Raider Battalions

Commando Like Unit

At that moment, the Marine Corps is already taking steps to initiate such a programme. On January 6^th, 1942, the 1^st Battalion, 5^th Marines is redesignated as the 1^st Separate Battalion and is reassigned from the 1^st Marine Division to the Amphibious Force, Atlantic Fleet, to be readily available for conducting individual raids or to operate as part of larger formations. Major General Thomas Holcomb, Commandant of the Marine Corps, observes the similarity to the British commandos but directs that the term Marine alone is sufficient to indicate a man ready for duty at any time and that the injection of a special name, such as Commando, would be undesirable and superfluous. The organisation, equipment, and training of infantry units of the Marine Divisions should, in practically all respects, be identical to that of the British Commandos. In general, it may be stated that the training of all units in the two Marine Divisions prepares them to carry out either offensive operations on a large-scale, or small-scale amphibious raids of the type carried out by the Commandos.

On January 14^th, 1942, the Commandant of the Marine Corps informs the Commanding General, Amphibious Force, Atlantic, Major General Holland M. Smith and the Commanding General, Department of the Pacific, Major General Charles F. B. Price of a proposal to appoint Colonel William J. Donovan, to Brigadier General, United States Marine Corps Reserve with duty as commanding officer of the raider project. Both generals are requested to comment on the proposal, and both use the opportunity to comment generally on the entire raider concept. General Smith recommends against Donovan’s appointment on grounds that the Marine Corps should not have to seek leaders from outside its ranks. He also opposes the raider concept on philosophical grounds, noting that all Amphibious Force, Atlantic Marines could be trained in raiding techniques by their own officers if it were deemed important. General Smith notes that there are enough “by-products” in the Corps and that “all Amphibious Force Marines are considered as commandos,” thereby expressing a view that would become increasingly common among senior Marine officers, namely, that there is no task that the “elite” raider units could perform any more effectively than regular line units. General Price’s reply notes that the rapid expansion of the Marine Corps is resulting in an extreme shortage of qualified officers and senior Non-Commissioned Officers with the requisite command experience. He therefore concurs with the raider concept only if the personnel are recruited directly rather than by drawing on already thin Corps resources.

Raider Battalion

On February 4^th, 1942, the Commanding General, Amphibious Force Pacific Fleet, in response to a directive from the Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet, orders the formation of four company-strength raider units. Concurrently, the Commandant of the Marine Corps orders the organisation of the 2^nd Separate Battalion on the west coast. The designation of the 2^nd Separate Battalion is thus assigned to the then-organising raider companies.

To comply with Commanding General, Amphibious Force Pacific Fleet’s instruction to form four companies, a reinforced company is detached from the 1^st Separate Battalion at Quantico and reassigned to the 2^nd Separate Battalion. In early February, General Holcomb writes to General Smith, acknowledging the latter’s letter, and provides some details regarding the appointment of Donovan. It seems that the push for this appointment came from a “very high authority,” and only the Commandant’s “complete disapproval” halted the process. It is clear that the Marine Corps’ heightened interest in raider units is, at least in part, due to significant political pressure from high levels. General Holcomb emphasises: “We must act swiftly. We must particularly prepare ourselves for one of our most critical missions, namely, the execution of amphibious raids…. given the current circumstances, it is crucial that we intensify this form of training.”

In a similar letter to Major General Clayton B. Vogel, Commanding General of the 2^nd Joint Training Force (later redesignated Amphibious Force, Pacific), the Commandant remarks: “I am confident that you and all other concerned parties will recognise the importance of promptly initiating this project. It is a matter of great concern to me, as it could significantly influence our future.”

Partly motivated by a desire to avoid a political appointee as leader of the raider units, Lieutenant Colonels Merritt A. Edson and Evans F. Carison are chosen to command the two battalions. Edson, a World War I veteran who has served in France, was a Marine pilot, captain of the Marine Rifle and Pistol Team, and an observer of the Sino-Japanese hostilities in Chapel, China. Carison has extensive experience with the Chinese (Communist) Eighth Route Army guerrillas and observed their tactics and organisation. Major Samuel B. Griffith, who observed the British commando training programme, is appointed as the executive officer of Edson’s 1^st Raider Battalion.

