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September 20th, 1944, 1st Polish Independent Parachute Brigade

September 17th, 1944 – September 26th, 1944
Operation Market Garden
Objectives
  • Land at Landing- and Drop Zones at Wolfheze, Oosterbeek, and Ede.
  • Capture the road bridge in Arnhem and hold it for a minimum of 48 hours
  • Link up with the advancing ground forces of the 30th Corps.
Operational Area

Arnhem Area, The Netherlands

Allied Forces
  • 1st Airborne Division
  • 1st Polish Independent Parachute Brigade
  • 52nd, (Lowland) Airlanding Division
Axis Forces
  • II SS-Panzer-Corps
    • 9. SS-Panzerdivision “Hohenstaufen”
    • 10. SS-Panzerdivision “Frundsberg”
  • Kampfgruppe von Tettau
    • Feldkommandantur 642
    • SS-Unterführerschule Arnheim
      • Bataillon I
      • Bataillon II
      • Bataillon III
    • SS-Polizei Schule
    • SS-Ausbildungs und Ersatz Bataillon 4
      • Bataillon I
      • Bataillon II
    • SS-Wach Battalion 3
    • Schiffsturm Abteilung 10
    • Schiffsturm Abteilung 6/14
    • Fliegerhorst Battalion 2
    • Fliegerhorst Battalion 3
    • Artillerie Regiment 184
    • Sicherheit Regiment 42
  • Kampfgruppe Knoche
    • Sicherheit Regiment 26
      • Bataillon I
      • Bataillon II
    • MG Bataillon 30
    • FlaK Abteilung 688
      • Bataillon I
      • Bataillon II
    • Hermann Göering Schule Regiment
      • Hermann Göering Schule Regiment
        • Bataillon I
      • Panzer Abteilung 224
      • SS Ersatz Abteilung 4
      • Deelen Airfield FlaK Kompanie
      • Wach Kompanie
      • Reichs AD
  • Kampfgruppe Kraft
    • SS-Panzer Grenadier Ausbildungs und Ersatz Bataillon 16
  • Schwerepanzer Abteilung 506
  • Schwerepanzer Kompanie Hummel
  • StuG Abteilung 280
  • Artillerie Regiment 191
    • Bataillon I
    • Bataillon II
    • Bataillon III
  • SS-Werfer Abteilung 102, Hauptsturmfürer Nickmann
  • Kampfgruppe Brinkmann
  • Kampfgruppe Bruhn
  • Kampfgruppe Harder
  • Sperrverband Harzer
    • MG Bataillon 47
    • Marine Kampfgruppe 642
    • Kampfgruppe Schörken
    • Kampfgruppe Kauer
    • SS-Abteilung “Landstrum Nederland”
  • Kampfgruppe Knaust
    • Ersatz Abteilung Bocholt
    • Panzer Kompanie Mielke
  • Kampfgruppe Spindler
  • FlaK Abteilung Swoboda
  • Kampfgruppe von Allworden
  • Kampfgruppe Weber
Another Delay of the 1st Polish Independent Parachute Brigade

Major-General Urquhart makes the decision to redirect the Polish Brigade to the village of Driel, located about 1.6 kilometres south of the division’s positions across the Rhine. The plan is for the Poles to use the Driel-Heveadorp ferry crossing to bring the entire brigade across the river into the base of the Oosterbeek perimeter.

Initially, this ferry is not included in the Market Garden plans, as it is assumed that the main bridges will be captured intact, rendering the small ferry insignificant. The Drop Zone, isnow located about 6.4 kilometres west of the original one. The revised Drop Zone, now designated as Drop Zone K, is near Driel, which is located almost directly south of the Hartenstein Hotel. This new location is within the artillery line of the Light Regiment around the Old Church in southern Oosterbeek, an ideal vantage point to monitor the potential arrival of the 1st Polish Independent Parachute Brigade.

As the Oosterbeek perimeter begins to take shape on Tuesday and Wednesday, it is established based on the positions that units occupy at that moment, without much thought given to its strategic value for the future of the operation. After the loss of the Arnhem road bridge, the ferry at Westerbouwing Heights, located at the far western end of the perimeter, becomes a critical asset.

Until Wednesday, the ferry operates normally, even ferrying men and equipment across the river from gliders that had landed south of the Rhine. However, on that day, the ferryman, Pieter Hensen, cuts the cable on the south bank to prevent the Germans from using it and later sinks the ferry near the north bank.

This area is particularly significant because it is one of the few locations in the direct area, where roads on both sides of the river reach the riverbank. If the XXX Corps had reached this area, it would have been possible that troops could have been transported across the river. Furthermore, if the area had been more securely defended, possibly with Westerbouwing as the central point, a Bailey bridge might have been constructed under the cover of troops on the northern bank, potentially allowing Operation Market Garden to maintain its momentum.

The message from the 1st Airborne Division luckily reaches Great Britain in time, so the men of the 1st Polish Independent Parachute Brigade can be informed before going into action.

Meanwhile, the 1st Polish Independent Parachute Brigade arrives at the Royal Air Force Saltby and Royal Air Force Spanhoe airfields around 08:45 in the morning.

At 08:45 hours in Royal Air Force Stamford, Lieutenant-Colonel Stevens, Liaison Officer for the 1st Airborne Division to the Polish Airborne Troops, delivers the message to the 1st Polish Independent Parachute Brigade headquarters. The Polish Parachute Brigade’s landing zone has been altered, and they are now instructed to drop approximately six kilometres west of the original location, near the village of Driel. General Sosabowski is instructed to use the Heveadorp ferry after his landing to cross to the northern bank of the Rhine. They then have to assemble in the Hemelsche Berg area, where they will be under the command of the 1st Airborne Division.

