Operation Squatter

Unit Force

• L Detachment, Special Air Service
  • Lieutenant David Stirling, Sergeant-Major George Yates, Sergeant Bob Tait, Sergeant John Cheyne
  • Lieutenant Eoin McGonigal, Private Doug Keith, Private Jim Blakeney Private Roy Davies, Private Sidney Hildreth
  • Lieutenant Jock Lewes, Captain Thomson, Sergeant. Pat Riley, Lance Corporal Brough, Private Warburton, Private Phillips, Private Cattell, Private Cooper, Private Burns, Private Storie, Private Jeff DuVivier
  • Lieutenant Bonnington,
  • Lieutenant Blair “Paddy” Mayne, Sergeants. MacDonald and Kershaw, Corporal White, Private White, Private Seekings, Private Hawkins, Private Arnold, Private Kendall, Private Chesworth, Private Bennett

Opposing Forces

Operation

After intense training L Detachment, Special Air Service, composed of five officers and sixty other ranks, is ready for to their first operational deployment, known as Operation Squatter. The operation’s objective is a nighttime parachute drop behind enemy lines, specifically targeting airfields at Gazala and Timimi on the night of November 16^th/17^th, 1941. This mission is part of a larger strategic effort to support Operation Crusader.

In the strategic context of the operation, Captain A. D. Stirling, aware of the impending large-scale Eighth Army offensive against Axis forces, named ‘Crusader,’ anticipates the mission’s importance. Operation Crusader’s primary aim is to reclaim the eastern coastal region of Libya, Cyrenaica, and take control of Libyan airfields from the enemy. Success in this operation would significantly aid the Royal Air Force (RAF) in increasing supplies to Malta, a key strategic location in the Mediterranean.

Concurrently, General Erwin Rommel, recognising the strategic importance of Malta, is completing his plans for an offensive with the Afrika Korps. Rommel’s objective is to push the British eastward, capture the critical airfields, and thus obstruct the RAF’s ability to support operations in Malta. The ensuing struggle over these airfields and the region as a whole becomes a crucial element of the North African campaign.

Stirling’s strategy for Operation Squatter involves a bold manoeuvre: he plans to insert his men via parachute between the expansive armies of the Allies and Axis, specifically targeting the Axis airfields at Gazala and Tmimi in eastern Libya. The operation is scheduled for a midnight strike on November 17^th, 1941, Stirling’s birthday.

The team dedicates time to meticulously prepare their explosives, weapons, and rations, with each member fully aware of their specific role and responsibilities.

However, Stirling faces a manpower challenge as not all his soldiers are fit for the operation. Injuries from parachute training, including those sustained by Lieutenant Bill Fraser and Private Jock Byrne, reduce his available force. As a result, Stirling commands a total of fifty-four men for the operation, organised into four sections. The first two sections are under the leadership of Lewes, while the remaining two sections are commanded by Blair Mayne, also known as ‘Paddy,’ a man noted for his physical and mental fortitude, high standards, and occasionally unbridled nature.

Mayne’s command, comprising 21 men, falls under the direct leadership of Lieutenant Charles Bonington. Their assigned target is the strategically located Tmimi airfield, situated west of Tobruk. The operational plan involves a stealthy approach to the vicinity of the airfield, remaining concealed during daylight to avoid detection, and then launching their attack precisely at one minute before midnight on November 17^th, 1941. This plan reflects the unit’s emphasis on surprise and precision in executing their critical mission objectives.

MOST SECRET

S.A.S.O.

Ops. 1

S.I.O.

1. The “Squatter” operation has now been fixed for the night of D-2.
2. Five Bombays will arrive at Bagush at about 1200 hours on that day and will take off again at 1730. The first one will be over the objective at 20.15 hours and will be followed by the other four at 15 minutes interval between each.
3. The Albacores will, therefore, be required to drop flares over Gazala No. 1 Landing Ground from 2000 to 2130 hours, and the Blenheims to bomb this Landing Ground between these times. The Bombays during this period will be carrying out their operation some 15 miles to the south west and it is desirable that when approaching or leaving the target, Blenheims should fly at not less than 3000 feet over the same area. Continued desultory bombing throughout the night (of GAZALA and TMIMI L.Gs) would help as a distraction to the enemy.
4. In order to ensure success and to synchronise times, a Conference between O.C. “Squatter” O.C. Bombays, and the O.C’s Albacores and Blenheims who are taking part should be held here at 1300 hours on D-2.
5. It is essential that O.C. “Squatters” should be provided with one mosaic and two sets of (a) Tmimi Landing Ground with an area ten miles to the south and west of it and (b) two strips in the Got Taray – Bir Temrad area west of Gazala and south of Tmimi.
6. Will the S.A.S.O. please issue the necessary instructions regarding (a) proposed conference on D-2, and (b) the operations of the Bombays and Albacores, and will the S.I.O. please check that the necessary action has been taken by the Army Survey Flight or the Photo Interpretation Section, to ensure that the photographs required are produced and issued to Captain Stirling immediately.

