The Glider Pilot Regiment

The Air Ministry further asserts that parachute troops are an outdated and cumbersome method of deploying men onto the battlefield and that gliders offer far greater potential. Churchill, sceptical, demands that this avenue be explored thoroughly and requests a full report on glider development.

On September 9^th, 1940, the War Office submits a report detailing the types of raids for which airborne troops could be deployed. It estimates that approximately 1,000 men would be required for such operations, including 100 paratroops and 900 glider-borne troops. Plans are in place to have three such forces ready by the following spring, along with an additional 200 parachute saboteurs. The total projected airborne force consists of 500 paratroops, 2,700 glider-borne troops, and 360 glider pilots. Churchill reluctantly accepts this, given the constraints on resources and the pressing priority of defending the United Kingdom against possible invasion. The Royal Air Force, in particular, is focused on acquiring fighter aircraft for home defence and bombers for the strategic campaign against Germany. As a result, the development of airborne forces remains low on the list of priorities.

Nevertheless, Ringway continues its work with determination. On September 18^th, 1940, the establishment is renamed the Central Landing Establishment (CLE), with Group Captain L.G. Harvey assuming command. He is assisted by Wing Commanders Sir Nigel Norman and G.M. Buxton, Captains M.A. Lindsay and J. Lander, along with several Royal Air Force enthusiasts and professional stunt parachutists. Technical trials and practical testing of various theories are well underway, with Major Rock playing a pivotal role. Despite having no prior experience in parachute training upon his arrival at Ringway, his courage and determination inspire those around him.

The establishment is placed under the command of No. 70 Group, RAF Army Co-operation Command, and the work carried out in these formative months proves invaluable to the future expansion of airborne forces. A strong working relationship is also forged between the Army and Royal Air Force, which will be instrumental in the success of future operations.

On September 26^th, 1940, the Duke of Kent observes a demonstration at Ringway, featuring two towed gliders and four live parachute drops. This is followed in October by a night tow of five miles, during which two Avro 504’s tow four sailplanes. On December 13^th, 1940, five sailplanes are towed to Tatton Park, five miles southwest of Ringway, where they land simultaneously as sixteen parachutists are dropped from two Whitley aircraft within a 200 metres radius. Additional tests explore the feasibility of landing sailplanes on water, using the lake at Tatton Park.

By September 1940, the policy has been established that glider pilots will be drawn from the army. In October, sixty-six men from No. 2 Commando, all with prior flying experience, are selected. No. 2 Commando is part of a force originally recruited from Independent Companies formed for the British intervention in Norway earlier that year. Following their return to England, No. 2 Commando is converted to parachute duties and, on November 21^st, 1940, redesignated as the 11^th Special Air Service Battalion, with both Parachute and Glider Wings. The sixty-six men are attached to Army Co-operation Command squadrons for preliminary flight training before progressing to glider instruction. By December, the Glider Wing is formally established, while the Parachute Wing evolves into the 1^st Battalion, Parachute Regiment.

As airborne forces take shape, questions arise over the appropriate service branch for glider pilots. The Air Ministry argues that gliders should be flown by Royal Air Force pilots, akin to naval landing craft being operated by naval personnel. Conversely, Group Captain Harvey asserts that army personnel, properly trained, will offer greater operational flexibility. This debate continues over the coming months, with influential figures such as Sir Arthur Harris arguing for the use of trained Royal Air Force bomber pilots. Ultimately, practical considerations and the growing demand for bomber crews lead to the decision that army personnel will form the core of the glider pilot force.

By late 1941, significant progress has been made. The first prototype Hotspur glider, developed by General Aircraft, has flown successfully, and production is underway. The Airspeed Horsa, a much larger glider designed to carry 25 troops, follows closely behind.

As the British airborne force continues to expand, training programmes are refined, tactics evolve, and equipment is further developed. These early efforts at Ringway and beyond lay the groundwork for the significant airborne operations that will follow in the later years of the war.

The Glider Pilot Regiment

Following the decision to establish a unit of army glider pilots, the War Office determines that it should be formed into a separate corps, initially proposed as the Army Air Corps. The inclusion of parachute battalions is considered but ultimately postponed. If deemed necessary in the future, the corps can be divided into a glider wing and a parachute wing.

A debate ensues regarding whether the unit should be called the 1^st Glider Pilot Regiment or the 1^st Glider Regiment, with the former eventually chosen.

The Army Air Corps is officially established by Royal Warrant on February 24^th, 1942, as stated in Army Order 21/1942, dated February 27^th, 1942. The order specifies that “The Corps will consist of such units and personnel as may be decided from time to time by the Army Council. Initially, it will comprise only the 1^st Glider Pilot Regiment, whose personnel will be drawn from volunteers already serving in the army.” The formation of the Glider Pilot Regiment, effective from February 24^th, 1942, is confirmed in Army Order 128/1942. A subsequent War Office memorandum clarifies that parachute battalion personnel should belong to a single regiment. Consequently, the Parachute Regiment is established as part of the Army Air Corps, with effect from August 1^st, 1942.

At its inception, the regiment establishes a training depot at a deserted airfield in Tilshead on Salisbury Plain. Previously home to No. 225 Squadron, Royal Air Force, and its twelve Lysander aircraft, the airfield has served as a base for Army Co-operation Squadrons since 1925. Though its wooden huts appear unremarkable, this isolated site becomes the centre of operations for a newly formed and unprecedented regiment within the British Army.

Lieutenant-Colonel John Rock is appointed as the regiment’s first commander. On January 1^st, 1942, he arrives at No. 16 Elementary Flying Training School at Burnaston near Derby to begin flying training. His role as Commanding Officer designate requires him to undergo training ahead of the arrival of the first forty-five volunteers. Burnaston is formally allocated for the initial training of glider pilots on light aircraft on December 31^st, 1942, with all six flights dedicated to this purpose.

Major G.J.S. Chatterton is appointed Second-in-Command and assumes his duties at the regimental depot on February 24^th, 1943, in preparation for the arrival of volunteers. These candidates must complete a three-week probationary period before being accepted.

From the outset, Chatterton enforces a strict disciplinary code, assisted by Brigade of Guards Warrant Officers, Command Sergeant Major’s Briody and Cowley, both of whom volunteer for the unit. He disregards the fact that many recruits are already trained soldiers who have passed the rigorous Royal Air Force Aircrew Selection Board process. Instead, he places particular emphasis on the War Office directive to exercise great care in the selection of senior Non-Comissioned Officers.

The degree of discipline at Tilshead is a subject of debate. While some level of regulation is necessary to instil high standards in a diverse group of recruits, excessive rigidity risks alienating promising individuals. The men must master not only the skills required for piloting but also the ability to fight alongside the airborne troops they transport. This unique dual role demands a high level of adaptability, requiring intelligence rather than excessive military drill. At Tilshead, some otherwise capable individuals are dismissed for minor uniform infractions, a loss that, in hindsight, may have been avoidable.

All recruits undergo a six-week probation period. Those deemed unsuitable return to their original units, while those who pass proceed to Elementary Flying Training School.

On January 15^th, 1942, No. 38 Wing of the RAF Army Co-operation Command is established at Netheravon, with Sir Nigel Norman in command. Its role is to provide air transport for the 1^st Airborne Division. On April 16^th, 1942, Churchill observes a demonstration of paratroopers and gliders at Netheravon, involving twelve Whitleys for the paratroopers and nine Hectors towing Hotspurs. Following this, he instructs the Chief of Air Staff to assess the feasibility of increasing the number of surplus bombers allocated to airborne forces. He also requests a review of Sir Nigel Norman’s earlier proposal to form a dedicated force of four squadrons, totalling 96 aircraft, exclusively for glider towing.