The primary mission of the two new raider units encompasses three main objectives:

• to serve as the vanguard of larger amphibious landings on beaches typically deemed inaccessible.
• to execute raiding expeditions requiring significant elements of surprise and rapid movement.
• and to undertake guerrilla-style operations for extended durations behind enemy lines.

On February 16^th, 1942, the 1^st Separate Battalion is redesignated as the 1st Raider Battalion, Amphibious Force, Atlantic Fleet. Initially, it is structured with a headquarters company and four rifle companies; however, in a reshuffle two days later, a fifth rifle company is established, though the total reverts to four in a subsequent reorganisation. Lieutenant Colonel Edson assumes command.

Meanwhile, the 2^nd Separate Battalion, stationed at Camp Elliott in San Diego, is redesignated as the 2^nd Raider Battalion, Amphibious Force, Pacific Fleet on February 19^th, 1942. Lieutenant Colonel Carlson assumes command with Major James Roosevelt as his executive officer. Throughout the spring, the 2^nd Raider Battalion remains in California for training.

During this period, high-level interest in the raider project persists. In a personal note dated March 17^th, 1942, the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Ernest J. King, requests information from General Holcomb regarding the status of the raider units. The Commandant is able to report significant progress. The 1^st Raider Battalion divides into forward and rear echelons. The former, consisting of 29 officers and 638 men with full equipment, departs Quantico on April 1^st, 1942, bound for Samoa via San Diego. Embarking on the U.S.S. Zeilin (AP-9) on April 12^th, 1942, it arrives in Samoa on April 28^th, 1942. The rear echelon, under Major Griffith, remains at Quantico until June when, after conducting extensive landing exercises, it moves to San Diego and embarks on the U.S.S. Heywood (AP-12) for Samoa. By early July 1942, all elements of the 1^st Raider Battalion are in Samoa and prepared for assignment.

The 2^nd Raider Battalion completes its basic training by mid-April. On April 23^rd, 1942, Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, Commander in Chief, Pacific, notifies Admiral King that the battalion is trained and ready to proceed to Hawaii for advanced instruction in rubber boat operations and submarine landings. Arriving and disembarking at Pearl Harbor on May 17^th, 1942, the battalion, minus Companies C and D, is detached and dispatched to reinforce the Marine units on Midway, where they participate in the Battle of Midway from June 4^th, 1942 to June 6^th, 1942, while attached to the 6^th Defense Battalion.

After the raiders completed their training in the United States, various opinions arose about the necessity of these units and how they should be organised and deployed. Reflecting on the events later, General Alexander A. Vandegrift, who is Commanding General of the 1^st Marine Division at the time, remembered the formation of the raider units:

“We progressed well in further filling, equipping, and training the units. But now the first blow fell. Merritt Edson, armed with ap-propriate orders, arrived to comb our units for officers and men deemed suitable for his 1^st Raider Battalion, a new organisation. I had known about the raiders in Washington. Neither General Holcomb nor I favoured forming elite units from units already elite. But Secretary of the Navy Colonel Frank Knox and President Roosevelt, both of whom fancied the British commandos directed us to come up with a similar organisation.”

In addition to disrupting personnel and training in regular units, the formation of raider battalions resulted in various requests for new and unusual equipment. Typical requests included riot-type shotguns, Lewis machine guns, collapsible bicycles, chain saws, scaling ropes, rubber boats, Bangalore torpedoes, and enough automatic pistols to issue one per raider. Edson discussed the armament of raider battalions in a letter to the Commandant in April. He compared the 81 millimetres mortar with the 60 millimetres, generally favouring the latter. He noted that including an 81 millimetres mortar platoon would exceed the high-speed transport capacity. A key consideration in raider organisation. Exceeding this capacity would require splitting companies among several ships, leading to disadvantages. Moreover, due to its greater weight, the 81millimeter mortar would be less suitable for the envisaged operations. The supply of ammunition would pose a particularly severe problem in fast-moving actions. Edson suggested that, if the 81 millimeter mortar was deemed indispensable, it be carried in the Weapons Company without personnel. It could then be operated by the 60 millimetres personnel when needed in stable situations. Edson also proposed replacing the Browning Automatic Rifle (BAR) used by squad leaders in the 60 millimetres mortar platoon with pistols or M1 carbines because the weight of the BAR plus ammunition would be too great if the squad leaders were also carrying the mortar base plate, cleaning brush, and field glasses.