PLANS,

A.H.Q.W.D.

9.11.41

Signed: [unreadable], Group Captain

Copy for information to the A.O.C.

SECRET & PERSONAL

Copy No. 2

10 Nov 41.

HQ/BA/12/G(0)

EIGHTH ARMY OPERATION INSTRUCTION NO. 16

Capt. D. Stirling

Comdg. ‘L’ Sec 1 S.A.S. Bde.

Ref Maps – LIBYA 1/500,000 DERNA sheets 5 & 13 – BARDIA sheet 14 1/100,000 BOMBA, GAZALA

1. Your force will consist of 54 men from ‘L’ Sec 1 S.A.S. Bde.(2)
2. Your primary task is to raid both aerodromes at TMIMI in sq (S) P 70, GAZALA No. 1 355446 and GAZALA No. 2 362443, the latter including the new ground cleared to the East, destroying as many aircraft as possible.
   Other objectives such as H.Q’s and communications should only be attacked if they will in no way prejudice the success of your primary task.
3. You will plan your raid so that it takes place on the night D-1/D1 at an hour to be decided upon by you.
   It is important that your plan should co-ordinate the efforts of all parties on the various aerodromes in order that the first explosions will take place at the same time, and it is most important that the enemy should be unaware of your having landed or of your presence during the whole of D-1 day.
4. The types of aircraft likely to be found are given below in order of priority for destruction: –
5. GERMAN
   ME 109 E & F(3)
   ME 110
   HE 111 (4)
   STUKA JU 87
   JU 88
6. ITALIAN
   G 50
   MACCHI 200
   CR 42
   BR 20
   S 79
7. The destruction of fighter aircraft is of greater importance than bombers and GERMAN aircraft of more more importance than ITALIAN.
8. HQ. RAF, Western Desert have arranged to bomb all aerodromes in para. 2 at dusk on D-1 and after moonrise night D-1/D1, you must therefore be clear of the aerodromes at these times.
   During the whole night D-2/D-1 all aerodromes will be bombed.
9. to 15. – missing
10. Recognition signals between your force and the LRDG patrol will be arranged between you and Capt. EASON-SMITH.
11. The date of D.1 will be notified to you separately.

Method of issue: by hand.

Time of Signature: 1810 hours

Signed: A. Galloway, Brigadier, General Staff.

Distribution:

Capt. D. Stirling, Comdg. ‘L’ Sec S.A.S. Bde. – 1

A.O.C. RAF. Western Desert – 2

Lt-Col G.T. Prendergast, Comdg. LRDG. – 3

B.G.S. EIGHTH ARMY – 4

C.G.S. G.H.Q. – 5

File – 6

War Diary – 7 & 8

Restrictions on air action against Key Targets

1. Range of Fighters
   Gazala and Tmimi and Gambut are within range of Tomahawks operating from L.G. 109, 110, and 111. Derna and Martuba are out of range. All the key targets except Gambut are out of range of Hurricanes.
2. Operations by Ground Forces against Key Targets
   1. “Squatter” operations against Gazala N and S and Tmimi will take place between 1800 hours D-1 and 0300 hrs D1 and Air Attacks will not take place during that time. Before 1800 hrs D-1 and after 0300 hrs on D1 these targets will be open to air attack.
   2. “Flipper” operations against DERNA will take place between 1800 hours and 2100 hours. Air Attacks on Derna L.G. must not therefore be laid on during these hours. (5)
   3. “Symphony” operations against a Landing Ground or Grounds, not yet selected but definitely not North of the line Mechili – Tobruk – Gambut will take place between 1800 hrs and 2400 hrs D-1. These should not affect primary targets.

November 16th, 1941

Stirling leads his team of 54 men from Kabrit to their advance staging area at Bagoush. Upon arrival, they are accommodated at the Royal Air Force officers’ mess, providing them a semblance of comfort before embarking on their high-risk mission. DuVivier, a member of Jock Lewes’s 11-man section, picks up on a palpable sense of tension among the officers. It’s not long before he learns from Stirling about the severe storm anticipated over their target area.

12:00 Five Bristol Bombays arrive at Bagush Airfield.

At 18:30 hours, a convoy of trucks arrives at the officers’ mess, signifying the commencement of the operation. They are there to transport the men to the five Bristol Bombay aircraft, each destined for the target area.

Despite the looming threat of the storm, which brings with it dangerously high winds, there’s a collective resolve among Stirling and his men to proceed with the operation. They make their way to the five Bristol Bombay aircraft designated for their mission, each loaded with vital equipment – weapons, explosives, and rations.