It appears that Sir Nigel’s proposal has already gained traction, as the Prime Minister’s directive is swiftly followed by an Air Ministry report on April 18^th, 1942, concerning pilots and crews for heavy glider tugs. The report highlights the inefficiency of the existing policy of temporarily reallocating bomber squadrons for glider towing. The transition between squadrons results in time lost fitting towing equipment and training crews. The report stresses that “we cannot afford to have learners on both ends of the tow-rope.”

This marks a significant policy shift, with the impracticality of previous arrangements finally acknowledged. Sir Nigel Norman, now a Group Captain, establishes his headquarters alongside the 1^st Airborne Division. On February 1^st, 1942, the Glider Exercise Unit moves from Ringway to Netheravon, where it is redesignated as No. 296 (Glider) Squadron. Together with the other squadrons of No. 38 Wing and later No. 46 Group, these units provide advanced operational training for glider pilots and prepare them for combat deployments.

Into Action and Expansion

Throughout the latter half of 1942, training is virtually at a standstill. A top-secret letter from Sir Arthur Harris proposes restricting post-training flying to seven hours per year, a notion which, if implemented, would prove disastrous for the Regiment.

Meanwhile the first glider operation, Operation Freshman is launched in November 1942 to sabotage German production of heavy water at the Norsk hydroelectric plant in Vemork, Norway. Allied intelligence determines that the Germans have increased heavy water production, a crucial component for atomic research, and the British War Cabinet prioritises its destruction.

Several attack strategies are considered, with glider-borne troops selected as the most viable option. The mission involves airborne engineers transported in gliders to a remote landing zone, from where they will proceed to demolish the plant and escape to Sweden. The operation faces numerous logistical and environmental challenges, including Norway’s rugged terrain and unpredictable winter weather.

Despite extensive training and planning, the mission encounters difficulties. Poor weather and mechanical failures prevent successful navigation. One glider crashes in Fylgjesdal, killing eight and injuring four, while the second crashes near Gasetjern, resulting in further casualties. Their Halifax bombers also fail to return, one crashing into a mountainside. Surviving British troops are captured and executed under Hitler’s orders, marking the operation as a tragic failure.

On January 11^th, 1943, General Browning reports to GHQ, Home Forces about the unsatisfactory state of airborne forces. He states that only 48 aircraft are available for dropping paratroops or towing gliders, none of which is capable of towing a fully loaded Horsa. It is not possible to drop a complete parachute battalion in one lift or to transport an entire air-landing unit with its equipment. He criticises the failure to implement the April 1942 agreement that No. 38 Wing should have 96 aircraft by November, adding that matters worsen when it is belatedly discovered that issued aircraft are unsuitable for towing Horsas. Browning asserts that Bomber Command shows no interest in airborne operations and predicts that the shortage of suitable aircraft will result in unnecessary British casualties in the coming year.

In response to the ongoing difficulties in securing flying opportunities, the Regiment establishes a Battle School at Southbourne, near Bournemouth, in early 1943. This initiative, led by Major Hamish O’Malley and later replaced by Major Ian Toler, provides valuable training. Meanwhile, in October 1942, No. 296 Squadron moves from Hurn to Andover, prompting Sir Nigel Norman to seize the opportunity to provide glider pilots with practical experience. Over seven months, 1,500 men and 230 tons of equipment are transported by lightly loaded Horsas, allowing pilots, tug crews, and ground personnel to gain valuable operational experience.

To align with Royal Air Force terminology, Colonel Chatterton proposes renaming the Regiment’s formations, replacing ‘Battalions’ with ‘Wings’, ‘Companies’ with ‘Squadrons’, and ‘Platoons’ with ‘Flights’. This change takes effect from January 25^th, 1943. The 2^nd Battalion, under Lieutenant-Colonel Iain Murray, becomes No. 1 Wing, while the 1^st Battalion, under Lieutenant-Colonel John Place, becomes No. 2 Wing. Each Wing is equipped with small arms, Bren guns, Thompson sub-machine guns, and PIATs, with four operational flights and a headquarters flight per squadron.

As training stagnates, morale among members of the Regiment deteriorates. One of them, 20-year-old Staff Sergeant Alec Waldron, takes the bold step of visiting Mr D.N. Pritt, the Socialist MP for North Hammersmith, at his Chambers in Middle Temple in early 1943. Waldron conveys the Regiment’s grievances regarding inadequate training and resources. In response, Pritt writes a letter to the Prime Minister, which is placed before him on March 4^th, 1943. The letter is highly critical of the Royal Air Force’s failure to supply suitable aircraft for glider towing and its apparent lack of urgency in providing adequate maintenance and training facilities for glider pilots. Consequently, the Prime Minister requests reports from the Secretaries of State for War and Air.

On March 17^th, 1944, the Secretary of State for War submits his report, highlighting that an RAF Wing under Army Co-operation Command has been attached to the Airborne Division. He dismisses any suggestion of a lack of cooperation or inadequate maintenance, noting that Royal Air Force tradesmen are not responsible for servicing other aircraft. He acknowledges a shortage of tug aircraft but asserts that glider numbers are sufficient. The report details plans made in 1942 to train 1,064 glider pilots by July 1^st, 1943, with a subsequent target of 90 per month. While the 1^st Battalion nears its required strength of 624 pilots, the 2^nd Battalion, currently at 450, is unable to conduct glider training due to production cuts. Instead, they continue military training, a decision influenced by the Prime Minister’s directive in December 1942 to curtail Horsa glider production.

The Secretary of State for Air, in his report dated March 18^th, 1943, outlines the available training facilities, provided according to the agreed scale, except for three exercise squadrons operating at 70% of their intended strength. This shortfall is attributed to the priority given to Bomber Command during the 50-squadron expansion plan and the unsuitability of the Whitley bomber for glider towing. Efforts to identify a replacement continue, with the Albemarle aircraft under urgent evaluation. The Secretary refutes claims that Royal Air Force maintenance crews prioritise their own aircraft, stating that the airborne training units have their fair share of personnel. He reiterates that, following a decision in November 1942, the Airborne Division was to consist of two parachute brigades and a small glider-borne force, maintaining a training establishment of approximately 600 glider pilots. Despite complaints from within the Regiment, the report concludes that the perceived uncertainty stems from these policies rather than any deliberate neglect.

Meanwhile, unbeknownst to Waldron, Major Willoughby separately raises similar concerns with Vernon Bartlett, a BBC war commentator, after taking him on a night flight from Shrewton. Bartlett, known to have the Prime Minister’s ear, assures Willoughby that Churchill will be informed. The lobbying efforts of these two Regiment members, conducted independently, yield results. The Prime Minister convenes a meeting with Sir Arthur Harris, who insists that no bombers can be spared for glider towing. Churchill, however, leaves no doubt that No. 38 Wing must receive the necessary tug aircraft. Thereafter, operational flying training for the Regiment improves.

Sicily

By mid-1943, the Allies shift their focus to the invasion of Sicily, following the successful North African campaign. Operation Husky, as the invasion is codenamed, is designed to provide the Allies with a stepping stone into Italy. The British argue for an invasion of Sicily as the next logical step, and despite concerns that the Tunisian campaign may not conclude in time, Churchill insists on a summer offensive. With planning underway, the British 1^st Airborne Division, including the Glider Pilot Regiment, is deployed to North Africa to train for the upcoming operation.

The Glider Pilot Regiment is ordered to accompany the 1^st Airborne Division to North Africa, where it will train for the airborne component of the invasion. Fifty fully trained crews from the Regiment, having completed their courses at Elementary Flying Training School, Glider Training School, and Operational Training Unit, are dispatched, alongside an additional sixty partially trained crews who are sent to continue their instruction under the American Troop Carrier Command.

