September 17th, 1944, 1st Airborne Division

Initiating Bombardments

The initial actions of Operation Market Garden are initiated by the Allied air forces. On the night before the operation and continuing into the following morning, the Royal Air Force’s Bomber Command, the 2^nd Tactical Air Force, along with the United States 8^th and 9^th Air Forces, conduct 1,395 sorties targeting strategic locations within the Market Garden area. These missions are supported by an escort of 1,240 fighters. Key German airfields, flak positions, and various targets around Arnhem are heavily bombarded. The flak positions at Deelen Airfield are effectively hit, as are military barracks in Arnhem and Ede, the latter located near the drop zone for the 4^th Parachute Brigade.

Tragically, the intense bombardment results in civilian casualties, with the most significant loss of life occurring at the psychiatric asylum in Wolfheze. The grounds of the asylum, believed to be occupied by German troops and situated near the glider landing zones, are considered critical to neutralize. The United States 9^th Air Force, reluctant to target a medical facility, requests explicit orders from Major-General Urquhart before proceeding. The subsequent raid, likely conducted by B-26 Marauders, misses the primary target where German soldiers are stationed, leading to the unfortunate deaths of approximately 90 civilians, half of whom are psychiatric patients.

First Airlift

The Glider Pilot Regiment is fully mobilised for the operation, with over 1,330 pilots from both Glider Pilot Regiment Wings stationed across England preparing over 650 gliders and their personal equipment for D-Day and subsequent lifts.

Weather conditions play a crucial role in any flight, especially for glider pilots, whose margin for error is slim as they have only one chance to land. The Meteorological Office’s forecast for Sunday morning is optimistic: low ground mist is expected at first light, with the morning sun clearing any residual mist by 09:00 hours. While the English weather seems nearly perfect, the forecast for the landing zones in Holland is slightly less favourable, with some haze and cloud expected en route and over the landing zones. However, the overall outlook for D-Day is close to ideal, which bodes well given the time of year.

The gliders are towed by tug aircraft from No. 38 Group and No. 46 Group of the Royal Air Force, positioned on the same airfields as the Glider Pilot Regiment squadrons. No. 38 Group’s fleet, including Short Stirlings, Handley Page Halifaxes, and Albemarles, supports 1 Wing Glider Pilot Regiment, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Iain Murray. No. 46 Group, with its C-47 Dakotas, handles the towing duties for 2 Wing Glider Pilot Regiment, led by Lieutenant Colonel John Place. Exceptions include C Squadron of 2 Wing, towed by 38 Group’s Halifaxes due to the Hamilcar’s size, which requires a four-engine tug rather than the Dakota’s two.

Royal Air Force tug pilots and their crews share the same apprehensions as the glider pilots. Repeated briefings cover routes, enemy opposition, navigation, and weather conditions. Each time, the operation is cancelled, leaving pilots in a state of pent-up tension. Finally, on the afternoon of Saturday, the camp is sealed, and all personnel attend another briefing, where preparations intensify.

By the early hours of Sunday morning, aircrews and troops across southern and eastern England wake to the realisation that this time the operation is going ahead. After months of anticipation and false starts, they will finally be leaving England behind.

Most Glider Pilot Regiment pilots, expect to return within days of landing, as they did in Normandy. They have checked and packed their kits, sewn escape tools into their uniforms, and are issued with syringes of morphine. Every aspect of their equipment is scrutinised to ensure readiness.

As the morning progresses, crews follow the meticulously rehearsed procedures for take-off. Aircraft line up along the runways, engines roar, and final checks are made. Pilots getting dressed and ready, checking navigational details and aircraft conditions one last time. The aircraft begin to take off, and by 10:00, the air is filled with the noise of engines as the combined force sets off for Holland.

Flight to the Landing and Drop Zones

As the glider-tug formations lift off from airfields across southern and eastern England, the tension among crews is palpable. This is the culmination of months of training and preparation, and each pilot understands the critical importance of the mission. The aircraft must navigate precisely to deliver troops and equipment into enemy territory behind Arnhem.

The takeoff sequence is smooth, and the gliders rise into the air, towed by their respective tugs, including Short Stirlings, Halifaxes, and Dakotas. The airfields at Royal Air Force Keevil, Fairford, Down Ampney, and others are hubs of activity as formations assemble. The gliders, laden with vehicles, guns, and troops, maintain tight intervals to avoid collisions, climbing steadily to their designated altitudes.

The flight over England is a carefully orchestrated manoeuvre, with hundreds of gliders and tugs forming streams in the sky. The departure routes are meticulously planned, with navigation points like Hatfield and Aldeburgh guiding the armada toward the North Sea. Pilots maintain constant communication with their tug aircraft, making minor adjustments to maintain their position in the crowded airspace.

As the formation leaves the English coast, the vast expanse of the North Sea stretches below. Tugs and gliders maintain altitude, their engines droning steadily as they progress towards Holland. Below, Royal Navy and Royal Air Force rescue launches are positioned to recover any aircraft forced to ditch. The weather, mostly clear with some patches of low cloud, poses minimal challenges at this stage, although visibility is a concern.

The glider pilots, flying unpowered aircraft, are acutely aware of their vulnerability. Any technical failure or miscalculation could result in a forced landing in the sea. The pilots monitor their instruments closely, maintaining the critical tow connection while adjusting for wind and turbulence. The sky is crowded with aircraft, and every crew is focused on maintaining the formation.

Upon reaching Schouwen Island, a critical waypoint, the crews can identify the Dutch mainland. Below, the terrain is a mix of flooded polders, farmland, and small towns. This coastal route is chosen for its relative safety, avoiding areas with high concentrations of German anti-aircraft guns. Despite the planning, the crews are vigilant; the threat of flak and ground fire remains.

Crossing into enemy territory, the airspace becomes increasingly hostile. Anti-aircraft fire, though initially sporadic, begins to target the formations. Flak bursts are visible, and some tugs and gliders are hit. Several gliders are forced to release prematurely; mechanical failures or severed tow ropes compel emergency landings.

Approaching the landing zones near Arnhem, the situation becomes more intense. Anti-aircraft batteries hidden in woods and fields open fire. Flak bursts around the gliders, and the sky is filled with explosions. One glider takes a direct hit in the cockpit, killing the co-pilot and forcing the remaining pilot to continue solo. Others struggle to navigate through the chaos, with some narrowly avoiding mid-air collisions.

First Landings

Around 12:40, the first British paratroopers, comprising 186 pathfinders from the 21^st Independent Parachute Company, are dropped near Arnhem from twelve Shirt Stirlings of No. 190 Squadron and No. 620 Squadron. The pathfinders secure the three drop and landing zones and activate Eureka beacons to guide the incoming airborne forces. Their mission is accomplished smoothly, with only two casualties from heavy landings.

From 13:00 on, the first gliders begin landing on Landing Zone S, carrying the 1^st Airlanding Brigade, minus A and C Companies of the 2^nd Battalion, South Staffordshire Regiment. As the tugs release their gliders, the pilots face the final challenge: landing on the designated zones. The landing areas, Landing Zone S and Landing Zone Z, are marked with smoke and flares, but they are already crowded with gliders arriving every few seconds. The ground is uneven, and obstacles such as trees and ditches make the approach hazardous. Some gliders overshoot and crash into wooded areas; others manage to land but sustain damage that makes unloading difficult. Of the 153 gliders destined for this zone, only nineteen fail to arrive.