To ensure a smooth jump and minimise the risk of entanglement, the men don standard desert uniforms, augmented with mechanics’ overalls. This precaution is crucial for preventing their gear from snagging on the parachute lines during the descent.

At 22:30 hours, the men are all seated in theirr designated aircraft, ready for the mission. The pilot of LIeutenant Mayne remarks about the rising wind stirred unease among us. The flight, lasting two and a half hours, feels interminable for the men.

Lieutenant Stirling and Lieutenant Eoin McGonigal aircraft are the first to take off .Lieutenant Jock Lewes plane is the third aircraft to follow. The fourth aircraft is occupied by Lieutenant Bonington and his nine-man team, while Lieutnant’s Mayne’s section is aboard the fifth. Each Bristol Bombay is also equipped with five, and in some cases six, canisters. Inside these canisters are essential items for the mission: two packs containing weapons, additional ammunition, fuses, explosives, blankets, and rations.

November 17th, 1941

As they approach the drop zone, they encounter mild anti-aircraft fire. Upon reaching the drop zone, Mayne’s aircraft successfully avoids detection by enemy anti-aircraft batteries, a testament to the crew’s skill and the operation’s stealthy approach. The urgency of the situation hastened their exit from the Bombay troop-carrying planes, a process that is remarkably swift. The intense cold of the night air was immediately palpable.However, the landing is far from smooth. The combination of high wind speeds and thorny bushes on the ground creates a hazardous landing environment, resulting in injuries to two of Mayne’s men. This challenging landing highlights the operation’s inherent risks and the hostile conditions the team must navigate.

After the difficult landing, Mayne’s team conducts an extensive search of the area. Their efforts, however, yield only a limited recovery of their essential packs and weapons, emphasizing the operation’s precarious nature and the unforgiving desert environment they find themselves in.

Faced with the diminishing hours of darkness, Mayne decides to position his section on the southern side of the target area. The team’s situation further deteriorates when they are caught in a heavy rainstorm, rendering their fuses useless. With the critical components of their mission compromised, Mayne is forced to postpone the planned attack, and his men endure a challenging night in the wadi, exposed to the harsh elements.

By the following morning, it becomes clear to Mayne that the fuses will not dry in time for a rescheduled attack. Prioritizing the safety and well-being of his men, he makes the difficult decision to abort the mission. Despite not engaging the enemy as planned, Mayne is impressed with the resilience and discipline his men display under these adverse conditions.

Meanwhile, Stirling and Sergeant Bob Tait face difficulties as well. Their aircraft is delayed and attracts enemy fire. Despite making it to the ground, they encounter injuries and assembly challenges. Stirling decides to attack the airfield with Tait while the rest, led by Sergeant-Major George Yates, head to the RV. However, they too abandon the mission due to a severe thunderstorm.

November 20th, 1941

Mayne’s section reaches the designated rendezvous point near the Rotondo Segnali. Here, they encounter members of the Long Range Desert Group (LRDG), with whom they share the experiences and challenges faced during their mission. Lewes’s group, despite having managed an organized landing, faces similar obstacles due to the inclement weather and challenging terrain. Consequently, Lewes also decides to abort the operation. Under the guidance of Pat Riley, the group navigates the difficult conditions to head south towards the RV, marking an end to their part in the operation under strenuous circumstances.

The LRDG waits at the RV for additional survivors, but eventually, they depart with Stirling and the men present. The LRDG searches for more survivors on November 21, but none are found.

November 25th, 1941

On the afternoon of , the surviving members of L Detachment arrived at Jaghbub Oasis on There. This location serves as the Eighth Army’s forward landing ground but also, nestled among the remnants of a renowned Islamic school, hosted a first-aid post. This provided a much-needed respite for the wounded.

Before handing over the injured to the medical staff, Stirling gathers his men for an important address. Despite the evident setback from their initial operation, he firmly declares that L Detachment is far from defeated. His words are aimed at revitalising the spirit of the unit, reinforcing the idea that their mission and purpose were still very much alive. Stirling’s leadership in this moment is crucial in maintaining the morale and focus of his troops, emphasising their resilience and the importance of continuing their efforts.

Later Stirling learns that Charles Bonington’s section’s aircraft was shot down, resulting in casualties and capture. Yates and Stirling’s section are also taken prisoner. The fate of McGonigal’s section remains a mystery until 1944 when two escaped POWs return to Britain with their account.

Mayne is deeply affected by McGonigal’s absence and vows revenge on the enemy. Stirling, though disappointed, is not despondent. He decides that future SAS operations will use trucks driven by the LRDG for more accurate and comfortable insertion.

Multimedia