Upon arrival in North Africa, training is hampered by poor conditions. The pilots are housed in a hastily converted prisoner-of-war compound at Tizi, on the Mascara Plain, alongside the 51^st Wing of the American Troop Carrier Command. Morale is further affected when the British pilots are required to remove all rank insignia and flying badges before departing the UK, an added security measure that demoralises the men. Training is conducted using American Waco gliders and C-47 transport aircraft, as they are the only available aircraft in sufficient numbers. The Regiment must adapt quickly to these unfamiliar aircraft.

One of the most significant training deficiencies is the lack of practice in offshore releases, an oversight that proves critical during the actual operation. Glider pilots are not given the opportunity to master judging distances from the coastline after being released at sea. Additionally, while the pilots gain experience in glider towing and flight endurance, they are unfamiliar with mass night releases under combat conditions.

With Operation Husky confirmed, the British 1st Air-Landing Brigade is assigned the task of capturing the Ponte Grande bridge, a key objective south of Syracuse, to facilitate the advance of the British 8th Army towards Messina. The Glider Pilot Regiment is tasked with delivering the Brigade to their landing zones under the cover of darkness on July 9^th, 1943 and July 10^th, 1943.

However, the glider deployment is complicated by logistical and tactical challenges. The C-47 transport aircraft, responsible for towing the majority of gliders, are slow, unarmed, and highly vulnerable to enemy fire. To minimise exposure to anti-aircraft defences, the decision is made to release the gliders 2.7 kilometres offshore, despite the pilots receiving no training for such conditions. This choice, while understandable given the need to preserve the aircraft for follow-up operations, ultimately leads to disastrous consequences.

On the night of July 9^th, 1943, the gliders are towed from Tunisia towards their release points off the Sicilian coast. The route takes them via Malta before turning north-east towards the target. However, the weather conditions deteriorate, with strong winds developing throughout the day. The aircrews are only informed of the necessary altitude adjustments at the last moment, preventing widespread adaptation to the new conditions.

As the fleet approaches Sicily, several factors combine to create confusion. The coastline is obscured by darkness and the unexpected dust storms stirred up by the wind, making navigation difficult for the tug pilots. The C-47s’ intercom systems fail, preventing proper coordination between the glider and tug pilots. Many tugs are blown off course, causing release points to become scattered. The lack of training in offshore releases means many glider pilots struggle to judge distances accurately. As a result, a significant number of gliders are released too far from the shore or in the wrong locations. Many plunge into the sea, drowning their crews and the airborne troops inside. Others land miles from their designated landing zones, dispersing the force across a vast area.

Despite the chaos, a small number of gliders manage to land near their objective. The most critical success comes from two of the eight Horsas carrying the coup de main party, which land near the Ponte Grande bridge. The glider pilots, demonstrating extraordinary skill, manage to fly their aircraft eleven kilometres in darkness after release, landing with remarkable precision despite the hazardous conditions.

However, the majority of gliders land in scattered locations, with many troops becoming lost or isolated. The wind, poor visibility, and lack of practice in night releases contribute to widespread dispersal. Those gliders that do reach land face additional challenges, with many crashing into rocky fields, damaging their cargo and injuring their occupants.

The airborne troops, led by the 1^st Air-Landing Brigade, fight fiercely to hold the Ponte Grande bridge, fending off repeated German and Italian counterattacks. They suffer heavy casualties, but their determination delays enemy movements and aids the success of the overall invasion. However, their position remains precarious, and reinforcements are desperately needed to hold the bridge. Eventually, seaborne forces link up with the airborne troops, securing the position and ensuring the continued advance of the British 8th Army.

The Glider Pilot Regiment suffers heavy losses, with many pilots lost at sea or killed in crash landings. The lack of training in offshore releases, compounded by the failure to adapt effectively to the unexpected strong winds, proves to be a critical flaw in the operation. The decision to release the gliders so far offshore, while intended to protect the C-47’s, ultimately costs many lives and prevents the effective concentration of forces. According to available records, 14 glider pilots were killed, and 87 are reported as missing or wounded. These losses are part of the broader casualties sustained by the 1^st Airlanding Brigade, which totaled 313 killed and 174 missing or wounded during the operation.

Following the operation, lessons are drawn from the experience, shaping future airborne operations. Training is modified to include practice in night landings and offshore releases, and greater emphasis is placed on ensuring tug pilots and glider pilots can effectively communicate and coordinate. Additionally, planners recognize the importance of minimising the distance between release points and landing zones to reduce the risk of dispersion.

Sicilian Aftermath

After Operation Husky, the surviving personnel of the Regiment’s No. 2 and No. 3 Squadrons are withdrawn to Tunisia, where they establish a camp between Sousse and Kairouan. There, they manage to conduct a limited amount of flying in Waco gliders while regrouping. They are soon rejoined by the remaining personnel of the Wing, who had departed Fargo Camp in June and travelled from Liverpool aboard H.M.T. Samaria. Their journey to North Africa is uneventful, with a brief stay in Algiers before being transferred to Philippeville on an American vessel, ultimately arriving at No. 5 Infantry Reinforcement Training Depot. Due to miscommunication and administrative delays, they remain unaccounted for over twelve days, causing them to miss the Sicily landings, despite urgent signals exchanged between 1^st Airborne Division and Allied Force Headquarters in Algiers.

Upon their arrival, the new personnel are met with a certain reserve by the battle-worn remnants of No. 2 and No. 3 Squadrons, who are understandably in a sombre mood. However, this initial froideur quickly dissipates as the newcomers begin their conversion training on Waco gliders. It is at this juncture that Colonel Dunn, in a moment of candour, confronts Major Willoughby regarding the Sicily operation. “We informed you at the briefing that a 30 mph headwind was blowing off Sicily and requested an increase in release altitude by 2,000 feet,” he asserts. “Your superiors refused. We also warned that our aircraft lacked self-sealing tanks and could not safely fly over anti-aircraft fire, yet this was disregarded. Now, we are being blamed for the debacle.” Willoughby, having not attended the briefing, refrains from comment.

Whether Dunn’s concerns were relayed to Colonel Chatterton in the chaos preceding Operation Ladbroke remains uncertain. What is clear is that insufficient time was allocated for the final briefing, and in any case, the majority of gliders were not released close enough to shore to have any realistic chance of reaching land.

Reflecting on the operation, Chatterton later states, “We could not release the gliders too far inland, and I did not want them to overshoot.” In hindsight, this decision is difficult to rationalise.

Shortly afterwards, Major Willoughby and Major T.R. Mordaunt-Hare, both recent arrivals, receive orders to return to No. 5 Infantry Reinforcement Training Depot. The reason for their removal becomes apparent when they are shown reports alleging that they had expressed opinions on the Regiment’s training and deployment that undermined the authority of the Commanding Officer. Willoughby denies this, stating, “We kept our opinions to ourselves and always supported him. However, we did suggest that instead of remaining idle, the pilots who had taken part in Husky should undergo military training for their own morale. This proposal was met with hostility.” It is evident that Chatterton has become aware of criticism, and as a result, two senior officers are lost at a critical stage in the Regiment’s development.

In August, General Hopkinson sends Colonel Chatterton back to England to educate those in authority on the proper employment of gliders. Determined to prevent a repeat of the Sicily landings, Chatterton recognises that securing institutional support will be a challenge. Leveraging the temporary oversight of the Wing by the American Troop Carrier Command, he seizes the opportunity to gain as much backing as possible. The fruits of his efforts will become apparent later. Before his departure, he transfers command of the Wing to his deputy, Lieutenant-Colonel J.W. Place.