During his time with the rear echelon of the 1^st Raider Battalion at Quantico, Major Griffith engages in discussions about battalion organisation. Drawing comparisons between the setups of the 1^st and 2^nd Raider Battalions, Griffith noted that the latter’s structure, with six line companies and a headquarters company, appears more conducive to raider operations, particularly due to the inclusion of a weapons platoon in each company.

Griffith envisions an ideal raider battalion with six line companies and a headquarters and service company, each adaptable to division among the companies. This envisioned structure entails each company housing two rifle platoons, a weapons platoon, and a company headquarters, with each platoon further divided into three squads. These squads, lead by squad leaders, are to be armed with a Browning Automatic Rifle (BAR), an M1 rifle, and a Thompson submachine gun, allowing for engagement of enemies at varying distances and terrains.

Such considerations highlighted the flexibility and adaptability crucial to the raider battalions. The continuous evaluation of troop organisation and readiness to adjust forces for specific objectives are emblematic of their operational ethos. As preparations for missions continue, the raider units hone their tactics and weaponry, with a particular focus on company-level strength, aligning with the envisioned requirements of raider operations.

Into Battle

By the summer of 1942, both raider battalions are primed for action. Shortly thereafter, the 1^st Raider Battalion undertakes the Tulagi landings during the Guadalcanal campaign on August 7^th, 1942, while the 2^nd Raider Battalion executes a diversionary raid on Makin Island on August 17^th, 1942.

Edson’s 1^st Raider Battalion crosses over to Guadalcanal on August 31^st, 1942 after completing operations on Tulagi. The 1^st Raider Battalion, with the 1^st Parachute Battalion attached, goes into bivouac west of the Lunga River behind Kukum. On September 2^nd, 1942, two raider companies embark on high-speed transports for an uneventful patrol on Savo Island. Afterwards, the raiders and parachutists are organised into a provisional battalion and take defensive positions on the southern rim of the perimeter below Henderson Field, the strategically located airfield behind Marine lines.

The Makin raiding force returns to Pearl Harbor and disembarks on August 25^th, 1942. After a short rest, they embark for their new permanent camp at Espiritu Santo, stopping at Canton Island and Noumea, New Caledonia en route, and finally arriving on September 20^th, 1942. Here, they reunite with the two companies from Midway.

Upon their arrival, a heated debate unfolds involving three senior admirals and General Holcomb concerning the formation of additional raider battalions. Rear Admiral Richmond K. Turner, Commander of the Amphibious Force, South Pacific, had directed the Commanding Officer of the Marine Detachment, 2nd Marines at Espiritu Santo to form a 2^nd Provisional Raider Battalion consisting of six rifle companies and a small headquarters. He further indicated his intention to order similar formations within the 7^th and 8^th Marines, arguing that raider or parachute battalions should be integral to Marine regiments for amphibious operations.

Vice Admiral Robert L. Ghormley, Commander of the South Pacific Force, forwards the letter to the Commandant of the Marine Corps via Admiral Nimitz. Both Ghormley and Nimitz oppose the reorganisation, believing raider battalions should remain specialised corps troops, capable of raider-type operations without the need for regimental integration. Admiral Nimitz states that such reorganisation should only occur in dire necessity.