The landings are a scene of controlled chaos. Gliders are touching down in quick succession, and troops and vehicles are swiftly unloaded. The atmosphere on the ground shifts rapidly from orderly landings to the reality of combat, with the sound of small-arms fire growing closer. The pilots, now on the ground, regroup to defend the landing zones as planned, but the unfolding battle begins to draw them into roles beyond their initial assignment.

Despite the losses and disruptions, the majority of the gliders reach their intended landing zones. The operation’s success hinges on the rapid consolidation of airborne forces on the ground, and the glider pilots, having completed their primary task, now transition to supporting roles. As the first elements move out towards Arnhem, the sounds of combat signal that the battle to secure the bridges is about to begin.

The subsequent glider lift at 13:19 brings Major-General Urquhart’s Headquarters and half of the Divisional Units, including the Reconnaissance Squadron’s Jeeps, artillery, and the 1^st Parachute Brigade’s vehicles and anti-tank guns. On Landing Zone Z, the heavier Hamilcar gliders struggle with the soft ground. Several overturn upon landing due to the combination of their weight, landing speed, and the absence of a significant headwind to slow their approach. One Hamilcar, carrying a 17-pounder anti-tank gun, flips completely, trapping the pilot under the wreckage. Despite the hazards of mass glider landings, the operation proceeds with minimal enemy resistance, though there are a few casualties from crashes and collisions. Where neccesarry Medical teams work quickly to rescue the injured, but casualties occur.

Starting at 13:50, 2,283 men from the 1^st Parachute Brigade and other parachute-trained units, including the majority of the Reconnaissance Squadron, begin their jump over Drop Zone X. Four men refuse to jump, and one is killed when his parachute fails to open. The heavy loads carried by the paratroopers lead to hard landings and some injuries, but the overall drop is considered highly successful.

The first Lift is now complete, with the landings largely unopposed and executed with remarkable efficiency. Major-General Urquhart observes the 1^st Parachute Brigade’s arrival and is pleased with the smooth start to Operation Market Garden.

As the paratroopers prepare to advance into Arnhem, the 1^st Airlanding Brigade secures the landing zones for the following day’s operations. The 2^nd Battalion, South Staffordshire Regiment clear Wolfheze of enemy resistance, and engineers from the 9^th Field Company destroy 21 abandoned 105 millimetres guns in the village. The 1^st Battalion, Border Regiment, under the temporary command of Major Cousens, secures a perimeter around Drop Zone X and Landing Zone Z, liberating Heelsum and capturing German soldiers along the way. Meanwhile, the 7^th Battalion, King’s Own Scottish Borderers secures the Ginkel Heath position, designated as Drop Zone-Y for the 4^th Parachute Brigade. Their actions along the Amsterdamseweg result in heavy casualties for the 3. SS-Wachbataillion, largely consisting of Dutch SS volunteers.

As the day goes by, the 1^st Airlanding Brigade disperses to secure the area against potential enemy attacks. The men also begin fortifying their positions and preparing for the second lift scheduled for the following day. The 1^st Battalion, Border Regiment moves south across the railway line to secure Landing Zone Z, which is designated for the second wave of troops. Meanwhile, the 2^nd Battalion, South Staffordshire Regiment, with only half of its strength having arrived with the first lift, the remainder expected to land the next day, stays on Landing Zone S to secure the area around Wolfheze and the northern perimeter of the airborne lodgement. The brigade’s third battalion, the 7^th Battalion, King’s Own Scottish Borderers, moves westward to cover Drop Zone Y, which will be used for the landings of the 4^th Parachute Brigade one day later.

The Initial German Response

SS-Obersturmbannführer Joseph ‘Sepp’ Krafft. His SS-Panzer Grenadier Ausbildungs und Ersatz Bataillon 16, later known as SS-Battalion Krafft after its commander, Sturmbannführer Josef “Sepp” Krafft, is positioned for field training in the woods between Wolfheze and Oosterbeek on the morning of the Allied landings. Krafft’s battalion, comprising just over 300 men, is mostly made up of inexperienced troops, but they are led by battle-hardened officers and Non-Comissioned Officers. Krafft, understanding that airborne landings are at their most vulnerable during the initial stages, notes in his war diary: “Experience shows that the only way to counter an airborne landing with a smaller force is to attack it immediately.”. Krafft notices the parachutes and gliders in the distance but is initially uncertain about the size and scope of the British assault. Acting quickly, he orders his 2. Kompanie to launch an attack on the landings and dispatches small patrols to gather more intelligence. Around 13:40 2. Kompanie, SS-Panzer Grenadier Ausbildungs und Ersatz Bataillon 16 attacks Landing Zone S and Landing Zone Z. At 14:00 SS-Obersturmbannführer Krafft moves his headquarters from Arnhem to the Wolfheze Hotel and orders his 4. Kompanie to join him.

Shortly thereafter, the patrols of 2. Kompanie report back, indicating that they have encountered a significantly large force, estimating the number at around 4,000 troops. After briefly engaging the British with small arms fire, the patrols are forced to retreat due to the overwhelming numbers. The scale of the landings leads Krafft to conclude that a major offensive is underway, likely aimed at capturing the crucial road and rail bridges over the Rhine.

He realises that the British forces will soon advance from the landing zones toward Arnhem, likely taking the most direct routes along the road through Wolfheze and the railway line. Krafft establishes his headquarters at the Wolfheze Hotel. Around 14:15 he orders 9. Kompanie forward to form a defence line to block the airborne troops’ direct route into Arnhem along the railway line. Krafft orders 2. and 4. Kompanie forward from Arnhem to block the other key routes, running north to south, just east of Wolfheze. He strengthens his force with over 100 additional troops gathered along the way, boosting his total strength to over 400 men equipped with machine guns, mortars, and flamethrowers, though they lack armoured support.

Anticipating that the British airborne landings are aimed at capturing the Arnhem Bridge, Krafft uses local knowledge and available intelligence to identify four possible routes from the landing zones to the bridge. He concludes that the British will likely attempt to use the two central routes and decides to block these. Krafft positions his companies along a line that extends from the area north of Route Tiger, through the Wolfheze Hotel, and along Wolfhezerweg, with a platoon stationed on the north side of the railway embankment, directly in the path of the Recce Squadron.

By 15:30 hours, Krafft’s blocking line is fully established, cutting off the central approaches to Arnhem. This swift action occurs before Major Gough’s 1^st Reconnaissance Squadron has moved off the landing zone and while the 1^st Parachute Battalion is still held in reserve. Krafft’s prompt response effectively stalls the 1^st Reconnaissance Squadron’s planned coup de main, and his troops begin pushing patrols towards the British landing zones to further disrupt the advancing forces.

However, Krafft’s line does not extend far enough south to cover Routes Tiger and Lion, leaving these approaches clear. This gap in Krafft’s defences allows the lead elements of the 1^st Parachute Brigade, under Gerald Lathbury, to advance towards Arnhem without facing immediate resistance from Krafft’s battalion.

While this was going on, Generalmajor Friedrich Wilhelm Enno Kussin, the Stadtkommandant Arnhem (garrison commander Arnhem), receives reports indicating enemy airborne landings to the west. The information is conflicting, leaving the situation unclear. Determined to understand the threat, Kussin decides to investigate personally. He travels to SS-Obersturmbannführer Krafft’s headquarters at the Wolfheze Hotel, where he is informed that a significant British assault is in progress, with the likely objective being the capture of the road and rail bridges in Arnhem. Realising that his command is now at the heart of a major conflict, Kussin recognises the urgent need to return to Arnhem to organize a proper defense of the road bridge and the town center.

