Levant Schooner Flotilla

To anchor this ambitious project, Seligman established the Levant Schooner Flotilla, choosing strategic locations for its base. The harbours of Beirut and Famagusta in Cyprus are selected for this purpose, both being under English control at the time. These locations offered a strategic advantage, providing a secure and accessible point from which the flotilla could operate effectively within the Eastern Mediterranean theater.

The Levant Schooner Flotilla operates under the directives of both General Headquarters (GHQ) and the Flag Officer Levant and Eastern Mediterranean (FOLEM). This dual command structure is essential due to the Levant Schooner Flotilla’s operations which intricately combined naval prowess with military tactical objectives.

Now leading the Levant Schooner Flotilla in late 1942, Seligman scrutinises the caïques at his disposal. These sturdy boats, about 10 metres long and weighing around twenty tons, accommodate a crew consisting of a skipper, stoker, coxswain, gunner, and wireless operator. Without a wheelhouse, sailors man the tiller in all weather conditions. Lacking basic amenities like a toilet, the crew requires good balance for personal needs. Originally used for transporting fish, their holds now have the capacity to transport several Special Forces raiders prepared for combat.

Seligman is dissatisfied with the caïques’ original 20-horsepower Bolinder diesel engines for being too noisy. Resourcefully, he secures 90-horsepower diesel engines from Matilda tanks of Australian armoured units in Haifa, Palestine These engines make the boats quieter and slightly faster, enhancing their stealth capability. The vessels are also equipped with long-range radios salvaged from Kittyhawk (P-40) fighter aircraft, enhancing their operational capabilities. At Seligman’s direction, each vessel is armed with a Swiss-made Oerlikon 20 millimetres cannon at the bow, two 50-caliber Browning machine guns, and twin .303-inch Vickers.

This period underscores the transition from conceptual strategy to actionable military operations within the complex theater of the Eastern Mediterranean during World War II. The Royal Navy takes on the responsibility of supplying and maintaining these caiques, which were to be manned by naval personnel and authorised to fly the white ensign, symbolising their official commission and operational mandate under the Royal Navy.

To man his Informal Navy, Seligman selects seventy officers and men, drawing officers from a group of young reservists and volunteers attracted by the allure of an unconventional naval experience. He trains his crew for clandestine warfare on a remote stretch of the western Cypriot coast.

The flotilla’s primary mission involves conducting night-time landings on Axis-controlled islands. Crews practice navigation using small aircraft steering compasses with luminous dials for stealthy approaches and memorise the silhouettes of coastlines to navigate towards specific landmarks in darkness.

The primary mission of the Levant Schooner Flotilla encompasses several critical tasks vital to the Allied efforts against Axis forces in the region. These includes the transportation of raiding forces, the delivery of ammunition, food, and other necessary supplies, and the execution of stealthy maneuvers up to strategic natural anchorages along the southwest coast of Turkey. Turkey’s neutrality in the conflict plays a significant role in the operational planning and execution of Levant Schooner Flotilla missions. Despite the country’s official stance of neutrality, the geographical and strategic importance of its coastlines offers the Allies a unique advantage. The utilisation of secluded natural anchorages serves not only as operational springboards for the Levant Schooner Flotilla but also as advanced bases for smaller raiding caiques.

One of the notable operational tactics involves the deployment of a larger schooner within the unit as the floating headquarters of the Levant Schooner Flotilla. This advanced base facilitates the coordination and support of the smaller raiding vessels, enhancing the operational efficacy and stealth capabilities of the Flotilla. The strategic choice of Turkey’s coast for these operations leverages the complex historical and diplomatic relations in the region. Despite Turkey’s neutrality, and its previous alliance with Germany during World War I, the British are able to navigate the diplomatic landscape effectively. Through skilled diplomacy, they mitigate potential tensions with Turkey, thus securing the use of critical Turkish coastal regions for their operations.

These operations are not without risks, given the historical context and the potential for hostility from the Turkish coastguard. Nonetheless, the strategic importance of locations such as the port of Deremen in the Gulf of Kos, the Gulf of Doris, and other natural anchorages like Gumusluk and Yedi Atala, opposite the straits of Chios and Lesbos, are invaluable for the Allied operations. These areas serve as crucial points for the Long Range Desert Group (LRDG), the Special Boat Service (SBS), and the Greek Sacred Squadron (GSS) to launch raids against the Dodecanese islands, challenging German positions and contributing significantly to the Allied war effort in the Mediterranean.

Camouflaging the boats during the day is another essential skill, the crews must hide their presence not just to evade German patrols but also to maintain plausible deniability for neutral Turkey. Each morning, they dismantle masts and cover hulls with camouflage netting, then erect bamboo poles and drape more netting to mimic rocky outcroppings, rendering the caïques indistinguishable from the coastline to Royal Air Force reconnaissance planes overhead.