Invasion of Italy

The Wing is soon informed that it will accompany 1^st Airborne Division during the planned invasion of Italy. The Americans, eager to conclude operations in the Mediterranean following the expulsion of Axis forces from North Africa, wish to shift focus to the impending invasion of France. However, after Sicily, they are reluctant to commit further resources to the region. The British viewpoint ultimately prevails.

Italy requests an armistice in August, with plans for the announcement to be made twenty-four hours before the Allied landings. As part of the invasion, General Hopkinson is tasked with seizing the Italian naval base at Taranto, under the codename Operation Slapstick. With American aircraft now reassigned to transport U.S. Airborne Forces into Italy, 1^st Airborne Division, including its glider pilots, must travel by sea.

On September 3^rd, 1943, the British 8^th Army crosses the Straits of Messina to land in south-western Italy. The American 5^th Army follows on September 9^th, 1943, landing further up the west coast at Salerno. The 1^st Airborne Division’s landings on the same day are of secondary importance, aimed at facilitating the escape of the Italian fleet to Malta.

While stationed in Tunisia, the glider pilots receive a visit from Lieutenant-Colonel Vladimir Peniakoff, commander of the renowned desert reconnaissance unit, Popski’s Private Army. His force, now attached to 1^st Airborne Division, requires ten glider pilots to accompany it for a month, familiarising themselves with its methods before flying Peniakoff and his men into the Italian mountains. The pilots are provided, and Peniakoff even insists on learning to fly a glider himself. However, the subsequent nature of operations necessitates an unannounced arrival, which a glider landing cannot guarantee, even at night. Ultimately, Peniakoff resorts to alternative transport.

Given the role the Wing is to play in the upcoming invasion, Colonel Place is now tasked with reorganising his six squadrons into an infantry battalion within forty-eight hours. He must secure the necessary arms and ammunition while adhering to strict limitations on baggage and transport. Major A. Simpson is assigned command of the rear party in Tunisia, while Colonel Place leads approximately 400 glider pilots in a convoy alongside the rest of 1^st Airborne Division to Bizerta, their departure point for the operation. Shortly after their arrival, Major G.A.R. Coulthard and a squadron embark aboard the Royal Navy cruiser Aurora as part of the advance party, with the remainder following on H.M.S. Princess Beatrix.

Although Italy has surrendered, the Allies cannot be certain of a friendly reception at Taranto. However, German forces in the region, primarily paratroops, are weak, and resistance is minimal. As the convoy approaches Taranto, Italian submarines and a battle fleet are observed sailing towards Malta to surrender.

Tragedy strikes when H.M.S. Abdiel, carrying 130 men of 6^th Parachute Battalion, as well as the Division’s anti-tank guns and reserve ammunition, detonates a mine in the harbour and is destroyed. The original intention had been to deploy the glider pilots in an infantry role, a decision that reflects a recurring wartime practice of using highly trained personnel for conventional duties. While competent infantrymen, the glider pilots are a scarce and valuable resource. In the end, they are not even used in combat, but assigned various non-combatant roles at Taranto.

The majority of the Wing withdraws to Sousse in November before returning to England incrementally between December 1943 and January 1944. However, No. 3 Squadron, under Major Coulthard, remains in the Middle East, attached to 2^nd Independent Parachute Brigade and renamed 1^st Independent Squadron. Meanwhile, a detachment under Major P.F. Stancliffe is sent to India to form the glider pilot contingent of the new 44^th Indian Airborne Division.

Preperations for Operation Overlord.

Upon returning to England in August 1943, Colonel Chatterton promptly arranges a meeting with Air Chief Marshal Sir Peter Drummond, the Director of Training at the Air Ministry and an old acquaintance from before the war. Drummond presents him with a cable from North Africa, which states: “Give every assistance to Colonel George Chatterton, US Air Force. Make available a number of lectures and follow the advice of this officer on glider operations. Signed, Wigglesworth, Air Commodore for General Dwight Eisenhower.” Puzzled by Colonel Chatterton’s apparent affiliation with the U.S. Air Force, Drummond nonetheless assures him of full cooperation.

This meeting signals a pivotal shift in the perception of the Regiment, as it begins to receive the recognition it has long sought. A further indication of its growing stature comes on July 20^th, 1943 with the establishment of the Regimental Association.

Despite these developments, in mid-1943 there is little indication of the Regiment’s impending significance in the years ahead. No. 1 Wing remains inactive in an infantry role, unlike No. 2 Wing, which is soon to be deployed as such, but neither receives much flight training. Stationed at Fargo Camp, glider pilots must travel by lorry to Netheravon for lectures and flights. Upon arrival, they sign in at the guardroom before proceeding to the Glider Exercise Unit. After a limited amount of instruction, they return to Fargo Camp.

In September, the Wing manages to conduct an exercise on Salisbury Plain, where eleven Whitleys tow Horsas to Shrewton in what proves to be a lacklustre demonstration of glider tactics. The supply of tow aircraft remains insufficient, with little improvement since the first glider exercise a year prior, when nine Hotspurs had landed in front of the Prime Minister. Nevertheless, this situation is about to change dramatically.

A significant opportunity for flight training emerges in August when Eisenhower requests an urgent transfer of twenty-five additional Horsas and ten Halifaxes to the Middle East. The Chiefs of Staff approve this on August 9^th, 1944, and Operation Elaborate is carried out by No. 295 Squadron between August 15^th, 1943 and September 23^rd, 1943. Fifteen Horsas are successfully ferried from Portreath to Sale and onwards to Kairouan, each carrying three pilots. However, out of twenty-four dispatched, eight gliders are forced to cast off due to mechanical failures, adverse weather, or enemy attacks. One combination is pursued by twelve German Junker 88 aircraft, with the glider eventually ditching in the Mediterranean. Fortunately, all three pilots are rescued by a naval vessel. Other crews are recovered off the Spanish coast by a fishing vessel and from the Bay of Biscay by an Air Sea Rescue team. Tragically, one glider crew is lost, marking another sacrifice for the Regiment.

A letter from the Officer Commanding No. 38 Group to Major-General Browning, dated November 13^th, 1943, praises the glider pilots, stating, “I would like personally to add the admiration both I and all of No. 38 Group have for the glider pilots’ courage and skill on these flights.”

Colonel Chatterton’s meeting with Drummond yields tangible results, as he is provided with an office at No. 38 Group Headquarters. Subsequent entries in the Group’s Operations Record Book highlight the growing influence of the Regiment. Authority is granted to staff officers to inspect prospective airfields, and a conference at Allied Expeditionary Air Force Headquarters determines airfield allocations for glider and transport squadrons. By early 1944, large-scale exercises, including mass glider landings and paratroop deployments, demonstrate the growing capabilities of the airborne forces.

At this stage, Colonel Chatterton assumes the self-styled title of Commander Glider Pilots, despite there being no formal position for such a role. His office at 38 Group Headquarters is initially located in a coal cellar, but this does not deter him from influencing high-level decisions. He secures an audience with Air Vice Marshal L.N. Hollinghurst, newly appointed commander of No. 38 Group, and forcefully argues the case for better recognition of glider pilots. He insists that, just as aircrews operate as cohesive units, glider pilots must be integrated into Royal Air Force stations rather than being relegated to remote army camps. His arguments prevail, and soon, glider pilots are fully integrated with the Royal Air Force on No. 38 and No. 46 Group airfields.

Support from the U.S. Troop Carrier Command proves instrumental in securing recognition for the Regiment. The telegram from North Africa is the catalyst that enables Colonel Chatterton to push through much-needed reforms, ensuring that the glider pilots receive the training and status they deserve.

Under Drummond’s arrangements, Colonel Chatterton delivers a series of lectures to the Army and the Royal Air Force planning staffs, despite facing resistance from traditionalists who disapprove of his unorthodox approach. His persistence pays off, and by early 1944, the Regiment is firmly established as an integral part of airborne operations.