As Kussin prepares to depart, Krafft advises caution, warning that British forces are already moving along several roads leading towards the town. As he turned onto Utrechtseweg from Wolfhezerweg, his vehicle encounters 5 Platoon from B Company of the 3^rd Parachute Battalion. The platoon opened fire, riddling the Citroën car with bullets, killing Kussin and his two passengers, Unteroffizier M. Koster (batman/interpreter) and Gefreiter J. Willeke (driver). After the encounter the men of B Company moved on leaving the men inside the car as they were killed.

The bodies remained in and around the bullet-riddled car until September 19^th, 1944, when Padre Pare of No. 1 Wing Glider Pilot Regiment, assisted by two German prisoners of war, buried all three beside the road. Sergeant D. Smith of the Army Film and Photographic Unit (A.F.P.U.) documents the scene, capturing several photographs of the car and the bodies.

During that same period of time, Generalfeldmarschall Walter Model, the commander of Heeresgruppe B, is having lunch at the Tafelberg Hotel in Oosterbeek. The sound of approaching aircraft alerts his staff officers, who rush to the windows, expecting bombers. Instead, they see the British paratroopers from the 1^st Airborne Division descending just three kilometres away. This unexpected proximity prompts Model to take immediate action.

Model quickly orders his staff car and departs the hotel. Initially, he may believe that the paratroopers are targeting him for capture or assassination. However, as he regains his composure, he realises that the Allied forces are likely attempting to secure key bridges in the north, particularly aiming for Arnhem. Before leaving, Model orders that the bridges may not be destroyed, recognising their importance for a potential counterattack.

He then travels forty-five kilometres to Doetinchem, east of Arnhem, where he wants to consult SS-Obergruppenführer Wilhelm Bittrich of the II SS-Panzer Korps at his headquarters. Bittrich’s II SS-Panzer Korps is officially made up of the 9. SS-Panzerdivision “Hohenstaufen” and the 10. SS-Panzerdivision “Frundsberg”. Ideally, each division should field around 18,000 personnel and roughly 170 main battle tanks. However, by the time the corps arrives in Gelderland, Netherlands, in early September 1944, its effective strength has been severely diminished compared to its initial deployment at the start of the Normandy campaign.

Upon establishing headquarters in Doetinchem, approximately 40 kilometres from Oosterbeek, on 10 September, Bittrich assesses the combat readiness of his divisions. The 9. SS-Panzerdivision “Hohenstaufen”, under SS-Oberststurmbannführer Walther Harzer, is in relatively better shape with around 3,500 troops, but retains only twenty of its original 170 Panther tanks. The division also has a limited mix of armoured cars, self-propelled guns, and half-tracks. Scheduled for a complete refit in Germany, the 9. SS-Panzerdivision “Hohenstaufen” is meant to hand over its serviceable vehicles to the 10. SS-Panzerdivision “Frundsberg”. However, Harzer is reluctant to comply and orders his men to deliberately disable their vehicles, removing wheels and tracks to keep them from being transferred.

The 9. SS-Panzerdivision “Hohenstaufen” is deployed in dispersed company-sized units, designated as Alarmeinheiten, positioned between Arnhem and Apeldoorn. These small independent combat teams are trained to react swiftly to any Allied threat. This deployment strategy is not new; both SS divisions have trained extensively in counter-airborne operations prior to the Normandy landings. This training was critical during the Arnhem engagement, as it empowered our Non-Commisoned Officers and officers to make swift, independent decisions in the heat of battle.

The 10. SS-Panzerdivision “Frundsberg”, also significantly weakened, reports only 3,000 effective personnel. Having been heavily battered during the Normandy campaign, the division has lost most of its armoured assets, primarily to Allied air attacks, and is regrouping near Zutphen on the Dutch-German border. Compounded by the absence of its Signal Regiment, the division’s operational capability is limited to its reconnaissance battalion, an armoured infantry regiment, two artillery battalions, and an engineer battalion, all of which are critically short of mechanised support and vehicles.

Despite the depleted condition of both divisions, the combined strength of the 9. SS-Panzerdivision “Hohenstaufen” and 10. SS-Panzerdivision “Frundsberg” amounts to about 6,000 experienced and determined soldiers. This force, though diminished in numbers and equipment, remains a serious challenge for the advancing Allied forces in the Arnhem area.

By the time Model arrives around 15:00, Bittrich has already issued orders to his corps, leaving Model, who is known for his tendency to intervene in lower-level commands, with little more to do than confirm Bittrich’s actions. Despite the uncertainty surrounding Arnhem and the possibility of further airborne landings north of the Rhine, General Wilhelm Bittrich reacts quickly and decisively to the Allied landings. He immediately orders the 9. SS-Panzerdivision “Hohenstaufen” stationed closest to Arnhem, to secure the Arnhem bridge and eliminate the British forces that have landed at Oosterbeek to the west. His top priority is to ensure the British are kept away from the vital Arnhem bridge.

Simultaneously, Bittrich recognises the strategic importance of Nijmegen. He instructs the 10. SS-Panzerdivision “Frundsberg” to move south at once to defend the Nijmegen bridge from the southern bank of the River Waal, understanding that the British Second Army is likely to advance through Nijmegen towards Arnhem. In parallel, he orders a reconnaissance mission towards Emmerich and Wesel, based on intelligence suggesting that there may have been additional paratroop landings in these areas, as well as in Nijmegen and Arnhem.

To support the move towards Nijmegen, Bittrich orders a reconnaissance operation in that direction ahead of Frundsberg’s advance. Since the 9. SS-Panzer-Aufklärungs Abteilung of the 9. SS-Panzerdivision “Hohenstaufen” is located at Beekbergen, much closer to Arnhem than the 10. SS-Panzer-Aufklärungs Abteilung, he transfers this battalion to the 10. SS-Panzerdivision “Frundsberg”‘s command and sends it southwards, crossing the Arnhem Road bridge. Later, the 10. SS-Panzer-Aufklärungs Abteilung is tasked with securing the Arnhem bridge to facilitate the division’s planned move south.

Bittrich’s rapid identification of General Horrocks’s objectives proves decisive. He opts not to focus solely on the 1^st Airborne Division, which would have weakened the German defence at Nijmegen. Conversely, concentrating only on Nijmegen would have allowed the British to strengthen their hold on Arnhem. By dividing his forces, Bittrich is able to challenge the Allied forces at both crucial locations simultaneously, while also summoning reinforcements to confront the British from both the east and the west. The success of the operation now hinges on how quickly the British XXX Corps can advance north.

As the British approach the Arnhem bridge, the 9. SS-Panzer-Aufklärungs Abteilung of the 9. SS-Panzerdivision “Hohenstaufen” crosses it around 18:00 and moves south to reconoitre the Nijmegen area for the 10. SS-Panzerdivision “Frundsberg” The latter starts moving towards the same area

Later, Model receives a detailed description of the entire Allied battle plan, recovered from a downed American glider near General Student’s headquarters at Vught, on the outskirts of ’s-Hertogenbosch. Student quickly relays the plans to Model via radio, and Model has them in hand before the end of the first day of the operation. Although Model is sceptical about the plan, it aligns with the actions already underway, so he sees no need to alter the current strategy. Even the following day, Model remains convinced that the primary objective of the Allied operation is to capture him and his headquarters, repeatedly expressing amazement at his narrow escape. This belief is likely reinforced by prior warnings from his SS and Luftwaffe colleagues about potential landings near his location.