For the same purpose, when operating within the neutral waters of Turkey, the caïques of the Levant Schooner Flotilla raisie the Turkish flag instead of the white ensign, which is the customary flag flown by vessels of the Royal Navy.

Into Action

By early June 1943, the Levant Schooner Flotilla has successfully transitioned to a state of operational readiness, marking a significant milestone in the Allied naval efforts within the Eastern Mediterranean. This period sees the formation of a small yet highly effective fleet of caïques, meticulously prepared for combat and clandestine operations against Axis forces in the Aegean Sea. Adrian Seligman’s leadership as the commander of LS 1 and the appointment of Andreas Londos, a Greek lieutenant of the Royal Hellenic Navy (RHN) serving with the British Navy, to administer LS 2 (later known as AHS 2), underscores the collaborative efforts between British and Greek forces within the Levant Schooner Flotilla.

The operational strategy of the Levant Schooner Flotilla is distinguished by its reliance on stealth, surprise attacks during nighttime operations, and the capability to engage in close combat with enemy vessels. The utilisation of offensive firearms not only enables the Levant Schooner Flotilla to defend against and engage enemy caïques effectively but also facilitated the capture of these vessels, enhancing the strategic advantage against the Axis. The responsibility for capturing or enticing enemy and escaped Greek caïques is primarily assigned to the Special Operations Executive (SOE), illustrating a broader strategic approach to undermining enemy operations and boosting Allied maritime capabilities in the region.

By late June 1943, the Allied Special Forces are ready for their inaugural raid against Axis airfields on Crete, aimed at disrupting enemy operations ahead of the Allied invasion of Sicily. Their mission is to permanently disable the enemy’s landing strips by destroying as many aircraft as possible.

A team of 17, led by Major Sutherland, departs Bardia on the North African coast on June 22^nd, 1943, aboard a Levant Schooner Flotilla launch. They land on Crete by dinghy early the following morning, splitting into three patrols to navigate the challenging terrain, each carrying over seventy pounds of food and explosives.

One patrol discovers its target airfield empty. However, the others achieve success. A patrol, under Lieutenant Anders Lassen, takes out five aircraft at Kastelli, eliminating several sentries in the process. Another patrol destroys fuel dumps at Peza, incinerating almost 200,000 litres of aviation fuel. Corporal Dick Holmes, responsible for the explosives at Peza, navigates through a gully into an area scattered with olive trees to reach the fuel dumps. Holmes has a narrow escape when he encounters two Wehrmacht soldiers with their guard dogs, who, fortunately for Holmes, the Germans are distracted by their conversation and do not detect his presence.

Holmes waits until the Germans move away, then stealthily makes his way to the second dump, places his explosive charges, and returns to his colleagues. They proceed to the rendezvous point, retracing their steps through the now-familiar gully. As they navigate, a series of explosions suddenly erupt, sending barrel after barrel sky-high. Overwhelmed with excitement, Holmes and his team engage in a celebratory dance on the Cretan hillside, exchanging hearty pats on the back.

The three patrols easily regroup, and in the early hours of July 12^th, 1943, they meet up with the Levant Schooner Flotilla launch. Sutherland reflects on the operation as amongst the most arduous ever undertaken by special forces, covering distances of well over 150 kilometres through mountainous terrain at night, over a three-week period.

By September 1943, the Allied advance onto the Italian mainland swiftly leads to an armistice, significantly altering the strategic situation in the Eastern Mediterranean. By this time, the flotilla numbers around ten ships. However, the operational strength of the Levant Schooner Flotilla varies, sometimes reducing to just a few active vessels. The British assume control of the Dodecanese Islands in the Aegean Sea following Italy’s surrender, but the Germans, requiring the larger islands of Leros, Simi, Samos, and Cos for airfields to safeguard their holdings in the Balkans, rapidly take possession.

On October 3^rd, 1943, German airborne troops land on Cos, resulting in intense combat with British infantrymen. Many are either killed, captured, or forced to flee into the hills. A Special Boat Squadron patrol locates some survivors, guiding them under the cover of night to a secluded beach. There, an Levant Schooner Flotilla caïque discreetly extracts the soldiers. Two months later, British Vice Admiral Algernon Willis commends the flotilla for its “many daring and successful operations in enemy-occupied islands,” underscoring the considerable impact and value of such forces in harassing the enemy and acquiring vital intelligence.

After the Germans take control of the four Greek islands, the Levant Schooner Flotilla retreat to a Royal Navy base in Beirut, Lebanon, to refit and expand. From the initial twelve caïques, the fleet grows to over thirty, supplemented by “mother ships” carrying supplies, necessitating an increase in crew numbers.