Army Order 42/1944 announces the formation of the Special Air Service Regiment as a unit of the Army Air Corps, effective from April 1^st, 1944.

As preparations for the invasion of Europe intensify, the Regiment is drawn into the planning for what will become the largest airborne operation of the war. Chatterton is determined that the Regiment remains independent, resisting efforts to place No. 1 Wing under the direct control of 6^th Airborne Division and No. 2 Wing under 1^st Airborne Division. His stance is ultimately vindicated, as the Regiment secures its own command structure within No. 38 Group.

Training accelerates, with mass glider landings and night exercises becoming routine. The introduction of the Hamilcar glider, capable of carrying heavy loads such as tanks and artillery, further expands the Regiment’s operational capabilities. By May 1944, over 2,800 glider lifts have been conducted, ensuring that pilots are fully prepared for the challenges ahead.

On May 19^th, 1944, an impressive exercise codenamed Exeter is staged in the presence of King George VI and Queen Elizabeth. One hundred Horsas, along with several Hamilcars, are towed by Halifaxes to Netheravon, where they land simultaneously with 300 paratroopers dropped from Dakotas. The exercise marks the culmination of years of effort to integrate airborne forces into large-scale operations.

As the countdown to D-Day begins, the Regiment is finally recognised as a crucial component of the airborne assault on Normandy. With 423 aircraft, 1,040 Horsas, 80 Hamilcars, and 1,500 trained glider pilots at its disposal, it stands ready to play a decisive role in the coming battle.

Operation Overlord

The invasion of German-occupied Europe, codenamed Operation Overlord, is set for June 5^th, 1944. The insertion phase, known as Operation Neptune, aims for the airborne troops to secure the eastern flank of the assault bridgehead. General Gale’s 6^th Airborne Division is tasked with this mission, while the 1^st Airborne Division remains in reserve.

The Glider Pilot Regiment plays a crucial role in these operations, conducting daring night landings to circumvent German defences and facilitate the seaborne landings. From June 5^th,1944, to June 6^th, 1944, the Regiment is responsible for three waves of gliders under Operation Tonga, followed by a fourth wave, Operation Mallard, in the evening of D-Day, ensuring the sustained reinforcement of airborne troops.

The first wave involves six Horsas, flown by elite glider pilots, delivering 138 men of the 2^nd Battalion, Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry, along with thirty Royal Engineers, to secure the Orne River and Caen Canal bridges. Operation Tonga starts with the second wave, consisting of seventeen Horsas piloted by members of the Regiment, follows with paratroopers, anti-tank guns, and heavy equipment. The third wave arrives at 03:00 hours, transporting additional forces, artillery, and key equipment, including a hazardous mission in which gliders are crash-landed onto the heavily fortified Merville Battery.

At 21:00 hours, Operation Mallard, executed with precision by the Glider Pilot Regiment, delivers reinforcements, including the 1st Battalion, Royal Ulster Rifles, and an Armoured Reconnaissance Regiment. Despite a brief weather-related delay, the glider pilots navigate challenging conditions and successfully land, securing key objectives.

Pathfinder errors cause some navigational difficulties, but the skilled glider pilots ensure most landings are near the designated targets. Their expert handling of the gliders contributes to the successful capture of the Orne and Caen bridges, which are reinforced by Lord Lovat’s Commandos by midday. The Merville Battery assault encounters difficulties due to scattered landings, but the operation ultimately succeeds in neutralising the guns.

By D+2, the 6^th Airborne Division is firmly established east of the Orne, repelling multiple German counterattacks. The glider pilots, having demonstrated their skill and bravery under intense enemy fire, are extracted and returned to England in preparation for further operations. Their success in achieving 95% of their objectives underscores the critical role of the Glider Pilot Regiment in airborne warfare.

In late May 1944, eleven glider pilot crews are withdrawn from D-Day training and formed into ‘X’ Flight under Captain ‘Peggy’ Clarke. Their task is to retrieve Waco/Hadrian gliders from American bases and undergo intensive training at Netheravon.

On August 5^th, 1944, ten WACO-CG-4A Hadrian gliders, towed by Halifax bombers of No. 644 and No. 298 Squadrons, transport thirty-five French 4^th Special Air Service troops and their heavily armed jeeps 270 km behind enemy lines to Vannes, Brittany. The Special Air Service, plans to link up with 3,000 Maquis resistance fighters. Escorted by thirty-two Spitfires, the gliders evade detection by flying low and reach their landing zone near Saint Helena without opposition. They are greeted by Maquis fighters and proceed under escort to a coastal hideout.

During their stay, the glider pilots observe sabotage operations against German forces. The Germans quickly recognise their presence, issuing a 20,000-franc bounty for their capture. Despite this, they remain hidden and eventually reach Vannes, where they are transported to Rennes before returning to England by Dakota on August 16^th, 1944.

Operation Overlord to Operation Market Garden

Over the course of three months, sixteen major airborne operations are planned, only to be repeatedly postponed and ultimately cancelled due to the rapid advance of Allied forces following the breakout from the invasion bridgehead. As a result, members of the Glider Pilot Regiment remain in a state of constant readiness, yet the unpredictable nature of the battle makes precise coordination of airborne operations extremely challenging.

Among the intended operations is a landing within the D-Day perimeter to reinforce American airborne troops facing intense resistance in the Cotentin Peninsula. Other plans include a 1^st Airborne Division landing near an airfield south of Caen, a night-time glider assault by the 1^st Air Landing Brigade to seize Saint Malo, and landings at Lannion and Vannes airfield. There are also objectives to destroy the Morlaix viaduct and secure key locations such as Chartres, V-1 rocket sites, bridges over the Seine, the Franco-Belgian border, and the island of Walcheren. The most ambitious of these is Operation Comet, which tasks the 1^st Airborne Division with capturing the Nijmegen bridges single-handedly. One week later, these same bridges are targeted by three entire airborne divisions. Operation Comet involves a main glider landing at Nijmegen, with coup de main assaults on the bridges, reminiscent of those executed at the River Orne and Caen Canal. Anticipating the mission, Albemarle-Horsa combinations are relocated from Brize Norton to Manston due to range limitations. However, just four hours before take-off, Comet is called off.

During this period, discussions within the Air Ministry once again raise the question of whether Royal Air Force pilots should replace Army glider pilots. On June 28^th, 1944, the Director of Operations submits a report to the Acting Chief of Air Staff, recommending a return to Royal Air Force glider pilots on the basis that this would enhance efficiency. By July 22^nd, 1944, the Air Ministry argues that training Army glider pilots is occupying 1,500 Royal Air Force personnel, despite the availability of a surplus of trained Royal Air Force pilots who could fulfil the requirement for the next two years. They propose that these surplus pilots should replace Army glider pilots, provided they are absorbed into Royal Air Force airborne squadrons rather than being seconded to the Regiment.

Further discussions take place on August 28^th, 1944, at an Air Ministry meeting convened to address the ongoing disagreement between the Army and the Royal Air Force regarding the provision of glider pilots. The prevailing opinion is that the primary duty of a glider pilot is to fly, with participation in ground combat deemed secondary. The perceived advantages of a unified Royal Air Force glider-pilot and tug-pilot team are cited as justification for the disbandment of the Glider Pilot Regiment, despite strong objections from the War Office. The meeting ultimately concludes with a recommendation that the Air Ministry should assume control over glider pilot provision. However, at a subsequent meeting attended by the War Office’s Director Air, a decision is reached to postpone any resolution for two months. Before this period expires, operational demands force the Regiment to request additional pilots from the Royal Air Force surplus, effectively settling the debate in the short term. Meanwhile, the RAF begins forming its own glider pilot units within South-East Asia Command, making use of available personnel in that theatre.