Model’s management of the battle is arguably one of his finest military moments. He takes direct command of the II SS-Panzer Korps and confirms the orders Bittrich issued to his troops at 17: 30. Beyond this, Model organises the defence into three Market sectors. First, he tasks the First Parachute Army with halting the British ground offensive and eliminating the 101^st Airborne Division along the Son-Veghel road. Kampfgruppe Chill is already positioned to oppose the ground advance, while the 59^th Infantry Division, en route west of Tilburg, is ordered to engage the 101^st Airborne Division. Additionally, the 107. Panzer Brigade is redirected from its movement towards the Aachen sector to confront the 101st Airborne Division from the east.

Second, Wehrkreis VI is instructed to neutralise Allied paratroopers on the Groesbeek Heights, defend or recapture the road and rail bridges over the Waal, and prepare for offensive operations to the south. Lastly, the Netherlands Command is directed to launch operations against the British forces in Arnhem and Oosterbeek. General Christiansen, Wehrmachtbefehlshaber in den Niederlanden (Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht in the Netherlands) is assigned the task of attacking the British landing zones from the west, utilising the forces at his disposal, particularly Kampfgruppe von Tettau. Major General Baron Hans von Tettau, Christiansen’s operations and training officer. Meanwhile, Field Marshal Model contacts Supreme Headquarters Oberbefehlshaber West, requesting that  Generalfeldmarschall  von Rundstedt sends reinforcements to Arnhem. Model emphasises the urgent need for additional anti-aircraft guns, self-propelled artillery, and infantry to strengthen the German defence in the area. These orders are all in place before midnight on the first day of the operation.

1st Reconnaissance Squadron Coup de Main

Major Gough’s 1^st Reconnaissance Squadron is assigned the critical task of racing ahead in their Jeeps to seize Arnhem Bridge by a coup de main before the main force arrives. However, the landing of Recce Squadron’s Jeeps transported by ‘C’ Squadron Horsas encounters significant difficulties upon reaching Landing Zone Z. One of the twenty gliders carrying the Jeeps crashes on landing, overturning and killing the first pilot, Staff Sergeant George Baxter, while rendering two Jeeps from A Troop inoperable. Additional delays arise as crews struggle to extract the Jeeps from six other gliders due to various landing-related issues.

The primary problems stem from damage sustained during landing, which distorts the Horsa’s tail sections, trapping the Jeeps inside. In several instances, the gliders land nose-down in soft ground, complicating the extraction process further. Removing the tail section of a Horsa is already a complex and physically demanding task, even in ideal conditions during training exercises, involving careful coordination between two well-practised men. During the operation, the task is far more challenging. The glider’s tail often ends up about 5 metres above the ground, requiring crew members to climb up the steep, sloping fuselage to access and release the securing bolts while avoiding falls onto the Jeeps below.

Once the tail is detached, lowering the Jeeps safely to the ground becomes another challenge. The standard ramps flown with the Jeeps are too short due to the awkward angle of the glider’s fuselage. Crews resort to stacking supply panniers to extend the ramps, allowing the Jeeps to be cautiously driven down the steep incline. This extraction process is time-consuming, and it is not until 17:50, as dusk sets in, that the last Jeep is successfully freed.

A further complication arises from the disjointed arrival of key components of Gough’s force. The Sappers from the 9^th (Airborne) Field Squadron, Royal Engineers, who are essential to the operation, do not arrive alongside the Recce Squadron Jeeps. Their gliders, flown by D Squadron from Royal Air Force Keevil, land separately, resulting in scattered units on the landing zone. This separation stems from the retention of the Air Movement Table from earlier planned operations codenamed Operation Linnet II and Operation Comet, which did not account for the specific requirements of a coup de main force.

Also adding to the delays, many of the 1^st Reconnaissance Squadron troopers responsible for manning the Jeeps do not travel in the gliders but parachute in with the 1^st Parachute Brigade onto Drop Zone X. After landing, these troops need to quickly orient themselves and make their way across the drop zone, carrying full combat gear, to join the assembly point located about 320 metres south of the railway along Telefoonweg. Despite these logistical hurdles, the 1^st Reconnaissance Squadron serials are largely effective, with twenty-eight out of thirty-one Jeeps ready for the mission. The remaining three Jeeps, part of A Troop, are held in reserve and not immediately needed for the initial push towards the Arnhem bridge. Despite the operational challenges, Gough’s force is well-positioned to proceed with the coup de main mission, maintaining their objective to seize the bridge.

By 15:30 hours, the coup de main force of the 1^st Reconnaissance Squadron finally is assembled and ready to move. However, the Jeeps from the 9^th (Airborne) Field Company, Royal Engineers has still have not arrived at the rendezvous point. Eager to get his column moving, Major Freddie Gough decides that the squadron cannot wait any longer. At 15:40 hours, with Lieutenant Peter Bucknall and 8 Section in the lead, the 1^st Reconnaissance Squadron sets off, departing the landing zone via the Wolfheze level crossing.

The squadron, well-drilled and eager, quickly negotiates the crossing and turns right onto Johannahoeveweg, a sandy but solid track that runs parallel to the railway embankment. With the embankment on their right, the column advances eastward, and as the route allows more freedom of movement, the squadron adopts a tactical formation. Each troop is broken down into pairs of Jeeps that ‘leapfrog’ each other in short, tactical bounds, using available cover. The troops also rotate turns in leading the advance, with the rear troops responsible for securing the column’s rear and flanks.

As the squadron moves along Johannahoeveweg, the lead pair from C Troop begins to establish the rhythm of these tactical bounds. The track dips into a patch of open ground, emphasizing the steep height of the railway embankment with dense undergrowth on the right and a wooded ridge on the left. At approximately 16:00 hours, Lieutenant Peter Bucknall drives his Jeep down the slope and safely crosses the clearing. However, as the second Jeep follows, German fire erupts from concealed positions on the embankment and the ridge, creating a deadly crossfire that sweeps the open ground.

Caught in the ambush, Sergeant Tom McGregor’s Jeep is hit; Trooper Dickie Minns is struck in the stomach and falls out. Lance Corporal “Taff” Thomas and Trooper Reg Hasler dismount quickly under McGregor’s orders, using the Jeep for cover as they attempt to return fire, though they are severely outgunned by the German positions above. The fate of Bucknall and his crew remains unknown as the remainder of the squadron is pinned down, unable to advance or fully locate all the enemy positions.

The momentum of the advance toward Arnhem Bridge is halted less than 1,500 metres from the landing zone. Major Gough’s command post is a few hundred meters behind the stalled column, and he is working on a plan to outflank the enemy when an order arrives for him to report to Major General Roy Urquhart. Assuming the order to be of great importance, Gough decides to leave the stalled column under the command of his Second in Command. He departs swiftly with two escort Jeeps from ‘D’ Troop, heading back towards Divisional Headquarters across the Wolfheze level crossing.