General Holcomb’s position on this matter is well known. On September 2^nd, 1942, he advises the Chief of Naval Operations that he opposes the formation of additional raider battalions due to the need for personnel in the three Marine divisions forming or in the field, the questionable value of raider operations, and the drain of top leaders from existing units. However, he acknowledges the commanders in the field favour forming more raider units and does not object to forming a 3^rd Raider Battalion from volunteers in the regiments and defence battalions in Samoa, given the eased threat.

General Holcomb expresses concern to Admiral Nimitz over Admiral Turner’s order, regretting the lack of consultation with the Commanding General of the 1^st Marine Division. Consequently, the 2^nd Provisional Raider Battalion is disbanded within two days of the authentic 2^nd Raider Battalion’s arrival at Espiritu Santo. This episode reiterates the principle that raiders should be separate, permanent, and distinct combat units.

Following this, the 3^rd Raider Battalion is activated in American Samoa on September 20^th, 1942, and the 4^th Raider Battalion is organised on October 23^rd, 1942 at Camp Linda Vista, California, later moving to Camp Pendleton. The Commandant directs the 4^th Raider Battalion to be organised in excess of its authorised strength, with the surplus forming a Raider Training Detachment. Consequently, Raider Company, Training Center, Camp Pendleton is organised on February 5^th, 1943.

In mid-September, while Carlson’s Raiders recover from the Makin raid and establish a permanent camp on Espiritu Santo (with two companies from Midway rejoining), Edson’s 1^st Raider Battalion is actively engaged on Guadalcanal. Edson’s Raiders cross to Guadalcanal on August 31^st, 1943, following the completion of mop-up operations on Tulagi. The 1^st Raider Battalion, now with the 1^st Parachute Battalion attached, sets up camp west of the Lunga River near Kukum. On September 2^nd, 1943, two raider companies depart on high-speed transports for an uneventful patrol on Savo Island.

Afterward, the raiders and parachutists form a provisional battalion, moving into defensive positions on the southern rim of the perimeter near Henderson Field, a strategic airfield behind Marine lines. Edson then plans an amphibious raid behind enemy lines near Tasimboko, where reports indicate a Japanese buildup. Just before dawn on September 8^th, 1943, Companies A, B, and C land east of Tasimboko and advance westward towards the Japanese rear. Supported by Marine Aircraft Group 23 and naval fire from the U.S.S. Manley (DD-74) and U.S.S. McKean (DD-90), they encounter fierce resistance at 10:45. Coordinated with the arriving parachute battalion, the raiders overpower the Japanese, forcing them to abandon their encampment. These enemy forces are part of the Kawaguchi Force, which is preparing to counterattack the airfield but will be stopped by the Raiders’ defense during the Battle of Bloody Ridge four days later.

The raider-parachutist force withdraws to division reserve until September 12^th, 1943, when General Vandegrift places them in a 4,000-meter defence line maintained by the 1^st Marines east of the Lunga. Sporadic contact occurs on the night of September 12^th, 1943, along the ridgeline held by the raiders and parachutists. On September 13^th, 1943, as Marines prepare for the night under sniper fire, Kawaguchi launches an attack on the line’s center and right. By 22:00, the Raiders and two understrength parachute companies face two enemy battalions. Kawaguchi continues assaults throughout the night, attempting to break Marine defenses on Bloody Ridge. At dawn, his attacks cease, and the retreating forces are bombed and strafed, scattering Kawaguchi’s forces around Mount Austen toward Kokumbona. Colonel Edson, commanding the joint force, earns the Medal of Honor for the defense at Bloody Ridge, as does Major Kenneth D. Bailey posthumously for his leadership in close combat.

On September 20^th, 1943, Edson assumes command of the 5^th Marines, with Lieutenant Colonel Griffith taking over the 1^st Raider Battalion. The Raiders leave Guadalcanal, arriving in Noumea, New Caledonia, on October 17^th, 1943 for rest and reorganisation. Meanwhile, after a rest on Espiritu Santo, the 2^nd Raider Battalion, led by Lieutenant Colonel Carlson, arrives at Guadalcanal and spearheads a landing at Aola on November 4^th, 1943, beginning the famed “Thirty Days behind the Lines.” After securing the landing of a construction and defence battalion at Ada, the Raiders move inland toward Gogende and Reko to intercept enemy forces. Between November 11^th, 1943 and November 17^th, 1943, they face and destroy a substantial Japanese force west of Tetere, then move to the Tenaru River to patrol suspected enemy supply routes.