By September 1944, the Allied advance continues unabated, with forty-eight divisions pushing eastward towards the Rhine, while Soviet forces approach Germany’s eastern borders. The success of airborne operations in Normandy prompts General Eisenhower to establish a Combined Headquarters to oversee all British and American airborne forces. Lieutenant-General Lewis H. Brereton assumes command of the newly formed 1^st Allied Airborne Army, with Lieutenant-General “Boy” Browning as his deputy.

General Montgomery seizes upon the opportunity for a decisive breakthrough, advocating for a bold thrust through Belgium and Holland, around the right flank of the Siegfried Line, and into Germany. He intends to use the extensive airborne forces at his disposal to secure a 90-kilometre-long corridor ahead of his advancing ground troops, paving the way for a swift crossing of the Rhine in the hope of concluding the war before the year’s end.

At this time, the British 1^st Airborne Division is under the command of Major-General R.E. Urquhart, following the death of General Hopkinson in Italy, where he is killed by machine-gun fire while observing an engagement between the 10^th Parachute Battalion and German forces. Frustration grows within the Division due to the repeated cancellation of planned operations, but optimism rises when they receive orders for their next mission, codenamed Market Garden. The airborne phase, designated “Market”, involves three airborne divisions and the Polish Parachute Brigade. The American 101^st Airborne Division is tasked with seizing a canal bridge at Son and securing the route between Eindhoven and Grave. The American 82^nd Airborne Division is assigned the capture of bridges over the Maas north of Grave and the Waal at Nijmegen. The British 1^st Airborne Division, alongside the 1^st Polish Independent Parachute Brigade, is ordered to take the critical bridge over the Lower Rhine at Arnhem. The plan also includes an airlift of the British 52^nd Division into Arnhem once an airstrip is prepared on D+8 and D+9, as well as Royal Air Force fighter support from Mosquitoes and Typhoons.

The aircraft assigned to tow the gliders once again come from Royal Air Force squadrons involved in Operations Tonga and Mallard, with the addition of No. 437 (RCAF) Squadron, newly formed at Blakehill Farm with Dakotas to strengthen No. 46 Group’s airborne capabilities.

A total of 1,378 members of the Glider Pilot Regiment are required for the operation. Given that this represents 90% of the Regiment’s entire strength, it is deemed essential that they assume only defensive roles upon landing and be withdrawn as soon as possible. Heavy casualties must be avoided, not only to preserve the Regiment for further airborne operations in Europe but also to meet the growing demand for glider pilots within South-East Asia Command.

To avoid the disorientation experienced during night operations in Sicily and Normandy, Market Garden is scheduled as a daylight assault. However, the lack of sufficient transport aircraft necessitates three successive lifts over consecutive days. The risks are evident: while the first wave may achieve surprise, the second and third waves will face an alerted enemy, making it difficult to concentrate forces quickly.

Intelligence reports indicate that formidable German units are present in Arnhem. Since August 1939, British intelligence has had access to messages encrypted by Germany’s Enigma machine, a breakthrough that allows them to intercept and decode German wireless communications. This intelligence, designated ‘Ultra,’ remains a closely guarded secret throughout the war. In one of the rare instances when Ultra intelligence is disregarded, reports reveal that the 2^nd SS Panzer Corps, consisting of two depleted armoured divisions, is refitting in the Arnhem area. Additionally, Field Marshal Model, the commander of Army Group B, has his headquarters in Oosterbeek, near Arnhem. Despite this crucial information, it appears that nothing will deter the launch of the operation.

Operation Market Garden

The Glider Pilot Regiment plays a major role in the Arnhem operation, transporting troops, vehicles, and heavy weaponry into battle through a large-scale glider deployment. On September, 17^th, 1944, they begin their mission with 304 Horsas, thirteen Hamilcars, and four Hadrians, carrying essential elements of the 1^st Airborne Division. The gliders transport Divisional Headquarters, 1^st Air-Landing Brigade Headquarters, and units including the 1^st Battalion, the Border Regiment, 2^nd Battalion, the South Staffordshire Regiment, and 7^th Battalion, the King’s Own Scottish Borderers. Additionally, they deliver the 1^st Air-Landing Anti-Tank Battery, 1^st Air-Landing Light Regiment, Royal Artillery, 9^th Field Company, Royal Engineers, 17-pounder anti-tank guns, artillery units, engineers, communications equipment, and Field Ambulance detachments.

Despite challenging weather conditions, the pilots execute precise landings, ensuring the successful deployment of their cargo. However, some gliders are lost en route, including those carrying reconnaissance troops essential to the operation. Poor weather over England causes twenty-three gliders to separate from their tugs before reaching the English coast. Some crash, while others land far from their designated zones, complicating efforts to establish an effective airborne presence.

Once on the ground, the pilots transition from aviators to combat troops. Their primary task is to secure the landing zones for subsequent lifts, a role they carry out despite facing increasing mortar fire and counterattacks. This necessity, however, reduces the number of troops available for the main assault on the Arnhem bridge, a factor that contributes to the overall difficulties faced by airborne forces. Glider pilots engage in close-quarters combat, reinforcing infantry units and helping to repel German attacks.

During the battle, glider pilots fight alongside paratroopers, particularly in the defence of the Arnhem bridge. At least twenty-one pilots from B Squadron’s 19 Flight actively engaging in combat, manning anti-tank guns and machine guns against sustained German assaults. Over the following days, their numbers are steadily reduced due to enemy fire. Many glider pilots are killed, wounded, or captured, yet they remain an integral part of the defensive effort.

Further glider lifts on September 18^th, 1944, and September 19^th, 1944, bring reinforcements, but fog delays and increasing anti-aircraft fire result in additional losses. Those gliders that make it to Arnhem face overcrowded landing zones and intense enemy fire. Several gliders land in German-occupied territory. While many pilots are taken prisoner, others evade capture with the assistance of the Dutch Resistance, hiding for weeks before eventually reaching Allied lines. Resistance groups in towns like Drunen and Den-Dungen play a crucial role in sheltering downed airmen at significant personal risk.

Despite their original orders to return to the Great Britain after landing, the glider pilots remain engaged in combat. Lieutenant M.D.K. Dauncey exemplifies this determination, leading counterattacks and engaging enemy strongpoints despite suffering multiple wounds. He is awarded the Distinguished Service Order for his actions. Glider pilots participate in street fighting, operate heavy weapons, and provide critical defensive support to airborne troops isolated in Oosterbeek.

By 25 September, with the battle lost, the remaining elements of the 1^st Airborne Division withdraw across the Rhine. Many glider pilots play a role in guiding their comrades to safety, displaying discipline even in retreat. Their contributions to the operation are significant, transporting thousands of troops and essential equipment while effectively transitioning into combat roles. However, the Glider Pilot Regiment suffers heavy casualties during the battle. Of the approximately 1,200 glider pilots who take part in the operation, over 229 are killed, while 469 are wounded or taken prisoner. These losses severely impact the regiment, as replacing such highly trained personnel proves challenging.

Operation Market Garden to Operation Varsity

Shortly after Operation Market Garden, Colonel Chatterton is soon summoned to a conference at the War Office. Presiding over the meeting is General Brereton, who commands the British 1^st Airborne Division, and 6^th Airborne Division and the U.S. 82^nd Airborne Division and 17^th Airborne Division. This force consists of 40,000 paratroopers and air-landing troops, supported by aircraft from two Royal Air Force Groups and one United States Air Force Wing.

During the conference, the Chatterton of the Glider Pilots is briefed on the planned crossing of the Rhine. Two entire airborne divisions are to land simultaneously on the eastern bank of the river at Hamminkeln, approximately ten kilometres north of Wesel, while the 21^st Army Group carries out an amphibious assault across a river that spans over 400 metres at this point. The ground operation, designated Operation Plunder, aims to secure a bridgehead between eight and sixteen kilometres in width and eight kilometres in depth, ensuring that bridging operations can proceed with minimal disruption from enemy artillery.