The ambushing force blocking the route, identified as Kompanie 2. of the SS-Panzer Grenadier Ausbildungs und Ersatz Bataillon 16, has effectively stalled the 1^st Reconnaissance Squadron’s advance along route Leopard, disrupting the squadron’s dash for Arnhem Bridge as the coup de main force is brought to a halt less than 1,500 metres from the landing zone. Major Gough’s headquarters is positioned a few hundred metres behind the stalled column, and as he begins devising a plan to outflank the German positions, an urgent summons from the Divisional Commander Major-General Urquhart reaches him. Believing that the order must be significant or involve new instructions, Gough quickly decides to leave the column. He sets off towards Divisional Headquarters on the far side of the Wolfheze level crossing, accompanied by a small escort of two Jeeps from D Troop, leaving his Second in Command to manage the ambush.

Major Gough speeds towards Divisional Headquarters, but upon arrival, he finds that Roy Urquhart has already departed, intending to locate Gerald Lathbury and his headquarters along route Lion. Determined to catch up, Major Gough then heads to the 1^st Airlanding Brigade Headquarters near the Wolfheze level crossing, still searching for his elusive Divisional Commander. As he nears the crossing, Major Gough encounters Major David Dobie, whose 1^st Parachute Battalion has finally been released from its reserve role and is on the move.

The two officers confer briefly about the German ambush that has blocked Major Gough’s advance along route Leopard. Realising that Major Gough’s men are pinned down, Dobie opts to bypass the obstruction by taking his battalion further north onto the Arnhem-Ede road, planning to continue towards his designated blocking position north of Arnhem. With Dobie’s decision made, Major Gough swiftly departs along route Lion with his escort of three Reconaissance Jeeps, determined to locate Major-General Urquhart, understand the reason for his summons, and then return to support his pinned-down squadron.

Maenwhile the situation at the 1^st Reconnaissance Squadron ambush site remains largely unchanged throughout the afternoon, with repeated attempts by Major Gough’s men to dislodge or outflank the entrenched SS troops proving unsuccessful. Sergeant Tom McGregor is killed by machine-gun fire, and his entire crew is wounded. The smouldering wreck of Peter Bucknall’s lead Jeep is visible, surrounded by bodies of fallen men. The surviving crew members from the second Jeep are captured by Krafft’s forces, except for Trooper Minns, who, severely wounded, is left behind as he is unable to be moved. Despite his severe wounds, he manages to crawl underneath the vehicle and remains hidden until he is recovered the following day. After nearly two hours of fighting, the 1^st Reconnaissance Squadron, now suffering additional casualties, is forced to retreat to its initial position under the command of its Second in Command to receive new orders.

The forward position held by the 1^st Reconnaissance Squadron along Johannahoeveweg is later absorbed into the 1^st Airlanding Brigade’s perimeter in preparation for the second lift. F Squadron Glider Pilot Regiment is assigned the wood line near the ambush site as part of its defensive responsibility. Captain Robson leads 16 Flight Glider Pilot Regiment down the same sandy track that the 1^st Reconnaissance Squadron Jeeps had used earlier, facing sporadic sniper fire and strafing runs from German aircraft. They eventually secure the wood line, from where they spot Sergeant McGregor’s lifeless body near his abandoned Jeep.

Unable to find Major-General Urquhart, Major Freddie Gough eventually finds Brigadier Lathbury’s headquarters and makes the decision to stay with them, advancing alongside the 2^nd Parachute Battalion towards the bridge. With the earlier confusion and disruption caused by communication breakdowns and German resistance, Gough assesses that his presence with Lathbury’s command will be crucial in coordinating efforts as they push towards their objective.

1st Parachute Brigade towards Arnhem

Meanwhile, Brigadier Lathbury’s 1^st Parachute Brigade prepares to quickly leave the Drop Zone and start the advance to capture Arnhem Bridge. By 15:00, the Brigade’s three battalions and their attached units are fully assembled and ready to move. The 2^nd Parachute Battalion commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Frost, accompanied by Lathbury’s Brigade Headquarters, sets off along the Lion Route, the most southern route, which follows the river, while the 3^rd Battalion commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Fitch advances via the Tiger Route along Utrechtseweg. Both battalions are tasked with securing Arnhem Bridge, with the 2^nd Battalion expected to arrive first.

Brigadier Lathbury deliberately holds back the 1^st Parachute Battalion on the drop zone for 30 minutes, as a reserve. Once ordered to advance, the 1^st Parachute Battalion commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Dobie follows the most northern route, code named, the Leopard Route, which runs parallel to the railway line towards Arnhem. Their mission is to secure the high ground north of the town, which overlooks a key road where German reinforcements are anticipated.

Meanwhile, Major Freddie Gough of the 1^st Reconnaissance Squadron, trying to locate Roy Urquhart, arrived at Divisional Headquarters only to learn that Urquhart has already departed to find Lathbury on route Lion, Major Gough continues his search, heading towards the 1^st Airlanding Brigade Headquarters near the Wolfheze level crossing. Here he encounters Lieutenant Colonel Dobie’s 1^st Parachute Battalion, having been released from reserve, is finally on the move. As Gough and Dobie discuss the German ambush blocking route Leopard, Lieutenant Colonel Dobie decides to bypass the obstacle, taking his battalion further north along the Arnhem-Ede road before heading towards his assigned blocking position north of Arnhem.

After briefing Lieutenant Colonel Dobie, Major Gough hastily set off with his three reconnaissance Jeeps along route Lion, determined to catch up with Major-General Urquhart and clarify his orders before returning to his pinned-down squadron.

During this period, Radio communication problems severely hinder 1^st Airborne Division’s Command Net, exacerbated by a powerful, unidentified station transmitting on the same frequency and effectively jamming the network. This interference disrupts Major General Roy Urquhart’s primary means of command and control, leaving him unable to communicate effectively. The combination of densely wooded terrain and the increasing distance also hampers attempts by his signal team to establish contact with Brigadier Hicks and the 1^st Airlanding Brigade.

Worried about the lack of critical information regarding the status of the future landing zones, Major-General Urquhart decides to head north towards the 1^st Airlanding Brigade headquarters at Duitsekampweg to speak directly with Brigadier Hicks and gain a firsthand understanding of the situation. Upon arrival, Urquhart discovers that Hicks’s Headquarters is also experiencing severe communication difficulties, having no viable radio link with his forward units. Therefor, Hicks has already left his headquarters to personally assess the unfolding situation at the front lines.

While at the 1^st Airlanding Brigade headquarters, Major-General Urquhart receives a misleading report that most of the gliders carrying 1^st Reconnaissance Squadron Jeeps have failed to land at their designated zone. There is no immediate reason to question the report’s authenticity, and even if there were doubts, the lack of reliable radio communication prevents verification.

Convinced that the planned Jeep coup de main at the bridge is now impossible, Urquhart quickly concludes that the success of the operation rests on the lead parachute battalions under the command of Gerald Lathbury. With the crucial element of his plan seemingly compromised, Urquhart urgently seeks to assess the 1^st Reconnaissance Squadron’s situation and orders it’s commander Freddie Gough to report to him immediately. The false report about the Reconnaissance Squadron and the communication breakdown prompts Urquhart to take decisive action. Unable to contact Lathbury by radio and uncertain of the precise location of the 1^st Parachute Brigade Headquarters, Urquhart decides to leave the 1^st Airlanding Brigade Headquarters and sets off in his Jeep to find Lathbury himself.

