-November 1944 against the Allied landing forces in Northern France.

The operations of the “Molch flotillas” ended in disaster from the outset. K-Flotilla 411 was deployed in September 1944 against the Allied landing forces in Southern France. The first attack resulted in the loss of ten out of the twelve deployed “Molchs.” Further operations were discontinued in this theater of war. K-Flotilla 412 fought an ultimately futile battle against Allied supply traffic in the Scheldt area from January 1945, leading to the loss of the deployed vehicles without any success.

The Lehrkommando 600 was stationed in Castelletto near Sesto Calende on Lake Maggiore in Upper Italy in the spring of 1944, adjacent to the Italian assault boat school Sant Anna, before being relocated to List at the northern tip of Sylt Island in October/November 1944. With the expansion of training activities, Lehrkommandos 601, which remained in Castelletto, and 602 in Stresa on the west shore of Lake Maggiore were established. These Lehrkommandos trained crews for Italian-made surface assault combat equipment (“mezzo d’assalto”), namely “one-man assault boats,” which were modified pleasure boats known as “MTM” (Motoscafo Turismo Modificato or Megliorato), and “two-man assault boats,” small torpedo speedboats called “MTSMA” or simply “SMA” (Motoscafo Turismo Silurante Modificato Allargato), and provided these vehicles. It is assumed that Lehrkommando 600 would have been responsible for these surface combat equipment given its geographical location and the expected cessation of production of MTSMA due to the war and simultaneous expansion of production of the small speedboat “Hydra.” However, there is no concrete evidence to support this.

Lehrkommando 600 was led by Kapitänleutnant Heinz Schomburg (formerly the commander of “U 145” and “U 561”). These Lehrkommandos established the 1st to 3rd Assault Boat Flotillas, which were renamed K-Flotillas 611 to 613 in mid-December 1944. While the 1st Assault Boat Flotilla was set up as an immediate measure after the Allied landing in Southern France on August 15, 1944, and was used for attack attempts against the Allied landing forces from Villefranche for a few days and later from San Remo until the end of the war – the flotilla was awarded the name “Hitlerjugend” for these operations – the 2nd and 3rd Assault Boat Flotillas were established only in late autumn 1944/winter 1944/45 and operated in the northern Adriatic. K-Flotilla 612 was based primarily in Pola and was mainly used as a transport flotilla for landing commando units of Marine Einsatz Kommando 71 and for transporting agents behind enemy lines. K-Flotilla 613, on the other hand, practically saw no use due to ongoing delays in the provision of the required equipment.