The operation requires the largest single airborne lift attempted to date, with the Regiment tasked with providing pilots for 440 gliders. While fewer in total than those flown during Operation Market over successive days, this surpasses the largest single lift in that operation, which involved 359 gliders out of a total of 697. The Regiment must rapidly adapt to meet these demands.

Following the heavy losses sustained at Arnhem and the limited time available to train replacements, the only viable solution is to draw pilots from the Royal Air Force reserve pool. The Air Ministry, having previously proposed such a measure, now provides 1,500 pilots, who remain attached to the Regiment until 8 December 1945. These Royal Air Force pilots undergo a fourteen-day small arms course at Fargo Camp, followed by a week of assault and field training at Bridgnorth. They then complete conversion training on the Hotspur, Horsa, and Hamilcar gliders. To integrate them effectively, Chatterton structures the force so that each unit pairs an army and an Royal Air Force pilot, ensuring that the latter becomes accustomed to army procedures.

The vast airborne fleet required for the operation, codenamed Operation Varsity, is assembled. A total of 546 aircraft are allocated to paratroopers, while 1,346 are assigned to tow gliders. Since the front line has advanced nearly 500 kilometres eastward since D-Day, British airborne bases are relocated to East Anglia, occupying airfields previously used by the United States 9th Air Force. For this final airborne operation of the European war, No. 38 and No. 46 Groups operate at full capacity. To meet the requirement for 440 aircraft, squadrons retain crews whose operational tours have already expired. The fleet comprises Stirlings from Rivenhall, Shepherds Grove, and Great Dunmow; Halifaxes from Earls Colne and Woodbridge; and Dakotas from Gosfield and Birch. These squadrons are tasked with towing 392 Horsas and 48 Hamilcars.

The airborne assault involves 14,000 troops from the British 6^th Airborne Division and American 17th Airborne Division, forming XVIII Airborne Corps under General Matthew Ridgway. Determined not to repeat the mistakes of Market Garden, Ridgway ensures that the entire force is delivered in a single lift. The airborne troops land within range of 21^st Army Group’s artillery, with all essential units deployed before the enemy can mount an effective response, removing the need for resupply aircraft. A captured German analysis of the Arnhem operation, which fell into Allied hands in December 1944, heavily influences the planning process.

The 6^th Airborne Division, now commanded by Major-General Eric Bols, adopts a tactical landing strategy to strike directly at enemy positions. This approach, first proposed by Chatterton, allows units to land precisely where they are needed while maintaining overall coordination. The new Horsa Mark II gliders, equipped with a forward-opening nose for rapid unloading, further enhance this capability.

The airborne troops’ objectives include securing high ground along the western edge of the Diersfordter Wald to neutralise enemy artillery, which would otherwise pose a severe threat to the four divisions engaged in the river assault. They must also capture two road bridges and a railway bridge over the River Issel, vital for the subsequent advance into Germany. The Regiment is tasked with landing the 6^th Air-Landing Brigade at Hamminkeln, which consists of the 2^nd Battalion, Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry, the 1^st Battalion, Royal Ulster Rifles, and the 12^th Battalion, Devonshire Regiment. Supporting units include the 53^rd Light Regiment Royal Artillery, the 3^rd Air-Landing Anti-Tank Batteries, Royal Artillery, and 4^th Air-Landing Anti-Tank Batteries, Royal Artillery, the Airborne Armoured Reconnaissance Regiment, Royal Engineers, and Field Ambulance units. Additional elements of the 3^rd and 5^th Parachute Brigades, as well as Divisional Headquarters, are also deployed east of the Diersfordter Wald.

Coup de main parties are assigned to seize the Issel bridges and prepare them for demolition if necessary. To achieve this, fifteen gliders carrying troops from the Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry and the Royal Ulster Rifles are included in the lift. Intelligence suggests that the landing zones are free of anti-glider defences and provide firm, level terrain. However, the surrounding area is occupied by ten German divisions with a combined strength of approximately 50,000 troops, supported by 100 tanks and self-propelled guns. Wesel itself is defended by the 1. Fallschirm-Armee, the 180. Infanterie-Division, the 160. Panzer-Division, Windhund and the 7. Fallschirmjäger Division, the same unit that captured Crete in 1941. Additionally, 8,000 Volkssturm militia reinforce the sector.

On March 17^th, 1945, , a rehearsal mission codenamed Operation Token is conducted to test navigational accuracy. Six Stirling/Horsa and Halifax/Horsa combinations take off from Great Dunmow and Earls Colne, while a Halifax/Hamilcar combination departs from Woodbridge, carrying concrete ballast to simulate cargo weight. The mission proceeds without incident but provides the Germans with clear evidence of impending airborne operations.

Operation Varsity

On March 24^th, 1945, in clear weather, 439 gliders of No. 1 Wing, led by Lieutenant-Colonel Iain Murray, take off between 06:00 and 07:50 hours. One tug aircraft fails to launch due to undercarriage failure. Simultaneously, 906 Waco gliders carrying American forces depart from France. The airborne force includes 243 aircraft for British paratroopers and 303 aircraft for American troops. Heavy anti-aircraft fire disrupts the landings, and many pilots struggle to locate their designated zones due to smoke from pre-invasion bombing and ground force operations.

Despite these challenges, the airborne troops achieve all objectives by 13:00 hours on March 24^th, 1943,. By 10:00 hours on March 25^th, 1945, they link up with 21^st Army Group. Over 4,800 troops, 342 jeeps, 348 trailers, seven tanks, and numerous artillery pieces are delivered by British gliders. The new Horsa Mark II facilitates rapid unloading, reducing casualties during disembarkation. Varsity proves a resounding success, with 239 Liberator aircraft completing supply drops within an hour of the landings. RAF Fighter Command provides air cover, and 1,227 Thunderbolts and Mustangs from the VIII USAAF conduct offensive sweeps. Enemy fighters fail to intervene. Despite this success, the Regiment suffers heavy losses, with 98 personnel killed, including 58 ex-Royal Air Force pilots. Many more are wounded.

Victory in Europe

This operation marks the final combat deployment of the Regiment in the European theatre. As the final months of the war in Europe unfold, two major airborne operations are planned but never executed. The first, codenamed Operation Arena, is conceived as the most extensive airborne assault ever proposed, involving the 1st Allied Airborne Army. The objective is a large-scale airborne drop in the Cassel – Fritzlar – Hofgeismar region of central Germany. However, the rapid advance of Allied land forces renders the operation unnecessary, leading to its cancellation at the last moment.

A second operation, planned for the 13th US Airborne Division, aims to secure airheads ahead of the advancing US Seventh Army, particularly in the vicinity of Bisingen and Cassel. This plan, too, is ultimately abandoned before it can be carried out.

At the same time, several contingency plans are developed to prepare for the potential collapse of Germany. Operation Eclipse is designed to facilitate the airborne seizure of Berlin, with both the 82nd and 101st US Airborne Divisions assigned to the task. However, as Soviet forces reach the city first in May 1945, the plan is never put into action.

Operation Jubilant is intended to ensure the protection of Allied prisoners of war should German forces offer resistance or attempt reprisals, while Operation Talisman provides for the capture of key strategic locations if required. Additional plans are also made for the airborne seizure of the port of Kiel, ensuring control over an important German naval facility in the final stages of the war.

These measures highlight the extent of Allied strategic planning as the conflict nears its conclusion. However, with the rapid disintegration of German resistance in April and May 1945, the majority of these operations are rendered unnecessary and ultimately abandoned.