Major-General Urquhart moves along the southern route in pursuit of Gerald Lathbury’s headquarters. By around 17:00 hours, Urquhart finally catches up with Lathbury’s Brigade Headquarters column. The unit is trailing behind Lieutenant Colonel John Frost’s 2^nd Parachute Battalion as it pushes eastward towards the Arnhem bridges. However, upon reaching the column, Urquhart discovers that Brigadier Lathbury has left his headquarters to confer with Lieutenant Colonel John Fitch and the 3^rd Parachute Battalion, which is advancing along route Tiger. In a great hurry, Urquhart shouts from his Jeep, urging the Brigade to advance quickly before the Germans reach the bridge first. He then speeds off to find Lathbury and the 3^rd Parachute Battalion.

Some time later Major-General Urquhart is finally able to catch up with Brigadier Lathbury. This leads to the fact that both Urquhart and Lathbury now find themselves in a precarious situation. Due to German activity they are effectively being trapped with the 3^rd Parachute Battalion. Urquhart urgently needs to return to Divisional Headquarters, as the Division is leaderless without him, while Brigadier Lathbury needs to rejoin his own Headquarters, which is advancing towards the Bridge with the 2^nd Parachute Battalion. However, the area around them is too dangerous to navigate, forcing them to remain with the 3^rd Parachute Battalion until it is safe to leave. As a result, the 1^st Airborne Division is temporarily cut off from both its Commander and his deputy as is the 1^st Parachute Brigade.

Shortly after Urquhart’s arrival, a platoon from B Company of the 3^rd Parachute Battalion, leading the advance, runs a German staff car that unexpectedly appears from a side road. The occupants, including General Kussin, the town Kommandant of Arnhem, are killed, although the paratroopers do not immediately realise the significance of this encounter.

A short distance further along the road, B Company comes into contact with elements of the SS-Panzer Grenadier Ausbildungs und Ersatz Bataillon 16, which is supported by a Self-Propelled Gun. The paratroopers, unprepared for armoured resistance, suffer casualties in the ensuing firefight, struggling to find cover due to high wire fencing along the road. After knocking out the only British anti-tank gun leading the 3^rd Parachute Battalion’s advance, the German forces withdraw, allowing B Company to continue its advance.

At around 18:30, Major Dennison’s A Company, bringing up the rear of the Battalion’s column, comes under sustained machine-gun and mortar fire from nearby woods. For the next two hours, they engage in a fierce battle with the German forces. Recognising that the enemy intends to use these delaying tactics all along the Tiger Route to Arnhem, Lieutenant-Colonel Fitch, the Battalion commander, decides to detach Major Lewis’s C Company with orders to flank the German positions by moving north along the railway line.

By this point, the 3^rd Parachute Battalion becomes fragmented. With C Company detached and A Company still engaged in combat at the rear, B Company is the only unit able to advance. However, it is unsafe for them to proceed alone and further widen the gap between themselves and A Company, so the decision is made to halt at the Hotel Hartenstein in Oosterbeek until the rest of the Battalion can regroup. In the end, the 3^rd Parachute Battalion remains in this position until just before dawn the next morning, some seven hours after A Company arrives.

It is believed that Lieutenant-Colonel Fitch is eager to resume the advance during the night and follow C Company along the railway line, but his ability to make independent decisions is limited by the presence of Major-General Urquhart and Brigadier Lathbury at his battalion headquarters. Having finally reconnected, neither Lathbury nor Urquhart can move due to German forces positioned both in front of and behind the battalion. While Lathbury maintains radio communication with the other two parachute battalions, there is no radio link available for Major-General Urquhart to connect with Headquarters 1^st British Airborne Division, limiting his ability to influence the ongoing battle.

Amid discussions on their next move, Tony Hibbert proposes that the 3^rd Parachute Battalion moves along the route Lion and proceed towards the bridge under the cover of night. However, Brigadier Lathbury decides against this, opting instead for a morning advance along the river road. For now, the battalion’s advance is stalled, with the main body held in position as C Company continues its aggressive push along the railway line towards Arnhem.

By 21:30 hours, the situation report from the 2^nd Parachute Battalion is cautiously optimistic, they have reached the bridge. Although they do not control both ends, the bridge remains intact, and the battalion is securely positioned around its northern end, holding firm despite the challenges.

Meanwhile, the 1^st Parachute Battalion, advancing along the Leopard Route, encounters similar challenges to those faced by the 3^rd Parachute Battalion. Lieutenant-Colonel Dobie, upon meeting the Reconnaissance Squadron and learning of the opposition ahead, decides to outflank it by moving north onto the Amsterdamseweg main road. This new route takes the Battalion through woodland, where R Company encounters and quickly overcomes German infantry. However, upon reaching the Amsterdamseweg around 16:30, they face more significant resistance from Kampfgruppe Weber. This unit consisted of ninety men, signallers of the Nachrichten Abteilung 213, Sösterberg Fliegerhorst Battalion under the command of Hauptman Willie Weber. It came south from Deelen airfield and took up positions at the norteast corner of Landing Zone S and is supported by armored vehicles. Although this enemy force is hastily assembled and inexperienced, it effectively halts R Company’s progress, keeping them engaged in the woods until dusk.

Lieutenant Colonel Dobie’s decision to bypass the German ambush on Johannahoeveweg initially seemed wise, as he aimed to avoid skirmishes that would delay his mission to the north of Arnhem. As the battalion began moving north before turning east towards the Ede-Arnhem road, Dobie deployed ‘R’ Company ahead of the main column in a tactical formation. However, less than 1.5 kilometres along the route, R Company came under fire from German troops hidden in the woods. The paratroopers responded swiftly, skirmishing through the forest and engaging the German defenders, primarily Luftwaffe troops from Deelen airfield, later joined by armoured cars from the Reconnaissance Battalion of the 9th SS Panzer Division.

As the skirmish intensified, S Company was drawn in to support R Company, but Lieutenant Colonel Dobie remained focused on his mission and ordered his companies to break away and continue east along the forest edge, hoping to rejoin route Leopard beyond the German positions. The manoeuvre worked briefly, allowing the battalion to cover approximately 1.8 kilometres eastward before coming under fire once again. Lieutenant Colonel Dobie’s lead companies probed the new German position, only to find it unexpectedly strong, with reports indicating five tanks, numerous armoured cars, and a company-sized infantry force blocking the route.

As the situation worsened, Dobie received an urgent radio message from John Frost’s 2^nd Parachute Battalion requesting reinforcements and ammunition resupply, confirming the severe resistance encountered by British forces. Realising that his initial objectives were now unachievable, Dobie resolved to abandon his original mission and move his depleted battalion south to support Frost at the bridge.

Regrouping the battalion in darkness proved difficult, especially as R Company had suffered 50% casualties and was still reassembling after the initial clash with Luftwaffe troops and SS armoured cars. With about 100 men killed, wounded, or missing, Dobie’s battalion was in disarray. By 01:00 hours, the remnants of R Company had still not reformed, so Dobie left guides behind to assist them and ordered the battalion to march towards Arnhem.

Later that night, Major John Bune, the battalion’s Australian Second-in-Command, was killed in an ambush while guiding a Jeep convoy carrying the seriously wounded. Despite these setbacks, the wounded eventually reached British medical aid stations in Oosterbeek.