Carlson divides his battalion into three two-company combat teams, with one in reserve. This structure allows for flexible patrols and quick reinforcement. The battalion destroys bivouac areas and encounters enemy patrols, resulting in around 175 enemy casualties at the cost of six Raiders. They return to the 1^st Marine Division lines at Matanikau on December 4^th, 1943, receiving praise from General Vandegrift for their service and impact on enemy positions behind Marine lines.

Following this operation, Carlson discusses the 2^nd Raider Battalion’s organisation: squads consist of one corporal and nine riflemen divided into three fire teams, each with a BAR, an M1, and a Thompson submachine gun. Carlson finds this structure improves command and leadership assessment. The battalion includes rifle and weapons platoons with M 1919A4 machine guns and 60 millimetres mortars, arranged within companies for better coordination. A small utility group functions as a reserve for snipers and demolitions.

The 3^rd Raider Battalion, organises in American Samoa on September 20^th, 1942 under Lieutenant Colonel Harry B. Liversedge, moves to Guadalcanal in February 1943, preparing for Operation Cleanslate in the Russell Islands. The 3^rd Raiders make an unopposed landing on Pavuvu on February 21^st, 1944, patrolling the area for enemy forces. In March, after uneventful garrison duty, they return for training until September, joining the 2^nd Raider Regiment (Provisional) for the Bougainville operation.

The 2^nd Raider Battalion, after its extended campaign on Guadalcanal, rests in Wellington, New Zealand, in early 1943 before returning to Espiritu Santo for amphibious training. The 4th Raider Battalion forms under Major James Roosevelt on October 23^rd, 1942, arriving at Espiritu Santo in February 1943.

On March 15^th, 1943, the 1^st Raider Regiment of the I Marine Amphibious Corps (IMAC) forms at Espiritu Santo, consisting of a Headquarters and Service Company alongside the four Raider Battalions. Colonel Liversedge assumes command of the regiment, with Lieutenant Colonel Samuel S. Yeaton replacing him as commanding officer of the 3^rd Raider Battalion. The 2^nd and 4^th Raider Battalions are stationed at Espiritu Santo, joined by the 3^rd Battalion on March 20^th, 1943 following the Pavuvu operation. Although part of the regiment, the 1^st Raider Battalion remains based in Noumea.

The 1^st Raider Regiment, excluding the 2^nd and 3^rd Battalions, is designated as part of the New Georgia Occupation Force. By late May, preparations are completed for relocation to staging areas on Guadalcanal. On May 31^st, 1943, the Headquarters and Service Company of the 1^st Raider Regiment and the 4^th Raider Battalion board the USS John Penn (AP-51) and arrive at Tetere, Guadalcanal, on June 2^nd, 1943. The 1^st Raider Battalion departs Noumea on June 7^th, 1943, aboard the USS President Hayes (APA-20), arriving in Guadalcanal on June 11th, 1943.

Operation Elkton, intended to advance into the Northern Solomon Islands and capture Rabaul—the Japanese headquarters on New Britain—is initially scheduled to commence on June 30^th, 1943 but is pushed forward to June 21^st, 1943. This change is prompted by a request for assistance from an Australian coastwatcher at Segi Point, New Georgia, due to an incoming Japanese force. Admiral Turner, stationed at Guadalcanal, decides to dispatch the 4^th Raider Battalion, then staging for the planned offensive on June 30^th, 1943.

On June 21^st, 1943, Companies O, P, and half of the Headquarters Company, led by Lieutenant Colonel Currin, land at Segi Point at 05:30 hours, moving inland to Segi Plantation to meet the coastwatcher. The following day, two Army companies and an airfield survey team also come ashore to initiate construction of a fighter airstrip. Currin then shifts focus to Viru Harbour, a key anchorage on the New Georgia coast needed as an operating base for patrol craft during the assault on Munda. The narrow entrance to Viru Harbour is flanked by coral cliffs and heavily defended, with a 76-milimetres coastal gun positioned near the village of Tetemara.

