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| April 27th, 2025 |
| Last Updated |
| May 14th, 2025 |
| Great Britain |
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| Founded |
| June 13th, 1940 |
| Disbanded |
| January 15th, 1946 |
| Theater of Operations |
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| Organisational History |
The Special Operations Executive is formed through the merger of three existing secret departments, all established shortly before the outbreak of the Second World War. Following Germany’s annexation of Austria (the Anschluss) in March 1938, the Foreign Office creates a propaganda organisation known as Department EH, named after its headquarters at Electra House and directed by the Canadian newspaper magnate Sir Campbell Stuart. Later that same month, the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS, also known as MI6) establishes Section D, with Major Lawrence Grand at its head, tasked with exploring the use of sabotage, propaganda, and other irregular methods to weaken enemy forces. During the autumn of 1938, the War Office expands an existing research section known as GS(R), appointing Major J. C. Holland to conduct studies into guerrilla warfare. This department is subsequently renamed Military Intelligence (Research), or MI(R), in early 1939.
Until the outbreak of war, these three organisations operate with limited resources and considerable overlap. Section D and Department EH frequently duplicate each other’s work, although cooperation between Section D and MI(R) is more effective, with their respective heads maintaining close communication. A general division of responsibility is agreed: MI(R) focuses on irregular operations to be conducted by regular, uniformed troops, while Section D undertakes clandestine activities.
During the early months of the war, Section D is first based at St Ermin’s Hotel in Westminster, then moves to the Metropole Hotel near Trafalgar Square. One of its early undertakings, an attempt to mine the Iron Gate on the River Danube to disrupt vital strategic supplies to Germany, proves unsuccessful. Meanwhile, MI(R) produces instructional pamphlets and technical manuals for guerrilla leaders and plays a role in the establishment of the Independent Companies, which are intended for sabotage and guerrilla operations during the Norwegian Campaign. MI(R) is also instrumental in the formation of the Auxiliary Units, designed as stay-behind commando forces drawn from the Home Guard to resist a potential Axis invasion of Britain.
| Formation |
The formal establishment of the Special Operations Executive occurs on June 13th, 1940, at the instigation of newly appointed Prime Minister Winston Churchill. Acting on Churchill’s instruction, Lord Hankey persuades Section D and MI(R) to coordinate their efforts. By July 1st, 1940, a Cabinet-level meeting agrees on the creation of a single sabotage organisation, and on July 16th, 1940, Hugh Dalton, the Minister of Economic Warfare, is appointed to take political responsibility for the new body. On July 20th, 1940, the Special Operations Executive is formally established. Dalton notes in his diary that Churchill instructed him, “And now go and set Europe ablaze.” Dalton models the new organisation partly on the activities of the Irish Republican Army during the Irish War of Independence.
Sir Frank Nelson, nominated by the Secret Intelligence Service, is appointed the first Director of the Special Operations Executive. A senior civil servant, Gladwyn Jebb, transfers from the Foreign Office to serve as Chief Executive Officer. Campbell Stuart departs the organisation, and Major Grand returns to the regular army. Major Holland, at his own request, also leaves to take up a commission in the Royal Engineers. Both Grand and Holland ultimately achieve the rank of Major-General. Meanwhile, Brigadier Colin Gubbins, Holland’s former deputy at MI(R), returns from commanding the Auxiliary Units to become Director of Operations at the Special Operations Executive.
One department of MI(R), MI(R)C, which is engaged in developing weapons for irregular warfare, remains outside the Special Operations Executive structure. It becomes an independent body known as MD1, directed by Major (later Lieutenant Colonel) Millis Jefferis and based at The Firs in Whitchurch, Buckinghamshire. Popularly referred to as “Churchill’s Toyshop” due to Churchill’s personal interest and support, MD1 plays a significant role in supplying innovative weapons for special operations.
The Director of the Special Operations Executive is usually referred to within the organisation by the initials “CD”. Nelson, the first to hold the post, brings to the role experience as a former head of a trading firm in India, a Conservative Member of Parliament, and a British Consul in Basel, Switzerland, where he had engaged in clandestine intelligence work.
In February 1942, Dalton is removed as the political head of the Special Operations Executive. There are competing explanations for his dismissal: some suggest it is due to his use of the Special Operations Executive’s telephone tapping facilities to eavesdrop on fellow Labour ministers; others argue it is because he is viewed as too sympathetic to communist ideas and a potential threat to Secret Intelligence Service interests. Dalton is reassigned as President of the Board of Trade. His successor, Lord Selborne, as Minister of Economic Warfare, oversees significant changes within the Special Operations Executive.