The German force that inflicted such heavy losses on the 1^st Parachute Battalion is an advanced element of the 9. SS-Panzerdivision “Hohenstaufen”, positioned as the northern shoulder of a German blocking line (Sperrlinie). It marks the end of a gruelling day for Dobie’s men, who, under the cover of darkness, continue to moves east and south through the Johanna Hoeve Wood. After several skirmishes with German patrols, the battalion finally emerges near the railway station in northern Oosterbeek, bloodied but still fighting.

Lieutenant-Colonel Frost’s 2nd Parachute Battalion dash for the bridges

Advancing along the lower Lion Route, Lieutenant-Colonel John Frost’s 2^nd Parachute Battalion faces considerably lighter resistance compared to the rest of the 1^st Parachute Brigade. Battalion Krafft, short on manpower, concentrates its defences between the railway line and Utrechtseweg, leaving the river road lightly defended by reconnaissance patrols. Lieutenant-Colonel Frost’s 2^nd Parachute Battalion is bolstered by a contingent of anti-tank guns as it advances along route Lion towards Arnhem. Frost has been allocated four 6-pounder guns from B Troop, 1^st Airlanding Anti-Tank Battery, Royal Artillery, providing critical firepower for the battalion. Additionally, a lone 6-pounder from C Troop, which had failed to link up with its intended unit at 3^rd Parachute Battalion, has also joined Frost’s force.

These anti-tank guns had been flown into Arnhem by gliders from 19 Flight of the Glider Pilot Regiment. With their primary task complete, half of the flight’s pilots, eighteen glider pilots, have now taken up a new role, forming an impromptu defence platoon to protect the valuable artillery. As a result, the glider pilots find themselves embedded within Frost’s battalion as it progresses cautiously along route Lion, weaving through the increasingly perilous terrain towards their objective at Arnhem Bridge.

Despite encountering some resistance, Major Tatham-Warter’s A Company, leading the advance, swiftly and efficiently clears the way. Shortly after leaving the drop zones, Lieutenant McDermont’s No. 3 Platoon ambushes a convoy of lorries, likely carrying elements of 2. Kompanie, SS-Panzer Grenadier Ausbildungs und Ersatz Bataillon 16. The ambush results in the death or capture of 30 German soldiers. As A Company proceeds, they encounter light mortar fire in nearby woods, but Lieutenant Grayburn’s No. 2 Platoon quickly disperses the attackers with a smokescreen-covered charge.

As they reach Oosterbeek, the Battalion is warmly welcomed by the local Dutch population, who, dressed in orange, offer food and drink to the advancing paratroopers. Officers and Non-Commissioned Officers ensure that the enthusiastic welcome does not impede their progress, and the sound of gunfire ahead soon encourages the civilians to return to their homes.

The 2^nd Parachute Battalion’s mission is complex. In addition to securing Arnhem Road Bridge, codenamed Waterloo, they are tasked with capturing a railway bridge 5.5 kilometres west of Arnhem , code-named Charing Cross, and a small German pontoon bridge within the town. C Company supported by engineers from 9^th (Airborne) Field Company, Royal Engineers, moves away from the main battalion after passing through Oosterbeek. Their mission is to secure the railway bridge over the Lower Rhine. Once the bridge is secured, the plan is to cross to the southern bank and advance east towards the southern end of the road bridge. Another company is tasked with following behind, securing the pontoon bridge, and joining the rest of the force at the southern ramp of the main bridge. Their goal is not only to capture the railway Bridge but also to cross the Rhine and position themselves to attack the southern end of Arnhem Bridge, allowing the Battalion to control both ends.

Around 17:00 C Company reaches the railroad bridge to capture the structure. Lieutenant Barry’s No. 9 Platoon leads the assault on the railway bridge under covering fire and a smokescreen provided by No. 8 Platoon and the Battalion’s mortars.

However, the assault does not go as planned. As one platoon approaches the railway bridge, they climb the embankment and position sections to provide covering fire. The lead section cautiously moves onto the bridge without immediate resistance. To screen their advance, a smoke grenade is deployed, and the men begin to move across the span. They manage about 45 metres before losing smoke cover, forcing them to halt as they assess the next move. At this critical moment, German forces detonate demolition charges pre-set on the bridge. The central span collapses into the river, destroying Charing Cross and preventing any crossing. German machine-gun fire sweeps the remaining span, wounding several troops. The section retreats down an access stairway, narrowly escaping further casualties.

The sound of the explosion echoes across the battlefield. Nearby troops hear the sharp crack of rifle and machine-gun fire, followed by the enormous blast as the railway bridge crumbles. Livestock grazing near the bridge collapse as if stunned by the shockwave. The sudden resistance catches the advancing forces off guard, halting their progress and forcing a reassessment of their situation. The destruction of the railway bridge drastically alters the dynamics of the planned advance, leaving the assault force exposed and scrambling to adjust their strategy in the face of this unexpected setback.

This explosion spares the platoon from certain disaster, but a sniper’s bullet wounds Barry, and another soldier is killed. With the bridge now destroyed, Lieutenant-Colonel Frost orders C Company to withdraw and rejoin the main Battalion, redirecting them to capture a German headquarters in Arnhem. Although this means the southern bank of the Rhine remains unsecured, Frost is somewhat relieved to have all his companies on the northern side of the river.

At this point, Brigadier Lathbury arrives to speak with Frost and delivers the unfortunate news that the 1^st Reconnaissance Squadron has been unable to secure the bridge ahead of them. Aware that the Germans now fully understand the scale of the attack and the strategic importance of the road bridge, Lathbury urges Frost to advance with all possible speed. After this, Brigadier Lathbury departs to meet with the 3^rd Parachute Battalion, emphasising the urgency of pushing forward aggressively toward the bridge area as their primary objective.

As A Company nears Arnhem, they come under fire from an armoured car, which quickly retreats when an anti-tank gun is brought forward. The company continues its advance but is soon halted by a machine-gun position on Den Brink, a high ground overlooking their route. Here, the resistance is stronger, as it includes troops from the 9. SS-Panzer Division. To prevent delays, B Company is tasked with clearing the position. However, as Lieutenant Cane’s No. 6 Platoon attempts to move into position, they come under fire from another machine-gun, resulting in Cane’s death along with three other soldiers and several wounded. While B Company manages to fight their way onto Den Brink, they are unable to fully dislodge the enemy. They do, however, succeed in pinning down the German forces until nightfall, when the machine-gun post loses visibility of the British troops below.

It becomes evident that the local German forces are being organized to prevent the British from reaching the road bridge, but so far, there has been no significant counterattack from heavier forces.

As darkness falls, A Company enters Arnhem, meeting sporadic resistance that they quickly neutralise. Armoured cars occasionally appear to slow their progress, but Major Tatham-Warter skillfully avoids unnecessary confrontations by leading his men through houses and gardens. Frost himself employs this tactic, at one point leading the entire Battalion through the back of a house and out the front door, much to the surprise of the homeowner. As they advance into the town, they encounter no major resistance, though small arms fire forces the leading troops, including Frost, to navigate through back gardens and around houses to avoid enemy roadblocks and snipers. They eventually reach the area near the pontoon bridge, leaving a small group to guard it, although the bridge is of little immediate use since its center section is moored on the opposite side of the river. This bridge had been an objective for B Company, but they are still engaged with the enemy at den Brink.