An occupation force is scheduled to secure Viru Harbour on June 30^th, 1943, and the approaches must be cleared before that date. Lieutenant Colonel Currin leads his force in rubber boats from Segi Point, using a traditional Melanesian war canoe to navigate the eight-mile crossing to Regi. The force lands at 01:00 on June 28^th, 1943. After navigating through mangrove swamps and rain-drenched terrain, Currin divides his unit, sending two platoons of Company P to capture Tombe, positioned across the narrows from Tetemara.

The occupation force, arriving at Viru Harbour on June 30^th, 1943, comes under brief fire from the coastal guns, which remain active despite efforts by the raiders to neutralise them. The raiders reach Tetemara by midnight, and at 09:00 on July 1^st, 1943, the two platoons successfully secure Tombe without suffering casualties. Alerted by the gunfire, the Tetemara garrison braces for an attack. Currin leads an assault on schedule, encountering strong resistance for nearly six hours. A final Japanese banzai charge is repelled, and by the evening of July 1^st, 1943, the village falls under Marine control. Following their relief, the raiders return to Guadalcanal.

Another preliminary operation supporting the New Georgia landings at Munda occurs on June 30^th, 1943, when Companies N, Q, and half of the Headquarters Company of the 4^th Raider Battalion land at Oloana Bay on Vangunu Island. The mission involves establishing contact with a scouting party, then forming a beachhead for an Army force scheduled to land shortly thereafter. Despite initial challenges—including rough weather, high seas, and communications breakdowns—the raiders regroup on shore, joined by Companies F and G of the 103^rd Infantry Battalion.

The combined force reaches the Kaeruka River by mid-afternoon, where they engage Japanese troops positioned across the river. Intense combat ensues, resulting in disrupted contact between raider and Army units, but by nightfall, the position is secured, allowing for the establishment of hasty defences on the beach. These defences prove fortuitous when a Japanese convoy of three barges attempts to land, unaware of the recent change in control. The raiders successfully neutralise the convoy, sinking one barge and forcing the others to beach. After mopping up survivors at Cheke Point, the raiders return to Oloana Bay on July 4^th, 1943, later moving to Gatukai Island on July 8^th, 1943, in search of Japanese forces but finding none. On July 12^th, 1943, , they withdraw to Guadalcanal and regroup with Currin’s force after the Segi Point and Viru Harbour operations.

The 4^th Raider Battalion reequips and reorganises at Tetere, Guadalcanal, until July 17^th, 1943, , when they embark for Enogai to reinforce the 1^st Raider Battalion, which had landed on July 5^th, 1943, to support the ongoing Munda campaign. The discovery of a trail connecting Bairoko with Munda raises the possibility of Japanese reinforcements reaching Munda, prompting the decision to deploy forces at Enogai to block the route. The landing group, known as the Northern Landing Group of the New Georgia Occupation Force, is commanded by Colonel Liversedge and includes the Headquarters Company of the 1^st Raider Regiment, the 1^st Raider Battalion, the 3^rd Infantry Battalion of the 148^th Infantry Regiment, and the 3^rd Infantry Battalion of the 145^th Infantry Regiment.

The group, tasked with capturing enemy positions and severing supply and withdrawal routes, makes an unopposed landing on July 5^th, 1943, at Rice Anchorage on New Georgia’s northwest coast. After regrouping, they establish their first bivouac at the Giza Giza River on the night of July 5^th, 1943. On July 6^th, 1943, the 3^rd Infantry Battalion, 148^th Infantry Regiment advances south to set up a block on the Munda trail, while the remaining forces move west toward the Dragon’s Peninsula, located between Enogai Inlet and Bairoko Harbour.