Selborne subsequently retires Sir Frank Nelson, who by this time is suffering ill health, and appoints Sir Charles Hambro as Director. Hambro, head of Hambros Bank and a decorated veteran of the First World War, retains several other prominent positions, including directorships in business and on the Great Western Railway Board. Some colleagues and subordinates express concern that these external commitments distract him from his duties as Director of the Special Operations Executive. Nevertheless, Selborne and Hambro cooperate closely until mid-1943, when tensions arise over the question of the Special Operations Executive’s future autonomy.
Hambro opposes proposals to integrate Special Operations Executive operations more closely with those of the British Army, fearing that the loss of independence would undermine the organisation’s effectiveness. Simultaneously, Hambro is found to have withheld vital information from Selborne, leading to his dismissal. Hambro is subsequently appointed to head a raw materials purchasing commission in Washington, D.C., involved in wartime atomic energy exchanges.
In September 1943, as part of a broader realignment between the Special Operations Executive and the Imperial General Staff, Major-General Colin Gubbins is appointed Director of the Special Operations Executive. Gubbins, who possesses extensive experience in commando and clandestine operations, has played a leading role in Special Operations Executive and MI(R) activities since the early stages of the war. Under Gubbins’ leadership, the Special Operations Executive benefits from the practical application of many lessons drawn from his earlier experience with the Irish Republican Army during the Irish War of Independence.
| Objectives |
As with its leadership and organisation, the aims and objectives of the Special Operations Executive evolve throughout the war, although they consistently centre on sabotaging and subverting the Axis war effort through indirect methods. On occasion, the Special Operations Executive carries out operations with direct military objectives, such as Operation Harling, which is initially designed to sever one of the Axis supply lines supporting their forces in North Africa.
The organisation also undertakes several high-profile missions aimed primarily at impacting morale, both among Axis forces and within the occupied nations. However, more generally, the objectives of the Special Operations Executive include fomenting mutual hatred between the populations of Axis-occupied countries and their occupiers, and compelling the Axis powers to expend manpower and resources in maintaining their hold over these subjugated territories.
The initial strategic outline for the methods to be employed by the Special Operations Executive includes “industrial and military sabotage, labour agitation and strikes, continuous propaganda, terrorist attacks against traitors and German leaders, boycotts and riots.” Early enthusiasm within the organisation for encouraging widespread strikes, civil disobedience, and acts of sabotage across Axis-occupied territories is ultimately curtailed, as operational realities and wider strategic considerations necessitate a more restrained and coordinated approach.
Subsequently, two primary objectives emerge, often proving mutually incompatible: the sabotage of the Axis war effort, and the establishment of secret armies that would rise to support the liberation of their countries when Allied forces approach or arrive. It is recognised that acts of sabotage would inevitably provoke reprisals and lead to heightened Axis security measures, thereby complicating efforts to build effective underground armies. Nevertheless, as the tide of war turns increasingly in the Allies’ favour, the importance of these secret armies becomes ever more pronounced.
| Organisation |
The organisation of the Special Operations Executive continually evolves and changes throughout the course of the war. Initially, it consists of three broad departments: SO1, formerly Department EH, responsible for propaganda; SO2, formerly Section D, charged with operations; and SO3, formerly MI(R), overseeing research.
SO3 quickly becomes overwhelmed with administrative work and is merged into SO2. In August 1941, following disputes between the Ministry of Economic Warfare and the Ministry of Information regarding their respective responsibilities, SO1 is removed from the Special Operations Executive and reconstituted as an independent organisation, the Political Warfare Executive.
From that point onwards, a single, broad Operations Department controls both the sections operating within enemy and, on occasion, neutral territories, as well as the selection and training of agents. Sections, typically identified by code letters or letter groups, are assigned to individual countries. In certain cases, multiple sections are designated to a single country to accommodate politically diverse resistance movements; France, for example, is assigned no fewer than six separate sections.
For security reasons, each section maintains its own headquarters and training facilities. This strict compartmentalisation proves so effective that, by mid-1942, five governments-in-exile jointly propose the establishment of a unified sabotage organisation and are taken aback to learn that the Special Operations Executive has already been operating for two years.
Four departments, along with several smaller units, fall under the control of the Director of Scientific Research, Professor Dudley Maurice Newitt, and are concerned with the development, acquisition, and production of specialised equipment. Other sections focus on finance, security, economic research, and administration. It is notable that the Special Operations Executive operates without a central registry or unified filing system throughout most of the war.