Far East

In January 1944, the War Office requests eighty glider pilot crews for the Hadrians in the Burma region. With the entirety of the Glider Pilot Regiment already committed to the upcoming Normandy invasion, only thirty pilots are available. To address this shortage, South-East Asia Command asks Middle East Command to supply forty non-commissioned officers from the Army, who are to be trained in India as second pilots. The thirty pilots from the Regiment travel to Ambala in East Punjab for a three-week refresher course on light aircraft, while the forty Non-Commisioned Officers from Middle East Command are sent to India to begin training.

By August 1944, the Glider Pilot Detachment is formally designated as 10 Independent Glider Pilot Squadron, with a strength of ten officers and 133 Non-Commisioned Officers, the additional personnel drawn from army units in India. Recognising the need for a much larger force, Vice Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten, Supreme Allied Commander of South East Asia Command, warns that a shortage of glider pilots could severely hamper operations in Burma. He reports an urgent need for 517 glider pilots and states that he requires two British-Indian airborne divisions in 1944–45 and three in 1945–46. Plans are laid for the delivery of 600 Horsas and 2,000 Hadrians to India by the end of 1944.

During that time, a debate arises over the command structure of the glider pilot organisation in India. The War Office suggests that it should be under army control, with senior positions filled by members of the Glider Pilot Regiment. The Air Council, however, opposes this, arguing that the Royal Air Force’s extensive commitment to airborne operations necessitates retaining control. It is also pointed out that Royal Air Force pilots have been assured they will remain under Royal Air Force command after conversion to gliders. As a compromise, it is decided that both Wings will be commanded by Royal Air Force Wing Commanders, with Army Majors as their deputies. Half of the six squadrons, numbered 668 to 673, are to be led by Royal Air Force Squadron Leaders, while the others will be commanded by Army Majors. The army glider pilots are distributed evenly throughout all six squadrons to share their expertise and provide leadership in ground operations.

The legal status of army personnel within the Royal Air Force glider organisation becomes a matter of discussion. On November 26^th, 1944, Headquarters, Air Command, South East Asia clarifies that all army personnel in the glider force will be attached rather than seconded to the Royal Air Force, meaning they will be subject to the RAF Act under Section 179(a).

The deployment of reinforcements from the Glider Pilot Regiment to India proves difficult. In December 1944, a Dakota en route to India from Northolt crashes near Usson in the Massif Central, killing fifteen of the twenty Regiment personnel on board. The surviving members of the draft reach their destination, but the loss of their paperwork in the crash delays their assignment.

Meanwhile, selection boards begin interviewing volunteer army glider pilots in India. Those chosen undergo training at Royal Air Force Elementary Flying Training Schools in Ambala, Jodhpur, and Begumpet. Upon completing their training, they are promoted to Sergeant and awarded the Second Glider Pilot Badge. On November 9^th, 1944, Chatterton is authorised to form No. 3 Wing of the Regiment for service in India, increasing the Regiment’s strength to thirteen squadrons.

By January 1^st, 1945, No. 343 Wing Headquarters is based at Fatehjang and 344 at Bikram. To better coordinate airborne operations in the theatre, No. 238 Group is formed, tasked with preparing for the recapture of Malaya. The new airborne squadrons are established at various locations, including Calcutta, Basal, Fatehjang, and Bikram, before later expanding to Dhamial, Upper Topa, Chaklala, Belgaum, Kargi Road, Tilda, and Lalaghat. A total of 470 Royal Air Force and Army glider pilots are eventually trained on Hadrians.

As preparations continue, it is recognised that glider pilots may need to assume command of Indian troops in the event of officer casualties within the Divisional Air-Landing Brigade. To prepare them for this responsibility, they undergo a six-week Platoon Commanders’ Course at Belgaum. Additional survival training takes place at the Jungle Survival School at Marbleshwar and the Royal Air Force Mountain Centre near Srinagar in Kashmir.

In April 1945, a meeting at the Air Ministry determines that airborne operations will remain a priority beyond the war in Europe. Without anticipating the imminent German surrender, plans are made to retain a force of 700 Horsas and 50 Hamilcars in the Great Briatin while sending any surplus glider pilots to South East Asia Command. Projections indicate that South East Asia Command will require 4,000 Wacos and 540 Horsas for operations in the Far East, with sufficient tug aircraft expected to become available after the capture of Rangoon. Plans are outlined for airborne landings in Singapore, Bangkok, Sumatra, and other strategic locations throughout 1945 and 1946.

The 10^th Independent Glider Pilot Squadron is disbanded in March 1945, with its personnel transferring to No. 670 Squadron.

By August 1945, South East Asia Command possesses 866 Hadrians, although a cyclone destroys sixty gliders assembled on the airfields. With Japan’s surrender on August 15^th, 1945, the division is no longer required for operations in Malaya and remains in India. In November 1945, it is redesignated as the 2^nd Indian Airborne Division. Major General (Temporary) Charles Hamilton Boucher assumes command on March 31^st, 1945, replacing Major General Down, who is posted to Greece. By mid-1946, the division is retitled as the 2^nd Airborne Division and, at the time of partition, is stationed in Karachi and Quetta. One brigade remains in the newly created Pakistan, while the other two are transferred to the new state of India.

With the airborne force in India no longer needed, the remaining army glider pilots are stationed at Rawalpindi, where they assist in the repatriation of prisoners of war and tour-expired servicemen. The end of Lend-Lease between Britain and the United States leads to a further issue: the British government is informed that, unless returned, the Waco gliders held in the Great Britain and South East Asia Command must be paid for in dollars, a clear sign that wartime cooperation between the two nations is rapidly being replaced by economic pragmatism.

The last two remaining squadrons in India are soon disbanded, and a number of their pilots are posted to Palestine, where they find themselves caught up in the escalating unrest in the region.

Post War

Since the end of the First World War, Britain has maintained a strategic presence in Palestine after the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire. The Allies grant Britain a mandate to govern the territory, though its administration is fraught with conflicting commitments. During the war, Britain promises independence to all Arab-populated areas of the Ottoman Empire, including Palestine, in return for their support against Turkish forces. However, the 1917 Balfour Declaration expresses support for the establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine, provided that the civil and religious rights of the existing non-Jewish communities remain unaffected.

These contradictory assurances fuel tensions, exacerbated by increasing Jewish immigration into the Mandate Territory during the interwar years. The situation reaches breaking point in 1945, as Jewish survivors of the Holocaust seek settlement in what they now claim as their rightful homeland.

Britain deploys the 6^th Airborne Division and the Glider Pilot Regiment to Palestine in early 1946 following the escalation of violence as tensions rise between Jewish and Arab communities in the British Mandate. Initially sent as a strategic peacekeeping force, the regiment becomes involved in internal security operations following widespread Jewish paramilitary attacks on British forces. Pilots from disbanded Indian-based squadrons reinforce the unit, which establishes bases at Royal Air Force Qastina and Aqir.

The regiment faces increasing hostility, with Jewish militant groups targeting British personnel and facilities. Notable incidents include the bombing of the King David Hotel, the execution of two Parachute Regiment sergeants, and coordinated sabotage of Royal Air Force airfields. Despite this, the regiment carries out training and operational duties, supporting the Palestine Police in counter-terrorism operations.

As Britain announces its withdrawal from Palestine in 1947, the regiment begins to wind down its presence. Units return to the Great Britain, with the final detachment departing at the end of the year. Meanwhile, back in Britain, the regiment faces reductions in manpower and facilities, reflecting the diminishing role of glider operations. By 1950, troop-carrying glider flights are phased out, and the regiment transitions towards light aircraft operations.

In 1957, a Royal Warrant formally disbands the regiment, merging its personnel into the newly formed Army Air Corps.