After reaching the outskirts of Enogai on July 9^th, 1943, , an initial assault is repelled, and Colonel Liversedge halts further attacks until the following morning. At dawn, the raiders begin an offensive with mortar support, successfully overrunning enemy defences by the early afternoon. The battle results in over 300 Japanese casualties, while 47 raiders are lost in the engagement.

After capturing Enogai, the Raiders patrol the area for a week to scout Japanese positions at Bairoko. Reports show Japanese forces constructing emplacements east of the harbour and strengthening their defensive positions around Bairoko. Colonel Liversedge’s unit receives reinforcements on July 18^th, 1943, when the 4^th Raider Battalion comes ashore from four transports at Enogai Point. On July 20^th, 1943, the Raider forces begin advancing towards Bairoko, encountering resistance at 10:15. Soon, the Marines are pinned down by intense automatic fire and sniper attacks.

The Japanese defences, located within bunkers built of logs and coral under banyan roots, make progress extremely difficult for the Raiders. The bunkers can only be overcome using small arms and demolitions; the dense jungle canopy prevents the use of 60 millemetres mortars, and flamethrowers are unavailable. Throughout the early afternoon, the Raiders push forward, but casualties mount quickly. The 4^th Raider Battalion is called in to support the 1^st Raider Battalion, but the advance is slow, with progress measured in metres.

At 14:45, the Japanese 90 millimetres mortars open fire, adding further casualties. This barrage is followed by a counterattack targeting Company D. In response, Company Q launches an offensive but suffers such heavy losses that they become ineffective. By this point, the Raiders have suffered around 30% casualties, approximately 250 men, with 150 more needed to assist with the evacuation of the wounded. Colonel Liversedge has no choice but to order a withdrawal. Throughout the night of July 20^th, 1943 and July 21^st, 1943, the wounded are evacuated, and by 14:00 on July 21^st, 1943, all troops return to defensive positions around Enogai.

For the next week, the Raiders conduct aggressive patrols to reconnoitre enemy positions. During this time, Bairoko is shelled by PT boats and destroyers, and bombed by B-17s on August 2^nd, 1943. One day later, XIV Army Corps reports that enemy positions at Munda are being overrun and requests units be sent to intercept retreating Japanese forces south of Zieta. Sporadic contact continues near Bairoko until August 24^th, 1943, when a company from the 3rd Battalion, 145th Infantry enters the village without resistance, as the Japanese have evacuated by barge. On the night of August 28^th, 1943, and August 29^th, 1943, the Raiders board transports and return to Guadalcanal.

Lieutenant Colonel Griffith’s 1^st Raider Battalion suffers 74 killed and 139 wounded, while Lieutenant Colonel Currin’s 4^th Raider Battalion loses 54 killed and 168 wounded. Of the 521 remaining men in the 1st Raider Battalion, only 245 are considered combat effective; the 4^th Battalion counts just 154 effective personnel out of 412. The final entry in the 1st Raider Regiment Journal, made at midnight on August 31^st, 1943, states: “1^st Raider Regiment relaxes (bunks, movies, beer, chow).” Unbeknownst to the men, this is their final combat operation. Both the 1^st and 4^th Raider Battalions enter rest and reorganisation schedules in September and see no further action.

The Bougainville operation, the final stage in capturing the Northern Solomons, begins in September 1943. On September 12^th, 1943, the 2^nd Raider Regiment (Provisional), commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Alan Shapley, is formed at Noumea to coordinate Raider participation in the landings. The regiment, consisting of a Headquarters Company and the 2^nd and 3^rd Raider Battalions, is assigned to the 3^rd Marine Division on October 3^rd, 1943. Headquarters Company and the 2^nd Raider Battalion join the 3^rd Marines, while the 3^rd Raider Battalion is attached to the 9^th Marines.

Bougainville, the largest island in the Solomon group, measures approximately 50 kilometres in width and 200 kilometres in length. It sits astride the northern end of “The Slot,” which separates the two Solomon chains. Bougainville, Buka, and Shortland Island host six major Japanese airfields and several naval installations, serving as a staging and supply point for Allied operations in the southern Solomons. The island’s defences, particularly significant as Allied forces advance northward, are key to Japanese operations at Rabaul.