Following the appointment of Major-General Colin Gubbins as Director, administrative practices which had evolved in a largely ad hoc manner are formalised. Gubbins appoints an Establishment Officer responsible for managing the manpower and logistical needs of the various departments.
The principal controlling body within the Special Operations Executive is its Council, comprising approximately fifteen heads of departments or sections. Around half of the Council’s members are drawn from the armed forces, although some are specialists who only receive their commissions following the outbreak of hostilities. The remainder include civil servants, lawyers, businessmen, and industrial experts. Recruitment into the Special Operations Executive, particularly among the senior officers and key functionaries, is often conducted by word of mouth, favouring alumni of public schools and Oxbridge colleges. However, this background does not notably influence the organisation’s political outlook.
Several subsidiary stations of the Special Operations Executive are established to manage operations deemed too distant for direct control from London.
Operations in the Middle East and the Balkans are directed from a headquarters based in Cairo, an establishment that quickly becomes notorious for its poor security, internal conflicts, and rivalries with other agencies. In April 1944, this station is formally named “Special Operations (Mediterranean)”, abbreviated as SO(M). Shortly after the Allied landings in North Africa, a station codenamed “Massingham” is established near Algiers in late 1942 to oversee operations into southern France. Following the Allied invasion of Italy, personnel from Massingham go on to establish forward stations at Brindisi and near Naples.
A subsidiary headquarters, initially designated “Force 133”, is subsequently set up in Bari in southern Italy, under the overall authority of the Cairo headquarters, to coordinate operations in the Balkans, including activities in Greece and northern Italy.
A Special Operations Executive station, initially referred to as the “India Mission” and later known as “GS I(k)”, is established in India towards the end of 1940. It is later relocated to Ceylon to be closer to the headquarters of the Allied South East Asia Command, and becomes known as “Force 136”.
Simultaneously, a “Singapore Mission” is set up alongside the India Mission. However, it is unable to overcome official opposition to its efforts to form resistance movements in Malaya prior to the Japanese occupation of Singapore. Following this setback, Force 136 absorbs the surviving personnel and operations.
In addition, a branch office is established in New York City, formally titled “British Security Coordination”, under the leadership of Canadian businessman Sir William Stephenson. Located at Room 3603, 630 Fifth Avenue, Rockefeller Center, this office coordinates the activities of the Special Operations Executive, the Secret Intelligence Service, and MI5, working closely with the American FBI and the Office of Strategic Services.
| Disbandment |
In late 1944, as it becomes evident that the war will soon draw to a close, Lord Selborne advocates for the retention of the Special Operations Executive or a similar body, proposing that it should report directly to the Ministry of Defence. Anthony Eden, the Foreign Secretary, insists that his department, already responsible for the Secret Intelligence Service, should assume control over the Special Operations Executive or its successor.
The Joint Intelligence Committee, which holds a broad coordinating role over Britain’s intelligence services and operations, expresses the view that although the Special Operations Executive is a more effective organisation than the Secret Intelligence Service, it would be unwise to divide responsibility for espionage and direct action between separate ministries, or to permit special operations outside the ultimate authority of the Chiefs of Staff.
The debate continues for several months. Churchill takes no immediate decision on the matter. Following his loss in the general election on July 5th, 1945, the issue falls to the new Labour Prime Minister, Clement Attlee. Lord Selborne informs Attlee that the Special Operations Executive still maintains a worldwide network of clandestine radio stations and sympathisers. Attlee, however, responds that he has no desire to own a “British Comintern” and orders the closure of Selborne’s network within 48 hours.
The Special Operations Executive is officially dissolved on January 15th, 1946. Some of its senior staff transition easily into positions within the financial services sector in the City of London, although some retain an undercover mentality that does little to enhance the City’s reputation. The majority of the Special Operations Executive’s personnel return to their pre-war civilian occupations or to regular service within the armed forces. Nevertheless, 280 members are absorbed into the newly formed “Special Operations Branch” of MI6.
This intake includes both former field agents and training and research staff, whose expertise is highly prized. However, Sir Stewart Menzies, the Chief of the Secret Intelligence Service (commonly referred to as “C”), soon concludes that maintaining a separate Special Operations Branch is unsound. He merges its functions into the general structure of MI6.
Major-General Colin Gubbins, the final Director of the Special Operations Executive, is not offered further employment within the Army.