During these setbacks faced by the Allies in the Dodecanese campaign of late 1943, the emergence of Greek caiques and schooners in Allied ports such as Beirut and Haifa highlighted the growing significance of Greek elements within the Levant Schooner Flotilla. This development leads to the expansion of the original unit and the formation of a new entity, the Allied Hellenic Schooner Flotilla (AHSF), which integrates the Levant Schooner Flotilla’s caique fleet. This merger represents a strategic evolution of the Allied naval forces, aiming to enhance operational effectiveness and capitalize on the increasing involvement of Greek maritime resources and personnel.

The formation of the Allied Hellenic Schooner Flotilla, with its blend of British and Greek leadership, reflected the Allied commitment to leveraging diverse capabilities and experiences. Except for A. Londos, who serves as a notable exception due to his Allied Hellenic Schooner Flotilla background and Distinguished Service Cross recognition, the command structure of the Allied Hellenic Schooner Flotilla’s caique sub-unit primarily consisted of British Royal Navy commanders.

On one noteworthy occasion, LS 3 is ordered to Mykonos. They find senior Wehrmacht officer and his Greek mistress waiting for them. The German has arranged with the island’s Special Operations Executive agent to give up information on German troop and shipping movements. In return, he and his woman will be lifted off the island and taken to Palestine. The local partisans don’t like this arrangement. They insist the officer is their prisoner. Fortunately, LS 3 has put a lot of food and a couple of bottles of rum ashore, resulting the Wehrmacht officer and his Greek mistress being handed over.

Turkey’s Neutrality

Turkey’s stance, influenced by the Montreux Convention, allows it to maintain a delicate balance of neutrality by permitting both Allied and Axis naval movements through its territorial waters from the Black Sea to the Aegean Sea. This strategic position makes Turkish waters a critical operational theatre for both British and German forces. The British, utilising the flexibility provided by Turkey’s neutrality, operate raiding forces and Combined Fleet Exercise (CFE) vessels, including Motor Launches (MLs), Levant Schooners (LSs), and Allied Hellenic Schooners (AHSs), along the Turkish coast. These operations do not go unnoticed by the Germans, who conduct reconnaissance over the area, capturing images of British vessels camouflaged and stationed along the Turkish coast.

The German ambassador’s complaint to the Turkish Foreign Office about the British presence highlights the complexities of wartime diplomacy and the strategic use of neutrality. Turkey’s response, suggesting the photographed vessel could be one of the Motor Launches previously sold to Turkey, coupled with a subtle questioning of the German plane’s presence over Turkish territory, underscores the adept navigation of international relations and neutrality laws by Turkey.

This diplomatic exchange marks a pivotal moment, affirming Turkey’s commitment to its neutral stance and discouraging further German provocations in Turkish waters. For the British, this incident serves as a crucial validation of their strategy, enabling them to continue utilising Turkish waters as a base for operations against Axis forces in the Dodecanese and the wider Aegean region with a reduced risk of direct confrontation in those waters.

The strategic use of over forty identified anchorages along the Turkish coast, from Kastelorizo in the south to the tip of Samos in the north, becomes instrumental for the British. These anchorages provide concealed operational bases for raiding units, including the special base of the Special Boat Squadron and Jellicoe’s headquarters, exemplified by the caique LS 31 or AHS 31, i.e., Tewfik, stationed in an anchorage like Port Deremen within the Kos channel on the Turkish side. This strategic pattern of operation, leveraging the cover and neutrality provided by Turkish waters, sets the foundation for Allied operations in the Aegean for the years to come, illustrating the nuanced interplay of warfare, diplomacy, and geography that characterises the conflict in this region.

During their existence, the Levant Schooner Flotilla suffer very few personnel casualties. The only known casualties are when the Germans capture a caïque occurs in April 1944, when German forces intercept LS 24 as it approaches the island of Alimnia. All ten crewmen are subjected to a fierce interrogation. For refusing to talk, even under duress, the Germans execute them.

However, most Levant Schooner Flotilla crew members worry less about the Germans than about the weather. To those unfamiliar, the Aegean might seem like paradise, yet experienced sailors are well aware of its sudden changes, especially under the influence of the Meltemi wind blowing south from the Balkans. The wind gets broken up by islands and causes confused seas, hitting the little ships from the port bow one minute and the stern the next.

Most Levant Schooner Flotilla crew members spend their days without seeing a German. Despite the flotilla’s heavy armaments, its primary role is not to seek combat, and engaging the enemy is always a last resort.

In April 1945 while on board LS 43. Near the Turkish coast, an enemy launch collides with the caïque, and the captors take the five crewmen, and two Special Boat Squadron passengers to Rhodes. Even though they face accusations of espionage they perceive the threats as bluffs, confident that no drastic actions would be taken with the war nearing its end.

Indeed, the Levant Schooner Flotilla crew’s predictions hold true. Instead of execution, they are imprisoned until the Allies liberate Rhodes following Germany’s unconditional surrender. After which the crew returns to base, only to find the Levant Schooner Flotilla has been decommissioned.