Mountain ranges dominate Bougainville, lowering gradually to a broad plain in the south. The planned landing zones are located at Cape Torokina, at the northern end of Empress Augusta Bay on the southwest coast. On October 16^th, 1943, to October 18^th, 1943, the 2nd Raider Regiment participates in landing exercises on Efate Island in the New Hebrides before embarking on transports to join the remainder of the assault force on October 31^st, 1943. D-Day is November 1^st, 1943.

The 2^nd Raider Battalion, led by Lieutenant Colonel Joseph P. McCaffery, lands on Green Beach, alongside the 1^st and 2^nd Battalions of the 3^rd Marines. Meanwhile, the 3^rd Raider Battalion, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Fred S. Beans, less Company M, lands on the offshore island of Puruata, securing the island from an estimated reinforced Japanese rifle platoon by 18:00 on November 2^nd, 1943. Company M lands with the main force at Green Beach 2, moving inland along the trail to Buretoni Mission, where they establish a roadblock approximately 900 metres from the beach.

The Raiders provide reinforcement for the 1^st Battalion, 3^rd Marines, assisting in the capture of enemy positions at Cape Torokina before taking up blocking positions along the Piva Trail, one of several inland routes. On November 9^th, 1943, the Raiders attack Japanese positions in front of their lines, advancing to the Piva and Numa Numa Trail intersection by 15:00 despite stubborn resistance. On November 13^th, 1943, the 2^nd Raider Battalion secures positions supporting the supply lines to the 21^st Marines, who are engaged at Coconut Grove.

On November 17^th, 1943, the 3^rd Raider Battalion, now attached to the 3^rd Marine Division, relieves the 3^rd Marine Battalion, 3^rd Marine Division during the night, allowing them to attack enemy forces above the Numa Numa Trail block. On November 29^th, 1943, Company M of the 3^rd Raider Battalion and the 1^st Parachute Battalion conduct a raid on Japanese positions 16 kilometres south of Cape Torokina on Empress Augusta Bay. The Raiders continue to support the 3^rd, 9^th, and 21^st Marine Battalion until December 22^nd, 1943, when they replace the 3^rd Marines in coordination with elements of the 1^st Parachute Regiment.

On January 11^th, 1944, the Raiders are relieved by the 132^nd Infantry Battalion of the Americal Division and withdraw to Guadalcanal. By early 1944, the Pacific war’s nature changes, reducing the need for Raider units. Senior Marine officers had always been sceptical of “elite” units, and this opposition gains strength as demand for such units wanes. In December 1943, a memo from the Pacific Section of the War Plans Division states that the Marine Corps prefers uniform infantry units, believing that its standard units could handle operations previously assigned to the Raiders. Instead of disbanding, the Raiders would form a regiment capable of conducting both raider and standard infantry operations.

The Chief of Naval Operations approves the transfer of the 1^st and 2^nd Raider Battalions to the 4^th Marine Division and the elimination of the 5^th and 6^th Raider Battalions. Plans proceed to form the 1^st Provisional Marine Brigade to assist the 3^rd Marine Division in recapturing Guam and lay the foundation for the 6^th Marine Division. The 4^th Marine Division is re-established to include the Raider units, inheriting the name and honours of the original regiment lost in the Philippines in 1942.

On January 26^th, 1944, the 2^nd Raider Regiment is disbanded, and the 2^nd and 3^rd Raider Battalions are attached to the 1^st Raider Regiment. On February 1^st, 1944, the 1^st, 3^rd, and 4^th Raider Battalions, along with the Headquarters and Service Company, are redesignated as the 4^th Marine Division. The 2^nd Raider Battalion is disbanded, and its personnel are reassigned to the 4th Marines’ Regimental Weapons Company. The Raider Battalion Training Centre at Camp Pendleton is also disbanded, with its personnel reassigned to the 5^th Marine Division.

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