This sudden change in plans is a significant setback, as they are scheduled to take off in just a few hours. To make matters worse, Sosabowski’s force is divided between two airfields. He promptly orders Major Thon, commanding the troops at Spanhoe, to meet with him. Sosabowski also contacts the airfield commanders, instructing them to delay the take-off until 13:00. With only a few hours to reorganise, Sosabowski must quickly adapt to the new circumstances.

After briefing Major Thon, Sosabowski heads to the airfield, and at 09:15 hours, he briefs his second-in-command, staff officers, and unit commanders with a new verbal operation plan, outlining the tasks, take-off airfields, and details for each unit. By 10:00 hours, lower commanders and stickmen are informed of the revised plan at Royal Air Force Spanhoe and Royal Air Force Saltby airfields,

The meteorological report is again unfavourable, and the airfield remains blanketed in a fine mist that seems determined to linger. Despite the challenges, Sosabowski’s officers and troops remain confident and take the change of orders in stride. The plan now is to leave at 14:00 hours

By 13:40, the engines of the Dakotas roar to life, and the aircraft begin to taxi down the runways. However, due to worsening weather conditions, fog and drizzle covering England and thick cloud cover up to 2,700 metres along the route to Holland, the operation is called off for the day and the postponed for another twenty-four hours.

This delay, however, grants them an additional 24 hours to review and refine their plans. Sosabowski uses the time to make several adjustments, which are promptly communicated to the units. By 17:00 hours, the Brigade returns to its garrison areas in Stamford, where new written orders are prepared in anticipation of the rescheduled operation. Lieutenant-Colonel Stevens, tirelessly seeking updated information, goes back and forth, ensuring they have the most accurate intelligence available. That evening, Stevens returns, exhausted but dutiful, and reports to Sosabowski about the situation.

Stevens informs Sosabowski that the 1st Parachute Brigade is engaged in fighting in the western outskirts of Arnhem, but one battalion has been cut off and is facing heavy resistance at the bridge. Meanwhile, the rest of the 1st Airborne Division is under intense pressure in the Oosterbeek area, with German forces attacking from the north and west. Stevens adds that the Germans still control the northern sectors of Nijmegen, and the bridge over the River Waal remains in enemy hands.

Sosabowski, concerned about the broader situation, asks about the progress of XXX Corps. Stevens responds that they appear to be bogged down and making little headway. When Sosabowski presses for more details on the timing of the report, Stevens admits that he cannot be certain, and the information might already be out of date.

Both men understand the gravity of the situation. The operation seems to have veered off course, and there is a growing concern that the 1st Polish Independent Parachute Brigade could be jumping into an untenable position. It becomes clear to Sosabowski that the mission is not proceeding as planned and could even be on the brink of failure. Determined to prevent his troops from being sent into a hopeless situation, he makes a critical decision to contact General Brereton at Allied Airborne Army Headquarters.

Sosabowski decides that it has been two days since he last received any orders from either Browning or Urquhart, and it’s evident that the 1st Airborne Division is in serious danger. Unless he can obtain a direct assurance from a senior officer at Army Headquarters about the current situation around Arnhem, the 1st Polish Independent Parachute Brigade will not take off.

Though surprised, Lieutenant-Colonel Stevens knows that Sosabowski is serious. He leaves immediately to seek the necessary information.

For Major-General Sosabowski, it is a difficult decision, one that carries enormous consequences. He knows that, by delaying the take-off, he risks not only the lives of British troops at Arnhem but also the possibility of being accused of insubordination or cowardice. The potential charges that could be levelled against him, disobeying lawful orders, refusing to reinforce a division in desperate need, are daunting. However to him, his primary concern is the safety of his men and the success of the mission. Their task is to drop south of the Neder Rhine and reinforce the British forces across the ferry. However, the information they are working with is outdated, and Sosabowski is unwilling to send his troops into a battle based on an obsolete plan. He knows that dropping his men into an unknown situation, where they could be easily overwhelmed, would not be justified.

That night, Sosabowski finds little rest. He spends hours pacing his office and then his bedroom, his mind filled with the anxiety of potential failure. Images of catastrophic battles, overwhelming German forces, and the possibility of standing before a court martial haunt his thoughts. Yet, even amid these doubts, Sosabowski remains steadfast in his belief that he is making the best decision for the safety of his brigade.

Polish Airborne in Oosterbeek

In Oosterbeek where the Polish anti-tank battery is stationed, heavy artillery and mortar fire causes further casualties. Meanwhile, the Polish anti-tank units support the battle on the northwestern side of the Oosterbeek perimeter, as the Germans advance and attempt to capture the British-held positions. One Polish anti-tank gun and its crew receives orders from the Royal Artillery Commander, 1st Airborne Division, to destroy a German self-propelled gun. While moving to fulfil this order, the crew is killed, and the gun is destroyed.

By the end of afternoon, it becomes clear that the Polish anti-tank units are urgently needed to help defend the southern side of the perimeter, where the Germans are attacking from both the west and east, aiming to cut the British forces off from the Rhine and isolate them from the advancing XXX Corps to the south. During the movement of the anti-tank guns, the Polish troops come under fire and suffer additional casualties. By 17:30 hours, they reach the southern perimeter, the Polish units take up defensive positions near the Oude Kerk and at the T-junction of Kneppelhoutweg and Benedendorpsweg, ready to resist further German attacks.

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