As dusk falls, A Company maintains the lead in the advance along the riverbank, progressing steadily while inflicting heavy losses on the German forces and capturing over forty prisoners. By 2000 hours, the forward sections of A Company reach the road bridge, now shrouded in darkness. The paratroopers take cover beneath the structure and listen as German vehicles move across the river above, highlighting the importance of their position. Remarkably, the approach to the northern end is free of enemy fire. Surprisingly, no Germans are defending the long ramp leading up to the bridge. Although there are Germans on the bridge, mostly gathered around a pillbox at the end of the ramp, they appear unaware of Frost’s men arriving. The town end of the bridge is also clear of enemy forces, allowing the British troops to arrive without interference. John Frost orders his troops to occupy the large buildings around the northern ramp of the bridge, and they immediately set about fortifying these positions against an expected counter-attack.

Frost’s men are fortunate, as only two hours earlier, a force of thirty armoured cars and tracked vehicles from 9. SS-Panzer-Aufklärungs Abteilung of the 9. SS-Panzerdivision “Hohenstaufen”, led by SS-Hauptsturmführer Gräbner, has crossed the bridge on their way to Nijmegen to recon the area between Arnhem and the American landings. Now, the area is quiet, except for a solitary German truck that crosses the bridge, its driver seemingly unaware of the British paratroopers’ presence. In complete silence, Grayburn and his platoon quickly secure positions along the ramp. Within minutes, A Company and Lieutenant-Colonel Frost arrive. Upon arriving at the bridge, there is a sense of disappointment when no sign of the 3^rd Parachute Battalion is found. By this time, Fitch’s battalion was expected to have established a position at the bridge. Nevertheless, A Company secures positions at the northern end of Arnhem Bridge. The company, having eliminated or captured around 150 German soldiers at the cost of one killed and a few wounded, is satisfied with their progress. Lieutenant-Colonel Frost, concerned that the Germans might destroy the bridge before his arrival, is relieved to find it intact and under British control. Despite some German commanders advocating for the destruction of key bridges to thwart the operation, Feldmarschall Model insists on keeping them intact for his planned counter-offensive.

Realising the situation, Frost quickly organises the men from his battalion who have arrived, setting up an all-round defensive perimeter while waiting for reinforcements. He is relieved to see that the bridge is still intact, unlike the rail bridge, which had been destroyed.

At around 20:45, the brigade headquarters group arrives to join Frost, nearly doubling the number of men at the bridge. Despite this, Frost’s force remains well below its full strength, as B and C Companies are still missing, and several men were lost during the march to the bridge. Nonetheless, they prepare to hold their position as they await further support.

The first attempt to cross the bridge is made by Lieutenant Jack Grayburn who leads his men in an attempt to seize the southern end of the bridge. He is met with intense fire from a pillbox and a German armoured car stationed further back, forcing his platoon to withdraw. While Grayburn reorganises his men and recovers the wounded, the rest of the 2^nd Parachute Battalion fortifies the northern ramp. Engineers from the 1^st Parachute Squadron, Royal Engineers, work under the bridge to check for demolition charges, and Frost establishes his headquarters in one of the nearby houses. During these preparations, the eighteen Glider Pilots and the four 6-pounder anti-tank guns from the 1^st Airlanding Anti-Tank Battery, Royal Artillery, which are positioned to help secure the bridge.

One of these guns, under the command of Sergeant Shelswell, targets the pillbox that has been holding up Grayburn’s men. Pushed into a firing position about 90 metres from the pillbox, the 6-pounder fires several rounds, suppressing the enemy fire. A flame-thrower is then brought forward to finish the job, dousing the pillbox with fuel. A PIAT is used to ignite the fuel, setting off a dramatic explosion that destroys a wooden shed behind the German position, which was unknowingly stocked with ammunition. The ensuing fire spreads to the freshly painted bridge, illuminating the area and making further British assaults impossible for the night.

As the bridge burns, Frost assesses his situation. His battalion, having captured the northern end, is now isolated. The railway bridge has been destroyed, and the pontoon bridge remains under German control. B Company holds a position near the pontoon bridge after clearing Den Brink, while C Company is still engaged in their secondary task of seizing a German headquarters in the town. The light from the fire strips away any cover of darkness, exposing Frost’s men to potential attacks.

Frost considers the achievements of the day: A Company has fought through eight miles of difficult terrain from the drop zone to seize the bridge in just six hours, overcoming significant resistance and inflicting over 100 German casualties. However, the inability to secure the southern end of the bridge poses a significant obstacle. With no boats available for a river crossing and no access to the pontoon bridge, Frost decides to hold a tight defensive perimeter around the northern end and wait for the rest of the brigade to arrive by morning.

At this stage, the force at the bridge comprises around 600 men from various units, including parts of Frost’s battalion, sappers, anti-tank troops, Recce Squadron Headquarters, a Royal Army Service Corps platoon, and several Glider Pilots. Despite being a mixed force, they are experienced airborne soldiers. The biggest concern is the lack of communication with the rest of the division; despite repeated attempts by signallers to establish contact, there is no response.

As Frost surveys the burning bridge and considers his next moves, he wonders about the whereabouts of the rest of the brigade. Unbeknownst to him, Lathbury and Urquhart are currently at the 3^rd Parachute Battalion Headquarters, preparing to continue the offensive at first light. Despite the mounting challenges, Urquhart remains cautiously optimistic, relying on Frost’s position at the bridge as a critical foothold. However, the strength and speed of the German counter-attacks have proven far greater than anticipated, posing a serious challenge to their plans.

During the night, a few enemy lorries attempt to cross the bridge from the south but are quickly destroyed by Frost’s men, leaving them burning on the road. With the flames illuminating the night, it becomes clear that there is no possibility of getting troops onto the bridge while the fires rage.

German Defences

Around 16:00 the advance guard of 9. SS-Panzer Division arrives along the Amsterdam Road. While SS-Panzer Grenadier Ausbildungs und Ersatz Bataillon 16 is blocking the two most northern routes of the 1^st Airborne towards the bridge more and more small units join the baataillon. By 18:00 larger units from the 9. SS-Panzer Division with all available local troops collect in Arnhem to block access to Arnhem along the centre route into the town. By 20:00 Kampfgruppe Spindler of the 9. SS-Panzer Division establishes a strong defence line barring all northern routes into the town. Other Kampfgruppen are rapidly organised to counter the British advance. Among them is Kampfgruppe Muller, composed of artillery companies and engineers. This group soon engages British paratroopers on the western outskirts of Arnhem, near the position held by Kampfgruppe Spindler. Later that day, Krafft’s forces link up with Muller, and additional quick-reaction units are assembled and deployed against the British.

By 21:30, SS-Sturmbannführer Krafft realises that his blocking line is at risk of being outflanked and orders his men to withdraw to an assembly area to the northeast. However, his position has already been bypassed by B and C Companies of the 3^rd Parachute Battalion to the south, and by the 1^st Parachute Battalion maneuvering behind him to the north. Despite this, Krafft’s forces manage to retreat safely towards the line fromKampfgruppe Spindler. His troops succeed in delaying the majority of the 1^st Parachute Brigade, which should have reached Arnhem by nightfall but instead covers only half the distance to the Bridge. Krafft’s efforts also allow the 9. SS-Panzerdivision “Hohenstaufen” of the II SS-Panzer Korps to begin establishing stronger defences closer to Arnhem. while reorganising several small units, like Kampfgruppe Weber, are placed under his command. By nightfall, all the dispersed German units around Arnhem have been integrated into the defensive line established by Kampfgruppe Spindler. The German response to the landings is swift and highly effective.

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